The Supreme Court of India has held that the High Court is well within its supervisory writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside concurrent quasi-judicial orders if they are perverse, based on surmises, or have completely ignored vital documentary evidence on record. A Division Bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar dismissed the appeals filed by the legal representative of a deceased claimant against M/s Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society, affirming the Delhi High Court’s judgment that had quashed the arbitral award and the appellate tribunal’s order granting allotment of a residential plot.
Background of the Dispute
The case arises from a protracted dispute initiated by the original claimant, Mr. S.N. Sharma, who claimed to be a member of M/s Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society and sought allotment of a residential plot. Alleging wrongful deprivation, he raised a dispute before the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Delhi, which was referred to an Arbitrator under Section 61 of the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1972.
Although an ex-parte award was initially passed in the claimant’s favour, the Supreme Court in Prakash Narain Sharma vs. Burmah Shell Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. set it aside on August 21, 2002, remanding the matter for fresh adjudication before the Registrar, Co-operative Societies.
Following the remand, the Registrar passed an award on October 7, 2003, holding that the original claimant was a member who had fulfilled his obligations and directed the Society to allot a plot to his legal heir, Mr. Prakash Narain Sharma, upon full payment. The Delhi Co-operative Tribunal subsequently affirmed this order in appeal under Section 76 of the Act on March 18, 2004.
Aggrieved, the Society approached the Delhi High Court through a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227. On October 6, 2010, the High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside both concurrent orders, observing that the claimant had resigned in 1951, was never re-admitted in 1952, and that four senior members held prior claims. The legal heir then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appearing for the appellant, Senior Advocate Mr. Jitendra Mohan Sharma submitted that the High Court exceeded its limited writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 by overturning concurrent factual findings recorded by the statutory authorities. Citing Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, he argued that the Arbitrator had properly appreciated all materials showing that the original claimant remained a member throughout his lifetime and was shown on the membership lists. He further relied on civil court findings to argue that vacant plots were available for allotment.
Opposing the plea, Senior Advocate Mr. Ashim Vachher, representing the Society, maintained that the Arbitrator and the Tribunal had completely glossed over vital documents. He pointed out that the original claimant had voluntarily resigned in 1951, his share was transferred to another member, and his subsequent application in 1952 was expressly rejected by the Managing Committee without any share certificate ever being issued. Relying on Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor and General Traders, Special Reference No.1 of 2002, and Raj Kumar Dey and others Vs. Tarapada Dey and others, he contended that the High Court rightly exercised certiorari jurisdiction to remedy a patent perversity and miscarriage of justice.
The Court’s Analysis on Certiorari Jurisdiction
Delivering the judgment, Justice Atul S. Chandurkar examined the scope and contours of the writ of certiorari. The Bench referred to the principles restated in General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and others Vs. Sri Giridhari Sahu and others, which had analyzed the Constitution Bench ruling in Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others, quoting:
“The jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is supervisory and not appellate. The Court considering a writ application of Certiorari will not don the cap of an Appellate Court. It will not reappreciate evidence. The Writ of Certiorari is intended to correct jurisdictional excesses… A finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence would be perverse and in fact would constitute an error of law enabling the writ court to interfere. It is also to be noticed that if the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not support the finding, it would render the decision amendable to certiorari jurisdiction.”
The Court also cited Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and another Vs. Bikartan Das and others, reiterating:
“However, we may clarify that findings of fact based on ‘no evidence’ or purely on surmises and conjectures or which are perverse points could be challenged by way of a certiorari as such findings could be regarded as an error of law.”
“…certiorari shall issue to correct errors of jurisdiction, that is to say, absence, excess or failure to exercise and also when in the exercise of undoubted jurisdiction, there has been illegality. It shall also issue to correct an error in the decision or determination itself, if it is an error manifest on the face of the proceedings. By its exercise, only a patent error can be corrected but not also a wrong decision. It should be well remembered at the cost of repetition that certiorari is not appellate but only supervisory.”
Applying these settled principles to the record, the Supreme Court observed that the Arbitrator and the Tribunal had ignored crucial documentary evidence, including:
- The claimant’s resignation and its formal acceptance recorded in the Minutes of the Managing Committee Meeting on May 5, 1951.
- The transfer of the claimant’s share to another member on August 18, 1951.
- The express rejection of the claimant’s fresh membership application on November 5, 1952.
- The rejection of the claimant’s request to deposit money for a plot as late as November 4, 1979.
The Bench highlighted the perversity in the Arbitrator’s finding, quoting the Arbitrator’s award:
“…The plea of resignation of Sh. S. N. Sharma and his subsequent re-entry to settle some accounts are not tenable as they are neither supported by any reason nor by the law. It has to be presumed that he continued to be a member of the society till the end of his life and his name continued to be shown in the list of members…”
The Supreme Court endorsed paragraph 13 of the High Court’s judgment:
“13. In view of the above, we accept the writ petition and set aside the orders of both the authorities below inasmuch as they are not only cryptic but they fail to discuss the relevant facts and the issues, and which if would have been done the same would have resulted in a decision in favour of the petitioner society. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order dated 18.3.2004 passed by the DCT and Award dated 7.10.2003 and dismiss the claim petition as filed by respondent No.1 and his father for grant of a plot in the petitioner society. The parties are left to bear their own costs.”
The Supreme Court held that the Arbitrator proceeded on mere assumptions and conjectures, while the Tribunal affirmed the award through a cryptic six-paragraph order. The High Court was also held justified in considering the balance of equities, as four members held prior claims for allotment over the original claimant.
Decision
The Supreme Court concluded that since the original claimant had ceased to be a member and was never re-inducted, the question of plot allotment did not arise, rendering any inquiry into the physical availability of vacant plots unnecessary.
Finding no infirmity in the High Court’s exercise of its certiorari powers, the Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeals with no orders as to costs.
Case Title: Shri Prakash Narain Sharma (Dead) Through Legal Representative v. M/s. Burmah Shell Co-operative Housing Society (Regd) Through Managing Committee Member Sh. P. Jindal and Others
Case No.: Civil Appeal Nos. 10693-10694 of 2026
Bench: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Date: August 31, 2026
