The Delhi High Court has held that a candidate convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude but released on probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, does not suffer disqualification for appointment under the Airports Authority of India (AAI) Regulations.
The Division Bench, comprising Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia, dismissed an intra-court appeal filed by the Union of India and the Airport Authority of India (AAI) against the judgment of a Single Judge which had directed the appointment of the respondent, Rajesh, to the post of Junior Executive (Common Cadre).
Background of the Case
The facts of the case were undisputed. An FIR was registered against the respondent in 2012 under Sections 498A, 406, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) following a complaint by his wife. On September 4, 2014, he was convicted under Sections 498A and 406 IPC and sentenced to simple imprisonment for one year.
During the pendency of his appeal against the conviction, the respondent’s marriage was dissolved by mutual consent vide a decree of divorce dated September 19, 2015. Consequently, the Appellate Court, while upholding the conviction, released the respondent on probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, vide order dated September 21, 2015.
The respondent was subsequently selected for the post of Junior Executive (Common Cadre) by the AAI in March 2024. He disclosed his conviction and release on probation in the attestation form. However, the AAI cancelled his offer of appointment on August 19, 2024. Following an earlier direction from the High Court to reconsider the matter, the AAI passed a fresh order on December 9, 2024, again rejecting his appointment, citing Regulation 6(7)(b) of the Airports Authority of India (General Conditions of Service and Remuneration of Employees) Regulations, 2003.
The respondent challenged this rejection in a writ petition (W.P.(C) 218/2025). The learned Single Judge allowed the petition on October 31, 2025, quashing the AAI’s decision and directing the respondent’s appointment. The Union of India and AAI challenged this order in the present appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
The Appellants (AAI/Union of India) argued that under Regulation 6(7)(b) of the 2003 Regulations, a person convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude is deemed ineligible for appointment. They contended that the release on probation under the 1958 Act “did not wash away his conviction” and that the employer retains the discretion to verify antecedents. The counsel relied on the judgment in Ajit Kumar v. Commissioner of Police and other precedents to argue that Section 12 of the Act does not obliterate the conduct constituting the offence.
The Respondent contended that Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act contains a non-obstante clause stating that a person dealt with under Section 3 or 4 “shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence.” It was argued that since the ineligibility under Regulation 6(7)(b) is attached directly to the conviction, Section 12 overrides the AAI Regulations.
Court’s Analysis
The Court focused on the interpretation of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person released on probation “shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law.”
The Bench referred to Regulation 6(7)(b) of the AAI Regulations, which states: “Persons convicted of offences involving moral turpitude… should be deemed to be ineligible for appointment in the Authority.”
Analyzing the interplay between the two provisions, the Court observed:
“A plain reading of Regulation 6(7)(b) of the Regulations, 2003 reveals that the ineligibility for appointment flows from conviction of the person seeking appointment of an offence involving moral turpitude and thus, such ineligibility or disqualification for appointment with the appellant – AAI… is attached to his conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude and therefore, the protection, in such a case, of Section 12 of the Act, 1958 will be available.”
The Court relied heavily on the Supreme Court judgment in Shankar Dass v. Union of India and Anr., (1985) 2 SCC 358, which established that while “dismissal” from service (under Article 311 of the Constitution) is not a disqualification within the meaning of Section 12, statutory bars to appointment or election based on conviction (such as in the Representation of People Act) constitute “disqualification.”
The Bench distinguished the present case from cases involving dismissal or disciplinary action. The Court held:
“The ineligibility for appointment, in our considered opinion, as described in Regulation 6(7)(b) of the Regulations, 2003, since stems from the conviction, therefore, such disqualification is directly related or attached to conviction of the person seeking appointment.”
Referring to Union of India v. Bakshi Ram, (1990) 2 SCC 426, the Court clarified that while Section 12 does not “wash away” the conviction or the finding of guilt, it explicitly removes the disqualification attached to it.
The Court distinguished the judgments cited by the appellant, including Satish Chandra Yadav v. Union of India (which involved suppression of facts) and Avtar Singh v. Union of India (regarding employer discretion in cases of acquittal). The Bench upheld the Single Judge’s reliance on the Division Bench judgment in Shaitan Singh Meena v. Union of India, noting that the matrimonial dispute in the present case was settled, leading to a divorce by mutual consent.
Decision
The Court concluded that the respondent is entitled to the protection of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
“Accordingly, since in this case the respondent was held to be ineligible for appointment only on account of his conviction where he was given benefit of Section 4 of the Act, 1958, in our opinion, the respondent is entitled to protection of Section 12 of the Act, 1958 and he cannot be made to suffer such disqualification attached to his conviction…”
The Division Bench dismissed the appeal and upheld the direction to appoint the respondent against the vacancy kept vacant under the interim order.
Case Details:
Case Title: Union of India & Ors. v. Rajesh
Case No: LPA 10/2026 & CM APPL. 1904-06/2026
Coram: Chief Justice Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Justice Tejas Karia
