The High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur has ruled on a significant legal question concerning the nature of contempt jurisdiction, deciding whether such proceedings can be maintained against a statutory authority itself or if they must strictly target the individuals responsible. Justice Bibhu Datta Guru held that contempt proceedings are inherently actions in personam aimed at natural persons rather than juristic entities. Consequently, the court dismissed a contempt petition impleading the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) as a primary corporate respondent, while reserving liberty for the petitioner to file a fresh petition against the specific individual officers.
Background of the Case
The contempt petition arose from the alleged defiance of a court order dated October 8, 2024, passed in WPC No. 529 of 2023 (Arvind Kumar Goyal v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others). In that original writ petition, the High Court had directed the NHAI to redress the grievances of the petitioner, Arvind Kumar Goyal, within 90 days from receiving the order.
Asserting that this order was disregarded, the petitioner filed a contempt petition, impleading the “National Highways Authority Of India Through Chairman” as respondent No. 1, alongside seven other respondents, including various individual officers of the NHAI and state administrative departments.
Arguments of the Parties
The central debate focused on whether a statutory body like the NHAI could be legally arrayed as a respondent in a contempt case.
Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. B.P. Sharma and Mr. M.L. Saket, argued that the NHAI was a necessary party in the contempt petition. They submitted that because the court’s original order was directed at the authority, the NHAI was liable to be proceeded against under Section 12(5) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. They contended that under the Act’s explanation, a “company” includes any body corporate, making the authority itself a proper party to the proceedings.
The Court’s Analysis
In its analysis, the court examined the statutory framework of Section 12(5) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which governs contempt committed by companies or corporate bodies. The court clarified that the provision is designed to establish the liability of individual directors, managers, or other officers when corporate neglect or connivance is proved.
The court emphasized that contempt jurisdiction is quasi-criminal in nature and cannot be treated like a civil suit against the state or a statutory body under Article 300 of the Constitution of India. To hold an individual officer liable, it must be established that the officer was personally in charge of the subject matter and deliberately failed to comply with the directive.
To support its findings, the court cited crucial historical precedents explicitly raised during the proceedings. It first referred to the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Tarafatullah Mandal & others v. S.N. Maitra and others (AIR 1952 Calcutta 919), quoting:
“A proceeding in contempt is by its nature a proceeding in personam. A contempt proceeding, therefore, cannot be, allowed to acquire the character of a representative proceeding. One of the respondents described in the petition for Rule is in the form: ‘The State of West Bengal represented by S. Banerjee, Secretary, Department of Land and Land Revenue.’ That I think is wholly an unjustified procedure and cannot be permitted………”
The court also cited the Calcutta High Court’s observations deprecating the practice of impleading the state as an entity:
“As the practice of impleading the State as represented by some particular individual is becoming common in contempt proceedings, it seems necessary to point out what the correct procedure is. Nothing can be less accurate or more ridiculous than to ask that a particular State should itself be committed to prison, or that the State should be regarded as personified in, some individual officer nominated by the complainant, and should be committed to prison in the person of that officer.”
Further, the court drew upon the Madras High Court’s ruling in R. Muthukrishnan Vs. The Collector Of Tiruvallur District (AIR 2011 Madras 186):
“From the aforesaid provisions, it is manifestly clear that in a petition for initiation of contempt, a person against whom contempt is alleged must be made party respondent in person. The word ‘Person’ means a human being, a natural person and not a juristic person, because a human being can commit contempt of court, and not an authority.”
The court also examined Rule 349 of the High Court of Chhattisgarh (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules, 2007, which requires a petitioner to precisely state the name of the specific person charged with contempt.
The court observed that contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the contumacious and deliberate conduct of an individual. Identifying and bringing the specific officer responsible before the court is not a mere technicality, but a vital requirement before determining whether a willful default occurred. A command to a corporate authority is, in legal reality, a command to the natural persons officially responsible for running its affairs.
The Decision
The High Court concluded that since the individual officers responsible for complying with the order had already been impleaded in their personal capacities, the NHAI—being a statutory and juristic entity—was neither a necessary nor a proper party.
Because the NHAI was impleaded as a corporate contemnor, the court held that the petition was improperly framed and dismissed it as not maintainable. However, the court reserved liberty for the petitioner to file a fresh contempt petition arraying only the specific individual officers alleged to have willfully flouted the court’s earlier directions.
Case Details:
Case Title: Arvind Kumar Goyal v. National Highways Authority Of India and Others
Case No.: CONT No. 618 of 2026
Bench: Justice Bibhu Datta Guru
Date: June 19, 2026
