In a landmark decision on the scope of matrimonial cruelty laws, a Supreme Court bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh held that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) applies to women in “live-in relationships” that qualify as “relationships in the nature of marriage,” provided the intent to marry is established as an intrinsic part of the relationship. Giving a purposive interpretation to the word “husband” under Section 498A IPC, the apex court declined to quash the criminal proceedings against the accused appellant, Dr. Lokesh B.H., while laying down strict safeguards and requiring preliminary enquiries prior to arrest in such cases.
Background of the Case
The appeal arose from a challenge by Dr. Lokesh B.H. against a common judgment dated November 18, 2025, passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru. The High Court had dismissed his petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) seeking to quash criminal proceedings in CC No. 28129 of 2023 and CC No. 630 of 2019.
The complainant, Smt. Theertha (Respondent No. 2), alleged that she and the appellant were married according to Hindu customs on October 17, 2010, and resided in Bengaluru. Due to marital disputes in 2016, she lodged two complaints. The first led to a charge-sheet under Section 498A IPC before the JMFC, Shivamogga District. The second resulted in a charge-sheet under Sections 498A, 504, 506, 307, 494, and 149 of the IPC, read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, before the XXIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru.
While the complainant asserted a valid subsisting marriage, the appellant contended that no valid marriage existed, rendering Section 498A IPC inapplicable. The High Court rejected the appellant’s argument, observing that he had suppressed his prior marriage and presented himself as her husband. The High Court held:
“13.14. In the result, I hold that the expression ‘husband’ in Section 498A IPC is not confined to a man in a legally valid marriage, but extends to one who enters into a marital relationship which is void or voidable, as also to a live-in relationship which bears the attributes of marriage, so long as the essential ingredients of cruelty as defined in the explanation to the section are satisfied.”
Arguments of the Parties
Senior Advocate Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, appearing for the appellant, argued that Section 498A IPC, being a penal provision, must be strictly construed to apply only to a husband in a valid, lawful marriage. He relied on Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of M.P., U. Suvetha v. State, and Aluri Venkata Ramana v. Aluri Thirupathi Rao to emphasize that a valid marriage is a prerequisite and that women in non-marital cohabitation have remedies under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act).
Additional Solicitor General Brijender Chahar, representing the Union of India, supported the appellant’s stance. He submitted that statutory regimes governing marriage recognize unions between biological males and females, and cohabitation does not constitute marriage. Referring to cases including P. Sivakumar v. State, Noor Jahan v. State, D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, K.V. Prakash Babu v. State of Karnataka, Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav, Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat, and Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, the Union submitted that recognition of live-in relationships under the DV Act was strictly for civil remedial purposes.
Conversely, Advocate Hetu Arora Sethi, appearing for Respondent No. 2, and the State of Karnataka urged for a purposive construction. Citing Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P., she argued that a man who induces a woman into a relationship under the proclamation of marriage cannot evade criminal responsibility for cruelty by taking shelter behind a void marriage or technicality.
Counsel Nina R. Nariman, assisting as amicus curiae alongside Additional Solicitor General Aishwarya Bhati, supported extending Section 498A IPC to live-in relationships qualifying as “relationships in the nature of marriage.” Relying on Koppisetti Subbharao v. State of A.P., Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu, Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), Rupali Devi v. State of U.P., and X v. State (NCT of Delhi), she argued that social welfare statutes require purposive interpretation. She further submitted that under Articles 14, 15(3), and 21 of the Constitution, as well as the principles of autonomy and privacy established in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, excluding partners “in the nature of a husband” would create an unconstitutional loophole for perpetrators of domestic cruelty.
Court’s Analysis and Legal Reasoning
The Supreme Court examined the rules governing strict interpretation of penal statutes alongside the mischief rule and purposive construction. Reviewing landmark authorities on statutory interpretation, including Commr. of Customs v. Dilip Kumar & Co., Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul, United States v. Wiltberger, Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, D. Vinod Shivappa v. Nanda Belliappa, Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan, RBI v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, and Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, the bench noted that strict construction does not enforce pedantic literalism that defeats obvious legislative intent.
Analyzing the origin of Section 498A IPC (inserted via the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983), the bench emphasized that the provision was enacted with a reformative and protective objective to curb domestic cruelty and protect women. Approving the three-judge bench decision in Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab—which affirmed Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam—the court highlighted that hyper-technical interpretations of “husband” would undermine the statute’s purpose. The Court cited Reema Aggarwal:
“It would be appropriate to construe the expression ‘husband’ to cover a person who enters into marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerces her in any manner or for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant provisions – Sections 304-B/498A, whatever be the legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of Sections 498A and 304-B IPC.”
Addressing the Union of India’s contention that the DV Act provides adequate civil remedies, the Supreme Court distinguished the scope of civil and criminal law. Referring to We the Women of India v. Union of India, Kunapareddy v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari, and Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, the Court observed that while the DV Act primarily provides civil reliefs, criminal law provides deterrence against physical and mental cruelty.
On constitutional grounds, the bench evaluated Articles 14, 15, and 21. Referencing K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa, Joseph Shine v. Union of India, Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay, Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), and Ravish Singh Rana v. State of Uttarakhand, the Court reasoned that the freedom to choose a partner is an intrinsic facet of personal liberty and privacy. Denying criminal protection against cruelty to a woman in a live-in relationship in the nature of marriage while extending it to a married woman lacks a rational nexus to the objective of preventing domestic cruelty, violating Article 14.
The Court observed:
“Live-in relationships are today, more or less, a reality — primarily in urban areas (be it for whatever reason), where an increasingly large section of the population resides, and the law must adapt itself to serve those who choose this form.”
“It is held, therefore, that a woman in a ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ shall be protected under Section 498A, giving the word ‘husband’ a purposive interpretation, keeping in view the reformative, corrective and socially beneficial intent of the Section.”
Safeguards Against Misuse and Threshold of Proof
Addressing concerns regarding potential misuse of Section 498A IPC—as noticed in rulings like Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, Arvind Singh v. State of Bihar, Gananath Pattnaik v. State of Orissa, Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam, Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat, Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat, B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, Janshruti v. Union of India, Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, Rinku Baheti v. Sandesh Sharda, Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, Rajesh Chaddha v. State of U.P., U. Suvetha v. State, and State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh—the Supreme Court instituted a higher threshold of proof and procedural safeguards.
The bench clarified that while all live-in relationships are not “relationships in the nature of marriage” (as delineated in D. Velusamy and Indra Sarma), Section 498A IPC requires an additional essential element: the intent to marry.
The Court observed:
“When the intent is absent, a question beckons as to why such relationship needs to be equated with marriage for the purposes of invoking penal provisions. In our view, it does not. Those relationships that are in the nature of marriage and also have the requisite intent to marry are the closest to marriage itself, and it is those relationships that shall be entitled to the protection of this Section.”
The Court held that the initial burden of proving the presence of intent to marry rests on the female live-in partner seeking protection under the law.
Final Decision
Applying the principles to the present facts in accordance with State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, the Supreme Court found that the allegations in the FIR—including suppression of prior marriage, demand for dowry, harassment, and physical injury—prima facie disclosed cognizable offences. Consequently, the bench refused to quash the criminal proceedings and disposed of the appeals with the following directions:
- Section 498A IPC is applicable to “live-in relationships” that qualify as “relationships in the nature of marriage” where the intent to marry is established.
- Such protected live-in relationships must be between two consenting adult individuals.
- This extended interpretation is strictly limited to Section 498A IPC and shall not affect any other statutory provision.
- Safeguards against arrest mandated in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar must be strictly applied. No accused partner or relative in a relationship in the nature of marriage shall be arrested without preliminary enquiries.
Case Details:
Case Title: Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026)
Bench: Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Date: August 3, 2026
