The Court of District Judge-01, New Delhi, Patiala House Courts, has dismissed an appeal filed by advocate Mehmood Pracha, which sought to have the 2019 Ayodhya judgment declared “null and void” on allegations of fraud.
The Court, presided over by District Judge Sh. Dharmender Rana, dismissed the appeal (RCA DJ No. 27/2025) as “absolutely luxurious and frivolous.” It affirmed the Ld. Trial Court’s dismissal of the suit, finding it lacked a cause of action and was barred by law. The court further enhanced the total costs imposed on the appellant to Rs. 6,00,000/-.
The appellant had challenged the judgment dated 25.04.2025, which had originally dismissed his suit with costs of Rs. 1,00,000/-.
Background of the Case
The appellant, Mr. Mehmood Pracha, had instituted a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction based on a public address delivered in Marathi by the Hon’ble Former CJI, Sh. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud.
The appellant claimed that in the speech, the Hon’ble Former CJI “admitted that the judgment dated 09.11.2019, delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India… (hereinafter referred to as ‘Ayodhya case’) was in terms of the solution provided to him by Bhagwan Shri Ram Lala Virajman (respondent herein…).”
Based on this interpretation, Mr. Pracha’s original suit sought two primary reliefs:
- A decree of declaration that the 09.11.2019 Ayodhya judgment “is vitiated by fraud, and is null and void”.
- A decree of mandatory injunction directing “fresh adjudication” of the Ayodhya civil appeals.
The Ld. Trial Court dismissed this suit on 25.04.2025, leading to the present appeal.
Appellant’s Arguments
The appellant assailed the Ld. Trial Court’s judgment on four main grounds:
- Locus Standi: It was argued that the Ld. Trial Court erred in dismissing the suit on ‘locus standi’. The appellant contended that as the Ayodhya case adjudicated the rights of the Muslim community, he, “being a member of Muslim community” and an “aggrieved person,” had the right to institute the suit.
- Cause of Action: The appellant argued the suit was not an appeal on the merits of the Ayodhya judgment, but a challenge based on fraud. He contended that the alleged admission by the “probable author” (the Former CJI) of communication with a litigant (Bhagwan Shri Ram Lala Virajman) constituted “unlawful interference,” which vitiated the judgment. He argued this claim required a trial.
- Barred by Law: It was submitted that the Ld. Trial Court wrongly relied on Article 141 of the Constitution, as no law prohibits challenging a judgment vitiated by fraud.
- Imposition of Costs: The appellant argued the Ld. Trial Court erred by imposing costs of Rs. 1,00,000/-, submitting that Section 35(A) of the CPC restricted such costs to a maximum of Rs. 3,000/-.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
The District Court, in its judgment dated 18.10.2025, analyzed each of the appellant’s contentions.
On Locus Standi: The Court agreed with the appellant on this preliminary issue. It noted that one of the suits in the Ayodhya case was a “representative suit” by the Sunni Central Waqf Board, and an issue regarding the rights of the Muslim community was framed. Judge Rana held: “Once the rights of the members of the Muslim community were involved, the appellant herein, who claims himself to be a devout Muslim, cannot be non-suited on the grounds of locus standi.”
On Cause of Action: This was the central issue. The Court found the appellant’s entire claim of fraud was based on a fundamental misunderstanding. The judgment states the appellant “seems to have missed the subtle distinction between the ‘Supreme God’ and the ‘Juristic Personality’ litigating before the Court, probably on account of misunderstanding the law and religion.”
The Court observed that the Former CJI’s speech, which it reproduced, referred to him “practicing prayer” and asking “the God” to “find out a way.”
The judgment then extensively quoted the Supreme Court’s Ayodhya verdict itself (M. Siddiq (D) through LRs Vs. Mahant Suresh Das) to demonstrate the legal distinction. The District Judge noted that the Ayodhya judgment explicitly clarified: “legal personality is not conferred on the ‘Supreme Being’ itself” and that the “Hindu idol is a juristic entity.” The idol, the court noted, is a “representation of the Supreme Being” but “as a matter of law, every manifestation of the Supreme Being is not a legal person.”
The District Court concluded that the appellant’s imputations were the “result of his sheer indolence and incorrect understanding of the subject.”
Regarding the allegation of ‘fraud’, the Court, citing S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu vs Jagannath, defined fraud as “an act of deliberate deception.” It held that seeking divine guidance, a right protected by Article 25, is a “deeply internal and personal” matter and a “journey within.” The Court found: “seeking guidance from the almighty cannot be berated as a fraudulent act… Thus, taking the averments of the appellant on its face value, there is no scope for arguing that the plaint discloses any cause of action.”
On Being Barred by Law: While the Court agreed with the appellant that a judgment obtained by fraud can be challenged (again citing S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu), it found the suit “clearly barred” on two other grounds:
- Non-Impleadment of Necessary Parties (Order I Rule IX CPC): The Court noted the appellant failed to implead the original parties from the Ayodhya case. Instead, the appellant “insisted” on impleading the Hon’ble Former CJI as the “next friend” of the respondent. The Court found “absolutely no justification” for this, stating it “appears that the appellant is actuated with an oblique intent.”
- The Judges Protection Act, 1985: The Court held the suit was “further barred under section 3 of the Judges Protection Act, 1985,” which provides additional protection to judges from civil or criminal proceedings for any “act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when… acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty.”
On Abuse of Process and Costs: The Court strongly affirmed the imposition of costs, labeling the litigation “absolutely frivolous.” It noted the appellant is “a fairly senior counsel” and cited Bar Council Of Maharashtra v. M.V Dabholkar on the “pious duties of the members of the Bar.”
The judgment held that “luxurious and frivolous litigation is a direct onslaught upon the fundamental rights of the sincere litigants patiently waiting in the queue.”
Addressing the appellant’s argument on the Rs. 3,000/- cost limit under Section 35(A) CPC, the Court held that later three-judge bench decisions of the Supreme Court (Maria Margarida sequeira Fernandes and Dnyandeo sabaji naik) have clarified the law, mandating the imposition of “exemplary and prohibitive costs” to curb frivolous litigation. The Court found “no fault” with the Ld. Trial Court imposing Rs. 1,00,000/-.
Final Decision
In its concluding remarks, the Court observed a “very negative trend… to target important public functionaries upon their demitting offices.”
It described the appellant’s actions in harsh terms: “The situation becomes distressful when the protector himself turns predator. In the case at hand, the appellant, despite being a fairly senior counsel, has opted to choose the wrong color of jersey.”
The Court concluded that the Rs. 1,00,000/- cost imposed by the Ld. Trial Court “has failed to achieve the intended goal of deterrent effect.”
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with an additional cost of Rs. 5,00,000/-. The Court ordered: “The total cost of Rs.6,00,000/- (Rs.1,00,000/- imposed by Ld. Trial Court + Rs.5,00,000/- imposed by this Court) be deposited within 30 days from today” with the DLSA, New Delhi.
