The Delhi High Court, presided over by Justice Mini Pushkarna, held that a court cannot pass a decree on admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) when the defendant raises a plausible defense involving triable issues regarding title and the nature of executed documents. Setting aside a trial court decree for possession in respect of an industrial property in Wazirpur, Delhi, the High Court observed that power under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and can be exercised only when admissions are clear, unambiguous, and unconditional.
Background of the Case
The dispute centers on property bearing No. A-137/1, Group Wazirpur Industrial Area, Delhi, measuring 334.4 square meters. The plaintiff, Vijay Gupta (respondent in appeal), filed a civil suit (CS No. 342/2016) against Subhash Chand Jindal (appellant in appeal) seeking possession, recovery of damages, and permanent injunction.
According to the plaintiff, he was the absolute owner of the property and had executed a License Deed dated November 9, 2001, in favor of the defendant for eleven months at a monthly license fee of Rs. 60,000. The plaintiff asserted that the license expired by efflux of time on October 8, 2002, but the defendant failed to vacate the premises and stopped paying user charges. The plaintiff also relied on an Agreement to Sell, Receipt, and Possession Letter dated September 15, 2001, a registered General Power of Attorney (GPA) and Will dated November 6, 2001, and a registered Conveyance Deed dated April 23, 2014, issued by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) in his favor.
Conversely, defendant Subhash Chand Jindal contended in his written statement that he was the actual owner and continuous possessor of the property since 1997-1998, operating an industrial unit named M/s. Mohit Industries as Karta of his Hindu Undivided Family (HUF). He asserted that the 2001 documents were sham paper transactions executed solely as security for a loan scheme arranged through the plaintiff. Jindal stated that the consideration amount was returned to the plaintiff by investing in the plaintiff’s company, M/s. Polo Plastic Limited, in which Jindal held 36% shares. He alleged that the plaintiff fraudulently obtained the Conveyance Deed from DDA in 2014 without his knowledge or possession.
The Trial Court (Additional District Judge-04, North West, Rohini District Courts) allowed the plaintiff’s application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC on August 6, 2016, holding that Jindal’s admission of executing the License Deed and title documents amounted to an admission of ownership and licensor-licensee relationship, directing vacant possession to be handed over to Gupta.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Contentions
Senior Counsel appearing for Subhash Chand Jindal argued that:
- The trial court erred in treating execution of documents as an unconditional admission of liability, ignoring the core plea that the documents were sham and never intended to be acted upon.
- No license fee was ever paid by Jindal or demanded by Gupta from 2001 until the suit was filed in 2014, proving the License Deed was a paper transaction.
- Jindal had already instituted a separate civil suit (CS No. 578044/2016) seeking cancellation of the 2014 Conveyance Deed and declaration of the 2001 documents as null and void.
- DDA in its written statement in the pending suit noted that it had initiated steps for cancellation of the Conveyance Deed issued to Gupta.
- Under proviso (1) to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, oral evidence is admissible to demonstrate that a written document was a sham and not intended to operate as a binding agreement.
Respondent’s Contentions
Counsel for Vijay Gupta argued that:
- The execution of the Agreement to Sell, GPA, Will, and License Deed were admitted by Jindal in his written statement, which clearly established Gupta’s ownership and the licensor-licensee relationship.
- Under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, a licensee has no legal right to retain possession once the license is terminated.
- Oral pleas alleging loan transactions or sham documents are barred by Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act.
- The registered Conveyance Deed dated April 23, 2014, conclusively conferred freehold ownership on Gupta, and Jindal could not challenge title while remaining in possession as a licensee.
Court’s Analysis and Legal Precedents
Reviewing the legal framework under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, Justice Mini Pushkarna reiterated the foundational principle:
Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC provides that where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, the Court may at any stage of the suit, and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. It is settled law that the power under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC is discretionary, and must be exercised by the Courts only when the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional.
The Court cited several landmark Supreme Court decisions:
- Himani Alloys Limited v. Tata Steel Limited (2011): The Supreme Court ruled that unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. The admission should be categorical and should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it.
- Karan Kapoor v. Madhuri Kumar (2022): The apex court emphasized that The said power is discretionary which should be only exercised when specific, clear and categorical admission of facts and documents are on record, otherwise the court can refuse to invoke the power of Order 12 Rule 6.
- S.M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj (2015): The Supreme Court noted that mere admission of tenancy execution when accompanied by a defense of an agreement to sell requires appreciation of evidence through trial.
- Rajesh Mitra v. Karnani Properties Ltd. (2024): The court warned that unless there is a clear, unambiguous, unequivocal and unconditional admission, Courts should not exercise their discretion under the said Rule because judgment on admissions is without a trial, which may even preclude a party to challenge the matter on merits in the Court of appeal.
- Vikrant Kapila v. Pankaja Panda (2023): The Supreme Court highlighted that The bottom line is that while ensuring judicial discretion, the court does not avoid a trial on an issue where a trial is needed, and findings recorded; alternatively, the court does not try an issue in which there is no contest between the parties.
- Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani (2003): Addressing the bar under Section 92 of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court held that Oral evidence is admissible to show that document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties.
Applying these settled principles to the pleadings, the High Court observed:
However, a reading of the written statement as a whole, makes it evident that the appellant/defendant has nowhere admitted that the respondent/plaintiff is the owner of the suit property. Rather, the entire defense set up by the appellant/defendant is that he is the owner of the suit property, and the said documents of the year 2001 are sham documents, executed for the purpose of a loan transaction and were never intended to be acted upon by the parties.
Thus, it cannot be said that the appellant/defendant had made unambiguous, unconditional and categorical admissions as to ownership of the respondent/plaintiff over the suit property, thereby, entitling the respondent/plaintiff to a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC.
The High Court noted that Jindal had consistently maintained uninterrupted physical possession of the suit property, operating M/s. Mohit Industries, and had submitted electricity bills, water bills, property tax receipts, and municipal licenses spanning several years. Furthermore, no license fees were paid or demanded for 12 years following the alleged expiry of the License Deed in 2002.
The appellant/defendant has raised a plausible defense, which can be tested only through a trial.
When triable issued have been raised, the Trial Court erred in dismissing the suit in limine and passing a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of CPC.
Decision
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and decree dated August 6, 2016, and remanded the suit back to the Trial Court for proceedings in accordance with law. The Court clarified that it expressed no final opinion on the merits of the case. Amounts deposited by the appellant pursuant to interim directions were ordered to remain in an interest-bearing account in the High Court, to be released subject to the final outcome of the trial court proceedings.
Case Details:
Case Title: Subhash Chand Jindal v. Vijay Gupta
Case No.: RFA 741/2016 & CM APPLs. 57489/2023, 63392/2023, 48255/2025 & 20928/2026
Bench: Justice Mini Pushkarna
Date: August 11, 2026
