A Supreme Court bench comprising Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice N.V. Anjaria has held that re-employed officers appointed as Presiding Officers of Central Government Industrial Tribunals-cum-Labour Courts (CGIT-cum-LCs) constitute a distinct class from regular government employees and cannot claim pay scales under the 6th Central Pay Commission at par with other administrative tribunals. Dismissing a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, the apex court ruled that equating CGIT Presiding Officers with the District Judiciary based on expert pay committee recommendations does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as pay fixation falls within the exclusive domain of the executive.
Background of the Case
The writ petition was instituted by R.K. Yadav and another, who were appointed as Presiding Officers of CGIT-cum-LCs functioning at New Delhi and Hyderabad, respectively. Petitioner No. 1, formerly a judicial officer in the Delhi Judicial Service, joined CGIT-I, New Delhi on deputation on April 21, 2009, until his superannuation on June 30, 2009, following which he was appointed on a re-employment basis from July 1, 2009. Petitioner No. 2 was similarly appointed as Presiding Officer at CGIT, Hyderabad.
The petitioners approached the Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus to implement the recommendations of the 6th Central Pay Commission for CGIT-cum-LCs at par with other administrative tribunals such as the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), and Railway Claims Tribunal. They also challenged the Ministry of Labour and Employment’s order dated January 16, 2012, which fixed their pay scales equivalent to the District Judiciary in accordance with the Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee recommendations.
The petitioners contended that CGIT-cum-LCs are Union Tribunals established under Article 247 read with Article 323-B of the Constitution and stand on the same pedestal as other Central tribunals. They alleged that the Union Government arbitrarily treated unequals as equals by grouping them with the State District Judiciary under Article 233, thereby denying them the higher pay scales recommended by the 6th Pay Commission.
Arguments of the Parties
The respondents, representing the Union of India and its authorities, contested the petition on several grounds:
- Statutory Framework: CGIT-cum-LCs are constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act), under the administrative control of the Ministry of Labour and Employment. Except for the National Industrial Tribunals at Mumbai and Kolkata—which are headed by serving or retired High Court Judges—the CGITs are presided over by serving or retired District Judges or qualified judicial officers.
- Historical Linkage to District Judiciary: The pay scales of Presiding Officers of CGITs were earlier revised pursuant to the First National Judicial Pay Commission (Shetty Commission) via Ministry letter dated September 28, 2005, bringing them at par with District Judges in the State Judiciary. Subsequently, following advice from the Department of Justice, their pay scales were revised as per the Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee report dated January 16, 2012.
- Rules Governing Re-Employed Pensioners: The Union argued that the petitioners are re-employed pensioners governed by the Central Civil Services (Fixation of Pay of Re-employed Pensioners) Orders, 1986. Under these statutory rules, re-employed pensioners draw pay strictly in the prescribed pay scale of the re-employed post, with no entitlement to pay scale protection of their pre-retirement posts.
- Consultation with Departments: Both the Ministry of Finance (Department of Expenditure) and the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) considered the petitioners’ representations for 6th Pay Commission scales and declined to review the pay structure for this category of re-employed officers.
The Court’s Analysis
Writing the judgment for the bench, Justice N.V. Anjaria traced the statutory evolution of pay structures under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and subsequent administrative rules, including the 2015 Rules, the 2017 Rules under the Finance Act, the 2020 Rules, and the Tribunal (Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021 framed under the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021.
The Supreme Court emphasized that the determination of pay scales is fundamentally an executive function that relies on the expertise of specialized bodies. Referencing established judicial precedents, the Court highlighted the limited scope of judicial review in pay fixation matters:
- Executive Domain: Citing State of U.P. and Others vs. J.P. Chaurasia and Others (1989), the Court noted that courts are not equipped to evaluate and compare pay scale differentiation on affidavits, and such decisions should be left to expert bodies absent mala fides.
- Limited Interference: Citing Union of India vs. Dineshan K.K. (2008), the Court reaffirmed that judicial review in pay structures is restricted to instances of apparent anomaly.
- Different Recruitment Rules: Citing Union of India vs. Indian Navy Civilian Design Officers Association and Another (2023), the court underscored that posts governed by distinct rules cannot be equated arbitrarily.
- Exclusive Executive Discretion: Citing Union of India vs. T.V.L.N. Mallikarjuna Rao (2015), the Court recalled: “The classification of posts and determination of pay structure comes within the exclusive domain of the executive and the Tribunal cannot sit in appeal over the wisdom of the executive in prescribing certain pay structure and grade in a particular service. There may be more grades than one in a particular service.”
Addressing the challenge under Article 14, the Court cited Charanjit Lal Chowdhury vs. Union of India (1950) to reiterate that the equality clause does not prohibit reasonable classification based on rational criteria. The Court held:
“Article 14 prohibits class legislation, but does not prohibit reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. The classification brought out in the instant case for the purpose of applying the pay scales is based on rational and intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons grouped together from those left out of the group.”
The Court emphasized that re-employed retirees do not stand on the same footing as regular, serving government employees:
“The category of re-employed officers/persons like the petitioners stand with substantial distinction against the regular officers in the employment of the government. The re-employed class could be reasonably and rationally classified separately for the purpose of applying pay scales which may not be equivalent to and on the same pedestal with the other classes. Upon re-employment, the reemployed officers/persons would cease to be homogeneous vis-à-vis class of regular officers in employment of the government.”
Regarding the equation with the District Judiciary, the bench observed that industrial tribunals and labour courts operate within States, making their linkage with District Judiciary pay scales—as recommended by expert bodies like the Shetty Commission and the Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee—rational and free from arbitrariness. The bench noted that “the power of judicial review in matters of classification of posts and determination of pay scale was very limited inasmuch as the equation of posts and salaries is a complex matter required to be best left to an expert body.”
Decision of the Court
The Supreme Court concluded that re-employed officers form a distinct class and have no enforceable fundamental right to demand pay parity with regular administrative tribunals under the 6th Central Pay Commission:
“The re-employed officers/persons after the retirement, when re-employed again, stand belong to a separate class. Their claim to avail the 6th Pay Commission pay scales has no basis to assert on the footing of Fundamental Rights or on any other grounds. Grouping them separately with those regularly working and equating them with District Judiciary cannot be said to offend either the tenets of Article 14 or the requisites of Article 16 of the Constitution.”
Finding no merit in the claims, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition.
Case Details
Case Title: R.K. Yadav & Anr. v. Union of India and Others
Case No.: Writ Petition (C) No. 193 of 2012
Bench: Justice S.V.N. Bhatti, Justice N.V. Anjaria
Date: August 12, 2026
