The Supreme Court has set aside the dismissal of Delhi Police constable Manohar Lal, holding that the extraordinary power under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution to dispense with a departmental inquiry cannot be invoked on mere presumption, assumption, or unsupported apprehension. The Court found that the disciplinary authority had dismissed him from service without a regular inquiry on the basis of an unsubstantiated belief that he might threaten or influence witnesses, even though he was in custody when the dismissal order was passed.
In its judgment delivered on March 12, 2026, a bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar allowed the appeal filed by Manohar Lal against the Delhi High Court’s order, as well as the orders of the Central Administrative Tribunal, the appellate authority, and the Deputy Commissioner of Police. The Court directed his reinstatement with continuity of service, granted notional consequential benefits, and limited back wages to 50% from the date of dismissal till reinstatement. It also left it open to the department to initiate a regular departmental inquiry in accordance with law.
Background of the case
Manohar Lal was dismissed from service by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, New Delhi, through an order dated July 18, 2017. The dismissal was ordered by invoking clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, thereby dispensing with the requirement of holding a departmental inquiry. The stated reason was that it was not “reasonably practicable” to conduct such an inquiry because of a perceived threat of intimidation, inducement, and tampering with vital evidence.
The case against him arose after registration of FIR No. 390 of 2017 on June 28, 2017. He was taken into custody on June 29, 2017 and was released on bail only on October 14, 2017. His appeal before the Special Commissioner of Police was dismissed on July 30, 2018. Thereafter, the Central Administrative Tribunal rejected his challenge in OA No. 744 of 2020 on November 29, 2022, and the Delhi High Court also declined interference in W.P.(C) No. 1309 of 2023.
Appellant’s case before the Supreme Court
Appearing for the appellant, senior advocate V. Mohana argued that the power to impose major punishment under the Delhi Police Act, 1978 and the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 is subject to Article 311 of the Constitution. Since dismissal is a major penalty, it ordinarily requires a regular departmental inquiry. She contended that the extraordinary power under Article 311(2)(b) had been wrongly invoked, especially when the appellant was already in custody and there was no convincing material to show any real possibility of his intimidating or traumatizing witnesses.
The appellant relied on several Supreme Court precedents, including Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, Ex. Const. Chhote Lal v. Union of India, Sudesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab, State of Punjab v. Harbhajan Singh, Reena Rani v. State of Haryana, and Risal Singh v. State of Haryana.
State’s stand
On behalf of the respondents, Additional Solicitor General Brijender Chahar relied on the preliminary inquiry report and related documents, including DD entries and investigation material, to argue that the complainant and witnesses had been traumatized by the alleged conduct of the appellant and his associates. It was contended that because of his alleged close association with criminals and his position in the police department, there was a possibility that he could influence, intimidate, or induce the complainant and witnesses to withdraw from the case or turn hostile.
What the Court examined
The Supreme Court examined the scheme of Sections 21 and 22 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 and Rules 5 and 6 of the 1980 Rules. It noted that dismissal is a major punishment and, ordinarily, can be imposed only after a regular departmental inquiry. The Court then turned to Article 311(2) and the scope of clause (b) of its second proviso, which permits dispensing with an inquiry only when the competent authority records in writing that holding such inquiry is not “reasonably practicable.”
Relying heavily on the Constitution Bench ruling in Tulsiram Patel, the Court reiterated that the expression used in Article 311(2)(b) is not “impracticable” but “not reasonably practicable,” and that the disciplinary authority must base its satisfaction on relevant material. The Court stressed that this power cannot be used lightly, arbitrarily, or merely to avoid holding an inquiry.
The Court reproduced and relied on the principle that: “A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department’s case against the government servant is weak and must fail.”
Preliminary inquiry report found insufficient
After calling for and examining the preliminary inquiry report, the Court noted that the ACP had recorded statements of the complainant Maniram, investigating officer SI Hardeep Singh, HC Kuldeep Singh, and Constable Devender. However, the Court found that none of these statements mentioned any instance of threatening, intimidating, or traumatizing the complainant or witnesses.
The Court held:
“No material showing connection of the appellant and his associates with criminals which may reasonably demonstrate that there is a possibility of the complainant or witnesses being approached through his associates with an intent to threaten, intimidate or induce them to withdraw from the case or turn hostile is on record. In absence of any material, in our view, it is merely a presumption of the ACP who conducted the preliminary enquiry and it cannot form the basis of a reasonable apprehension which may be sufficient to dispense with the regular disciplinary inquiry.”
The Court also found it significant that the dismissal order was passed on July 18, 2017 while the appellant was in custody and remained so until October 14, 2017. In that context, it said the authorities ought to have pointed to some concrete material showing threat or intimidation even from custody, which they had failed to do.
Strong observations against the disciplinary authority
The Supreme Court concluded that the disciplinary authority had acted on presumption without material and had failed to properly apply the law laid down in Tulsiram Patel. It observed:
“In absence of the same, merely belief or a presumption is not sufficient to record such finding and to deviate from the normal procedure.”
It further held:
“The order passed by the disciplinary authority dispensing with the enquiry as required is without application of mind and cannot be sustained.”
The Court also referred to departmental circulars issued by the Commissioner of Police in 1998 and a clarificatory circular dated September 11, 2007, both cautioning that Article 311(2)(b) should not be used as a shortcut and that speaking orders supported by material on record are essential before dispensing with inquiry. The Court noted that even these internal instructions emphasized that such power must not be invoked on assumptions and conjectures.
Final decision
Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the order dispensing with regular departmental inquiry was arbitrary and that the dismissal order, along with the affirming orders of the appellate authority, CAT, and Delhi High Court, could not stand. The Court ordered that the appellant be reinstated forthwith with continuity of service and notional consequential benefits, while restricting back wages to 50% in view of his involvement in the criminal case. It clarified that the respondents remain free to initiate departmental proceedings in accordance with law.
Case Details
Case Title: Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 13860 of 2024
Citation: 2026 INSC 234
Bench: Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Date of Judgment: March 12, 2026
