The Supreme Court of India, comprising a Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria, has set aside the conviction and 10-year rigorous imprisonment awarded to a man under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, and Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Clarifying the statutory scope of the reverse burden of proof, the Court held that the legal presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act is rebuttable and does not relieve the prosecution of its initial obligation to establish foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt. Finding that the ocular evidence was riddled with irreconcilable contradictions, the forensic and medical examinations ruled out sexual assault, and the complaint was triggered by a neighborhood water dispute, the Bench ordered the immediate release of the appellant.
Background of the Case
The criminal proceedings originated from a complaint lodged on December 11, 2015, at Kalkaji Police Station by the mother of a 2.5-year-old girl. According to the complainant (PW-5), her daughter went missing while playing outside their jhuggi on the evening of December 9, 2015. She was informed by her brother-in-law (PW-6A) that their neighbor Deepak (the appellant) had taken the toddler to Hans Raj City Park. The mother alleged that upon locating the appellant and her daughter at the park, she brought the child home. The child fell asleep and, upon waking, began crying while pulling at her pyjami. The mother claimed she noticed blood on the clothing, and the toddler allegedly indicated that the appellant had subjected her to sexual assault.
The victim was purportedly taken that evening to a private practitioner, Dr. Rajesh Parthasarthy (PW-1), who advised them to approach the police. Following an inquiry, charges were framed, and the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-01 (Special POCSO Court), South-East, Saket Courts, convicted the appellant on August 21, 2023, under Section 363 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, sentencing him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. On July 3, 2025, the High Court of Delhi dismissed the appellant’s appeal, holding that the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act shifted the burden entirely onto the accused to establish his innocence.
Submissions of the Parties
Appearing for the appellant, learned counsel Mr. Pulkit Prakash argued that the prosecution’s case suffered from glaring contradictions between the oral testimonies and the medical findings. The counsel pointed out that the forensic examination failed to detect any blood, semen, or male DNA on the seized articles, thereby demolishing the allegation of penetrative assault. Furthermore, the defense established that the complainant and the accused shared a common water source, and ongoing quarrels over water collection provided a clear motive for false implication.
Opposing the appeal, learned Additional Solicitor General Mr. Davinder Pal Singh, representing the State, submitted that the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court warranted no interference. The State argued that the discrepancies in the testimonies were of a peripheral nature and could not overshadow the gravity of the offence committed against a child of tender age. It was contended that the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act applied with full force against the accused.
The Court’s Analysis
Addressing the appreciation of evidence, the Supreme Court noted that the testimonies of the mother (PW-5) and the private doctor (PW-1) displayed manifest contradictions. While Dr. Parthasarthy testified that the mother brought the child to his clinic between 4:00 PM and 5:00 PM alone, the mother asserted that she visited him at 9:30 PM accompanied by her husband. The doctor admitted that he neither prepared case records nor administered any first aid. Although he claimed to have phoned the police station, none of the examined police personnel corroborated receiving such a call. The Court also observed that the mother made material improvements during trial that were absent in the First Information Report (FIR).
Crucially, the Court observed that the ocular assertions were thoroughly dismantled by the scientific and medical evidence. Dr. Varnit, who physically examined the child at AIIMS (deposed to by Dr. Mansi, PW-7), found no injuries, no bloodstains over the vulval region, and noted that the hymen was intact. Furthermore, Dr. Naresh Kumar, the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) expert (PW-8), deposed that biological and DNA examinations on the seven seized parcels revealed no semen, no male DNA, and no blood on the victim’s pyjami.
The prosecution placed reliance on State of U.P. vs. Babul Nath to argue that the absence of injuries or semen does not ipso facto disprove rape. However, the Bench distinguished the precedent, observing that the medical evidence and the FSL report in the present case completely excluded the possibility of any penetrative act.
Assessing whether the mother could be treated as a “sterling witness,” the Court referred to the principles articulated in Rai Sandeep alias Deepu vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and reiterated in Ganesan vs. State:
“…..the ‘sterling witness’ should be of a very high quality and calibre whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused.”
The Bench concluded that the mother’s version failed this test due to major omissions, gaps, and total divergence from the scientific evidence. Furthermore, admissions elicited during her cross-examination substantiated the defense version that the families shared a single municipal tap among four households and had frequent disputes regarding water fetching, establishing a credible motive for lodging a vindictive complaint.
Interpretation of Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act
A central focus of the judgment was the application of statutory presumptions. The Court held that trial courts must not analyze evidence under the oppressive shadow of Section 29 (presumption of commission of offences) and Section 30 (presumption of culpable mental state). Citing the Bombay High Court ruling in Navin Dhaniram Baraiye vs. State of Maharashtra, the Bench reiterated:
“It cannot be countenanced that the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act is absolute. It would come into operation only when the prosecution is first able to establish facts that would form the foundation for the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act to operate.”
The Court observed that presumptive provisions operate merely as a rule shifting the evidential burden once the prosecution adduces basic and foundational facts. Drawing parallels with reverse burden provisions in statutes such as the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985, the Bench cited Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab, Naresh Kumar alias Nitu vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, and Gangadhar alias Gangaram vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, emphasizing:
“An initial burden exists upon the prosecution and only when it stands satisfied, would the legal burden shift. Even then, the standard of proof required for the accused to prove his innocence is not as high as that of the prosecution. Whereas the standard of proof required to prove the guilt of the accused on the prosecution is ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ but it is ‘preponderance of probability’ on the accused.”
Referring to V.D. Jhingan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Court underscored that an accused discharging a statutory reverse burden is required to establish his defense solely on the standard of preponderance of probability. Quoting Trilok Chand Jain vs. State of Delhi, the Bench noted:
“If the story set up by the prosecution inherently militates against or is inconsistent with the fact presumed, the presumption will be rendered sterile from its very inception, if out of judicial courtesy it cannot be rejected out of hand as stillborn.”
Reiterating the constitutional protections under Article 21 and the landmark decision in Kali Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, the Supreme Court stated:
“The guilt of the accused has to be adjudged not by the fact that a vast number of people believe him to be guilty but whether his guilt has been established by the evidence brought on record……”
The Court held that statutory presumptions cannot override the foundational principle of criminal law: where two views are reasonably possible, the view favoring the accused must prevail.
Decision of the Court
The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption by exposing the inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case, adducing a probable defense of prior enmity, and demonstrating that the medical evidence negatived the occurrence of any sexual assault. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeals were allowed, the judgment of the Delhi High Court dated July 3, 2025, and the trial court’s conviction were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges under Section 363 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, with a direction for his immediate release from custody.
Case Title: Deepak In JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi
Case No.: Criminal Appeal Nos. of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 21271-72 of 2025)
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria
Date: September 17, 2026
