The Supreme Court of India has held that an offence of robbery under Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 cannot be sustained solely on uncorroborated allegations when no stolen property or incriminating material is recovered from the accused. A Division Bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar partly allowed an appeal against a Bombay High Court order, altering the appellant’s conviction from voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery (Section 394) to voluntarily causing grievous hurt (Section 325). Taking into account that the 63–64-year-old appellant had already undergone approximately ten months of incarceration and the incident dated back over three decades, the Court reduced his substantive sentence to the period already undergone.
Background of the Case
The case dates back to the night of January 23, 1993. The complainant, her husband, and their minor daughter resided in a three-room farmhouse situated on their agricultural land. Following dinner, the complainant was asleep on a cot on the porch, her daughter was sleeping nearby on the floor, and her husband was irrigating their onion crop near a field well.
According to the prosecution, four assailants entered the premises. Woken by her daughter’s shouts, the complainant found the appellant sitting beside her on the cot. He threatened her with a knife at her neck. When she resisted and attempted to seize the weapon, she sustained a hand injury. The appellant then punched her in the face, knocking out an upper tooth, and allegedly snatched her gold mangalsutra and dorle, weighing around five tolas and valued at ₹4,000. Another assailant took the daughter inside the house and assaulted her, while the remaining two tied the husband’s hands. The intruders subsequently fled along the railway tracks.
An FIR was registered at Police Station Manmad City under Section 394 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The complainant and her family were examined that night at the Rural Hospital, Manmad by Dr. Lalchand Jadhav. Following investigation, charges were framed against the appellant and one Kailas (Accused No. 2), while two co-assailants could not be traced.
The Additional Sessions Judge, Malegaon convicted the appellant under Section 394 of the IPC, sentencing him to seven years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,000. On appeal, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dismissed his appeal on January 16, 2026, affirming the conviction and sentence, while acquitting Accused No. 2 of charges under Section 376 of the IPC. The appellant thereafter approached the Supreme Court.
Contentions of the Parties
The appellant challenged his conviction primarily on the issue of identification. It was argued that the incident occurred late at night, the assailants’ faces were covered, no Test Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted, and the appellant was shown to the witnesses by the police following his arrest. The defense also pointed out that during cross-examination, both the complainant’s husband and daughter stated that the assailants were not previously known to them.
On the other hand, the prosecution relied on the prompt lodging of the FIR within four hours of the incident, the consistent testimony of the complainant identifying the appellant by name and residence, the corroboration offered by her family members, and the supporting medical evidence documenting injuries sustained by the victim.
The Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court first addressed the challenge to the appellant’s identity, affirming the concurrent findings of the courts below. The Bench noted that the FIR was lodged at 1:50 a.m., within four hours of the occurrence, where the complainant explicitly named the appellant and detailed their prior acquaintance. The husband corroborated that the appellant visited their village to meet relatives, the porch bulb was switched on throughout the hour-long incident, and the appellant had sat directly on the cot confronting the complainant. Consequently, the Court held that the absence of a Test Identification Parade was not fatal to the prosecution’s case.
However, the Bench found merit in questioning the sustainability of the conviction under Section 394 of the IPC, underscoring that robbery is an indispensable ingredient of the offence:
“The robbery or attempted robbery is not at all a peripheral circumstance and is rather an essential component of the offense. In the present case, such allegation of robbery rests entirely upon the assertion of the complainant that the appellant snatched her mangalsutra and dorle from her neck. There was no recovery of the alleged jewellery and nothing incriminating was seized from the appellant’s possession either. There was no purchase receipt or any other material establishing the identity or value of the articles, as admitted by the complainant herself in cross-examination. Though the High Court relied on the observation in the spot panchanama that wooden tulsi beads and black beads were found scattered on the porch, these beads were never connected through evidence to the mangalsutra, and only pieces of rope were exhibited and their seizure from the spot proved through Subhash Kisan Kakad (PW-3), one of two panch witnesses, before the Trial Court. Therefore, in our considered opinion, we cannot sustain the conviction under Section 394 of the IPC.“
Invoking Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding to Section 245 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the Court noted that an accused charged with an offence consisting of several particulars may be convicted of a minor cognate offence if established by the facts. The Bench referenced the decision in Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi vs. State of U.P. (2011 INSC 546), which recognized the principle of cognate offences enabling courts to convict an offender for a minor offence whose essentials are met by the record, even if originally charged with a major offence.
Examining the injuries, the Court observed that while the medical officer recorded an incised wound on the complainant’s left hand measuring 7 x 1/2 x 1/2 cm, no knife or weapon was recovered or linked to the injury, and the wound was relatively shallow, ruling out Section 326 of the IPC.
Nevertheless, the Court found conclusive proof that the appellant struck the complainant in the face, causing her left upper incisor tooth to fall out. Because the dislocation or fracture of a tooth falls squarely within the definition of “grievous hurt” under Section 320 of the IPC, the Bench altered the conviction to Section 325 of the IPC.
Sentencing and Final Order
On the question of sentence, the Court noted that the appellant was detained for 91 days in 1993, remained on bail during the lengthy proceedings, and surrendered on February 27, 2026, serving a total of about ten months. Highlighting his present age of 63–64 years, the Bench referred to the precedent in Mathai vs. State of Kerala (2005 INSC 30), quoting:
“In the instant case considering the size of the stone which was used, as revealed by material on record, it cannot be said that a dangerous weapon was used. Therefore, the conviction is altered to Section 325 IPC. No hard and fast rule can be applied for assessing a proper sentence and a long passage of time cannot always be a determinative factor so far as sentence is concerned. It is not in dispute that a major portion of the sentence awarded has been suffered by the appellant. On the peculiar facts of the case we restrict it to the period already undergone.“
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, convicting the appellant under Section 325 of the IPC and restricting his substantive sentence to the period of imprisonment already undergone, while maintaining the fine of ₹1,000. The Court ordered his immediate release, provided he was not required in any other case.
Case Title: Appa v. The State of Maharashtra
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 4766 of 2026 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 4575 of 2026)
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar
Date: October 07, 2026
