The Supreme Court of India has held that a Magistrate commits a “very serious error” by ordering a police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) on a complaint filed by a judicial officer for an offence under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.). While explaining the scope of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., a bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan clarified that the correct course of action for the Magistrate was to take cognizance directly upon the complaint.
The Court disposed of a Special Leave Petition filed by a police officer challenging the registration of an FIR against him. While declining to quash the FIR at the current stage, the Court granted the petitioner liberty to raise the legal contention regarding the bar on cognizance under Section 195 Cr.P.C. before the trial court if a chargesheet is filed.
Background of the Case
The case originated from an incident on October 3, 2013, involving Ravi Dutt Sharma, a Process Server with the Nazarat Branch, Shahdara. He alleged that when he went to the Nand Nagri police station to serve court-issued warrants and summons, he was misbehaved with and obstructed by police officials, including the petitioner, Inspector Devendra Kumar, who was the Station House Officer (SHO).
According to the complaint, after a constable improperly received the documents, the Process Server was made to wait. The complaint detailed that SHO Devender Kumar abused the Process Server, forced him to stand with his hands raised for half an hour as punishment, and then made him sit on the floor for three to four hours. He was allegedly not allowed to leave until a Head Constable arrived and provided a receipt for the court processes.
The Process Server reported the matter to the District and Sessions Judge of Shahdara, who assigned the complaint to the Administrative Civil Judge (ACJ). The ACJ, in turn, lodged a private complaint under Section 195 Cr.P.C. before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM), Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
On November 28, 2013, the CMM passed an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., directing the registration of an FIR against the petitioner for offences under Sections 186 (obstructing public servant) and 341 (wrongful restraint) of the I.P.C. The petitioner’s challenges to this order were dismissed by the Sessions Court and subsequently by the High Court of Delhi, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Petitioner
The petitioner, represented by counsel Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, argued that even if the allegations were taken as true, they did not constitute an offence under Section 186 I.P.C. It was contended that mere obstruction is insufficient unless accompanied by the use of criminal force. The primary legal challenge was that an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. could not be passed for an offence under Section 186 I.P.C., as Section 195(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. creates a bar, permitting cognizance only upon a written complaint from the public servant concerned or their superior.
Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court began its analysis by addressing the procedural misstep by the CMM. It observed that while the complaint was correctly filed by the ACJ in line with Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C., the subsequent action was flawed.
The Court stated, “However, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate should have straightaway taken cognizance upon the said complaint and issued process to the petitioner-herein. Asking the police to investigate the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. was a very serious error that the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate could be said to have committed.” The bench questioned the necessity of involving the police in a complaint lodged by a Civil Judge, noting that the “dignity of the court was at stake.”
On ‘Obstruction’ under Section 186 I.P.C.
The Court clarified the meaning of “obstruction” under Section 186 I.P.C., rejecting the petitioner’s argument that it requires criminal force. The judgment held that the expression is not confined to physical obstruction. Citing its decision in Collector of Customs and Central Excise v. Paradip Port Trust, the Court observed that “obstruction is not confined to physical obstruction and it includes anything which makes it more difficult for the police or public servant to carry out their duties.”
The Court concluded on this point: “The act need not be a violent one. It is enough if the act complained of results in preventing a public servant in discharge of his lawful duties.” It held that the allegations in the complaint, if established as true, “would certainly constitute an offence punishable under Section 186 of the I.P.C.”
On the Bar under Section 195 Cr.P.C.
The judgment extensively analyzed the bar to cognizance under Section 195 Cr.P.C., which mandates a written complaint from the public servant for offences like Section 186 I.P.C. The Court explained that this provision is a safeguard against “irresponsible and reckless prosecutions by the private individuals.”
The Court addressed the issue of whether other distinct offences (like Section 341 I.P.C. in this case) that are not covered by Section 195 can be prosecuted if they are part of the same transaction. It referred to State of U.P. v. Suresh Chandra Srivastava & Ors., holding that if offences “form an integral part so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction,” the bar of Section 195 would apply to them as well.
However, the Court also clarified that Section 195 does not bar the police from conducting an investigation. Citing its previous rulings in State of Punjab v. Raj Singh and M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka, the bench affirmed that the bar under Section 195 “comes into operation at the stage when the Court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) Cr. P.C.; and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an F.I.R.”
Decision of the Court
In its final conclusion, the Supreme Court summarized that Section 195(1)(a)(i) Cr.P.C. creates a mandatory bar on a court from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 186 I.P.C. without a written complaint from the concerned public servant or their superior. Non-compliance vitiates the prosecution.
While noting the “very serious error” by the Magistrate, the Court did not quash the FIR. It disposed of the petition by granting liberty to the petitioner, Devendra Kumar, to raise the contention regarding the bar of Section 195 Cr.P.C. before the trial court, should a chargesheet be filed against him following the investigation. The Court also directed its Registry to circulate a copy of the judgment to all High Courts.
