The Delhi High Court has ruled that constitutional courts should not ordinarily interfere with disciplinary proceedings at the stage of a Show Cause Notice or Inquiry Report, particularly in cases involving sexual harassment, unless the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or patently illegal.
Dismissing a petition challenging an ongoing departmental inquiry, a Division Bench comprising Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Amit Mahajan emphasized that a writ petition challenging a show cause notice is generally premature as it does not, by itself, result in adverse civil consequences.
Background of the Case
The matter originated from a complaint of sexual harassment filed on January 17, 2015, against the Petitioner, Sh. Sapan Suman, and his senior officer, under Rule 3(c) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
To address the complaint, the Respondent department issued an Office Order on February 2, 2015, constituting a Complaints Committee (Respondent No. 3). This was done in compliance with the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, and Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (CCS (CCA) Rules).
The inquiry culminated in a report dated November 1, 2021, which concluded that the allegations of misconduct against the Petitioner were proved. Subsequently, the Disciplinary Authority issued a Show Cause Notice on February 9, 2022, calling for the Petitioner’s representation.
The Petitioner moved the High Court challenging the 2015 Office Order constituting the committee, the 2021 Inquiry Report, and the 2022 Show Cause Notice, arguing procedural lapses and lack of jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
The Petitioner contended that the entire proceeding was void because the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) issued an Office Memorandum (OM) on July 16, 2015, prescribing specific steps for conducting sexual harassment inquiries, which were allegedly not followed. He argued that under this OM, the inquiry report should have been treated merely as a preliminary report.
Further, the Petitioner claimed that Rule 14(3) of the CCS (CCA) Rules was violated because no formal “Article of Charge” was issued to him; instead, the complaint itself was treated as the charge. He also alleged bias, noting that his senior officer was exempted from proceedings following an apology.
The Respondents, representing the Union of India, argued that the DoPT OM of 2015 was not applicable as it was issued after the complaint was received and the committee constituted. They maintained that under the proviso to Rule 14(2) of the Rules of 1965, the Complaints Committee is legally deemed to be the inquiring authority.
Crucially, the Respondents asserted that the petition was premature since only a Show Cause Notice had been issued, and no final penalty had been imposed by the Disciplinary Authority.
Court’s Analysis: Judicial Restraint at Notice Stage
The High Court’s primary focus was on the maintainability of the writ petition at the intermediary stage of disciplinary proceedings.
Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana (2006), the Bench reiterated the settled legal position that a mere show cause notice or charge sheet does not infringe on the rights of an individual to the extent of warranting judicial interference.
“It is well settled that a writ petition challenging a show-cause notice or a Article of Charge is ordinarily premature, as such a notice, by itself, does not give rise to any civil consequences or adverse order upon the noticee,” the Court observed.
The Bench clarified that the extraordinary writ jurisdiction should only be invoked at this stage if the notice is “wholly without jurisdiction or is patently illegal.” Upon reviewing the facts, the Court found no such patent illegality.
On Procedural Objections and Retrospectivity
Addressing the specific procedural challenges, the Court held that the non-issuance of a formal Article of Charge was, at best, a “procedural irregularity” that did not vitiate the inquiry. The Court noted that the Petitioner was supplied with the complaint and annexures, making him fully aware of the allegations, and had actively participated in the inquiry without raising this objection earlier.
“The purpose of supply of Articles of Charges stands fulfilled, once the complaint containing the alleged misconduct has been supplied,” the Court stated.
Regarding the DoPT OM dated July 16, 2015, the Court rejected the argument that it should apply retrospectively to proceedings initiated in early 2015. The Bench reasoned that the OM was an administrative guideline intended to streamline processes, not a substantive statute conferring vested rights.
“To accept the Petitioner’s argument would mean that every sexual-harassment inquiry set in motion prior to 16.07.2015 would have to be aborted and restarted, thereby leading to inordinate delays and potential denial of justice to the complainants,” the Court remarked.
Decision
The High Court dismissed the petition as premature and devoid of merit. The Bench clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the Inquiry Report’s findings, leaving those to be examined by the Competent/Disciplinary Authority independently.
The Court concluded that since the disciplinary process was still in progress and the Petitioner had been called upon to submit his representation, there was no ground for judicial interference at this juncture.
Case Details:
- Case Title: Sh. Sapan Suman v. Union of India & Ors.
- Case Number: W.P.(C) 4181/2022 & CM APPL. 12528/2022, CM APPL. 12530/2022, CM APPL. 21213/2024
- Coram: Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Amit Mahajan
- Counsel for Petitioner: Ms. Kanika Agnihotri, Mr. Vaibhav Agnihotri, Mr. Ankit Singh, Mr. Vidit Pratap Singh, Mr. Harshit Kiran, Ms. Suruchi Khandelwal and Ms. Khushi Anand
- Counsel for Respondents: Ms. Arunima Dwivedi (CGSC), Ms. Himanshi Singh, Ms. Monalisha Pradhan; Mr. Vinod Sawant (Law Officer) for Union of India
