A Supreme Court bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria has affirmed the life imprisonment sentence of an appellant convicted of murder linked to witchcraft allegations, ruling that the direct, credible testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Rejecting the appeal, the Court held that evidence must be weighed by its quality rather than counted by quantity, emphasizing that superstitious beliefs cannot override the rule of law and constitutional morality.
Background of the Case
The case stems from an incident on February 17, 1998, at around 5:00 p.m. in village Gundibali Luhakera, Police Station Sector-15, Rourkela, District Sundargarh. Following the death of the youngest daughter of Manobodha Naik, his family members claimed that her death was caused by witchcraft practiced by the deceased, Puni Naik.
The appellant, Balku Oram, along with co-accused Udai Oram, went to Puni Naik’s house, dragged her outside to the front of Manobodha Naik’s residence, and severely assaulted her with a lathi. The entire assault was witnessed by Sukra Naik (P.W.3), the daughter of the deceased, who protested and was also beaten by the appellant. Puni Naik succumbed to her injuries during the early hours of February 18, 1998.
At 11:00 a.m. on February 18, 1998, P.W.3, accompanied by her maternal uncle Hrudananda Ganda, lodged a written complaint at Police Station Sector-15, leading to the registration of FIR No. 19/1998 under Section 302/34 IPC. The prosecution examined nine witnesses, while the defense examined none. Relying on the eyewitness testimony of P.W.3, the Trial Court convicted both accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The High Court of Orissa at Cuttack dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 158/2003 on September 29, 2022, affirming the conviction and sentence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appealing before the Supreme Court, senior counsel for the appellant raised four key contentions:
- Interested Witness: P.W.3, being the daughter of the deceased, is a related and interested witness whose uncorroborated testimony cannot form the basis of a conviction.
- Reduction of Offence: The act was committed under grave and sudden provocation, lacking the requisite intention to constitute murder under Section 302 IPC, and thus falls under Section 304 Part I or Part II IPC.
- Delay in FIR: The incident occurred on February 17, 1998, but the FIR was lodged on the next day, February 18, 1998.
- Discrepancies in Evidence: Discrepancies were pointed out regarding the time of death stated in P.W.3’s cross-examination (12:00 p.m. or 1:00 a.m. night) versus the FIR (5:00 p.m.), and P.W.3’s cross-examination statement that “Balku was holding axe and Udya was holding Badi”, whereas the post-mortem report did not show axe injuries.
Counsel for the respondent-State argued:
- The testimony of a relative cannot be discarded solely due to relationship, particularly when corroborated by medical evidence.
- Conviction can be sustained on the sole testimony of a reliable witness, as the quality of evidence matters more than quantity, relying on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras and Adalat Yadav Etc. v. State of Bihar.
- The delay in registering the FIR was sufficiently explained in the courts below.
- The defense failed to establish Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC.
Court’s Analysis
Addressing the scope of interference with concurrent findings under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Court cited Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (referencing Balak Ram v. State of U.P., Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham, Nain Singh v. State of U.P., and State of U.P. v. Babul Nath), reiterating that interference with concurrent findings of fact is permitted only under exceptional circumstances or where findings are manifestly perverse.
On direct ocular evidence, the Supreme Court quoted from Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh:
“To put it simply, in assessing the value of the evidence of the eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In respect of both these considerations, the circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial, yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or puts forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence.”
The Court noted further from the same judgment:
“There is nothing palpable or glaring in the evidence of the two eyewitnesses on the basis of which we can take the view that they are not true or reliable eyewitnesses. Few contradictions in the form of omissions here or there is not sufficient to discard the entire evidence of the eyewitnesses.”
Regarding the sole eyewitness rule, the Court quoted Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras:
“As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character.”
“Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character.”
“Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes.”
“If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of an accused person may be established on the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well-established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact.”
“Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses.”
Reaffirming Section 134 of the Evidence Act, the Court cited Prithipal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Another (referencing Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, and Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B.):
“This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the court will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number or the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence, rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence.”
Addressing the submission that P.W.3 was a related/interested witness, the Court cited Shio Shankar Dubey and Others v. State of Bihar, which referenced Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, and Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab.
Quoting Kartik Malhar:
“The term “interested” postulates that the witness must have some direct interest in having the accused somehow or the other convicted for some animus or for some other reason.”
Quoting Dalbir Kaur:
“Moreover, a close relative who is a very natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness. The term “interested” postulates that the person concerned must have some direct interest in seeing that the accused person is somehow or the other convicted either because he had some animus with the accused or for some other reason. Such is not the case here.”
Quoting Dalip Singh:
“A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.”
On the plea to convert the conviction to Section 304 IPC, the Court reviewed the post-mortem report of P.W.6, which revealed multiple external injuries, including bruises on the scalp, temporal area, thigh, lower abdomen, chest, and shoulder, lacerated wounds on the neck and thigh, blood clots beneath the skull, and brain edema. To distinguish Section 302 from Section 304 IPC, the Court cited Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of A.P.:
“Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.”
The Court held that the nature and extent of injuries on vital parts manifested a clear intention to cause death, rejecting the plea to alter the conviction to Section 304 IPC.
Regarding the delay in lodging the FIR, the Court cited Om Pal and Others v. State of U.P. (Now State of Uttarakhand) and Ramdas and Others v. State of Maharashtra, quoting from Ramdas:
“The proposition is too broadly stated to merit acceptance. It is no doubt true that mere delay in lodging the first information report is not necessarily fatal to the case of the prosecution. However, the fact that the report was lodged belatedly is a relevant fact of which the court must take notice. This fact has to be considered in the light of other facts and circumstances of the case, and in a given case the court may be satisfied that the delay in lodging the report has been sufficiently explained. In the light of the totality of the evidence, the court of fact has to consider whether the delay in lodging the report adversely affects the case of the prosecution. That is a matter of appreciation of evidence… In the ultimate analysis, what is the effect of delay in lodging the report with the police is a matter of appreciation of evidence, and the court must consider the delay in the background of the facts and circumstances of each case.”
The Court noted that P.W.3 was 15-16 years old at the time and in severe shock after witnessing her mother’s murder, making it natural that she waited for her maternal uncle before lodging the report, thereby fully explaining the delay.
Court’s Observations on Witch-Hunting
Reflecting on the grave nature of the offense, the Court opened its judgment by quoting Dr. B.R. Ambedkar:
“A just society is that society in which ascending sense of reverence and descending sense of contempt is dissolved into the creation of a compassionate society.”
The Court observed that witch-hunting remains a societal malady where prejudice, superstition, and irrational fear override the rule of law and constitutional morality, subjecting vulnerable women to severe torture and violence. It emphasized that a constitutional democracy requires reason and the rule of law to prevail over irrational collective hostility.
Decision
The Supreme Court concluded that the direct evidence against the appellant was compelling and firmly established that the appellant and co-accused brutally murdered the deceased on allegations of practicing witchcraft. Finding no error in the judgments of the Trial Court and High Court, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and life sentence.
Case Title: Balku Oram v. State of Odisha
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 2298 of 2026
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, Justice N.V. Anjaria
Date: August 13, 2026
