The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, in a judgment pronounced on November 3, 2025, dismissed a writ petition challenging the final report of an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) constituted by a private airline. Justice N. J. Jamadar ruled that the petition, filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, was not maintainable, holding that the petitioner has an efficacious statutory remedy of appeal under Section 18 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“the POSH Act”).
The petition, filed by a Captain employed with Akasa Air (Respondent No. 2), sought to quash the February 12, 2025, report from the airline’s ICC (Respondent No. 1) and requested a fresh inquiry, alleging severe violations of the principles of natural justice.
Background of the Case
The court noted that the petitioner, a Captain with Respondent No. 2, was assigned to oversee the training of Respondent No. 3, a trainee captain. On November 24, 2024, Respondent No. 3 filed a complaint with the ICC, “highlighting a list of instances of behaviour of, and comments made by, the petitioner which caused discomfort and desecrated the professional learning environment for respondent No.3.”
The ICC (R1) commenced an inquiry, served the complaint on the petitioner, and received his written response. The committee examined the complainant (R3), the petitioner, and three witnesses. A preliminary inquiry report was shared with both parties on January 20, 2025.
In its final report dated February 12, 2025, the ICC made several recommendations, including:
- Issuing a final warning letter to the petitioner.
- Requiring the petitioner to undergo a POSH refresher training module.
- Making the petitioner ineligible for any upgrades for six months.
- Revoking the petitioner’s Employee Leisure Travel benefits for 45 days.
Aggrieved by the report and the procedure, the petitioner filed the writ petition.
Arguments of the Parties
The petitioner, represented by Ms. Ankita Singhania, argued that the inquiry was “marred by severe procedural violations.” The “principal grounds of challenge” included a “complete denial of petitioner’s right to cross-examine the witnesses” and the denial of a personal hearing, which constituted a “breach of fundamental principles of natural justice and fairness.”
The petitioner’s counsel contended that in cases of “most flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice,” the existence of an alternate remedy does not bar the court from exercising its writ jurisdiction, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited vs. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited. It was also argued that the ICC, though part of a private entity, was discharging a statutory public duty, making it amenable to writ jurisdiction, based on a Karnataka High Court judgment in Ms. X vs. the Internal Complaints Committee.
Ms. Payel Chatterjee, counsel for the ICC (R1) and Akasa Air (R2), countered that the petition was not maintainable on two primary grounds. First, the petitioner had an “efficacious statutory remedy of appeal” under Section 18 of the POSH Act, where all alleged procedural infractions could be examined. Second, the respondents are private entities and not ‘State’ under Article 12, making them not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Counsel cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in R. S. Madireddy and another vs. Union of India and others, which held that writ jurisdiction did not subsist against Air India Ltd. after its privatization.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
Justice Jamadar analyzed the two primary objections to the petition’s maintainability.
1. Maintainability against Private Entities: The court acknowledged that while Article 226 is wide, a writ against a private body lies only when it performs a public function or discharges a public duty involving a “public law element,” citing Federal Bank Ltd. vs. Sagar Thomas and St. Mary’s Education Society.
The court found that Akasa Air (R2) is “incontrovertibly” a private enterprise. Distinguishing the Ms. X case, the court drew a line between an ICC’s refusal to perform its statutory duty (which might invoke writ jurisdiction) and an alleged defect in an inquiry it has already conducted. Justice Jamadar observed: “An incorrect finding or defect in procedure would not necessarily amount to failure to discharge a public duty. At best, that would be an error within the jurisdiction.”
The court concluded, “Thus, I am not inclined to accede to the submissions on behalf of the petitioner that, in the facts of the case, the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable against respondent No.1 as it was discharging a public duty.”
2. Maintainability in Face of Alternate Remedy: The court then addressed the petitioner’s claim of natural justice violations. It noted that while exceptions exist, the Supreme Court in Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh affirmed that “When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy… resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy…”.
Regarding the denial of cross-examination, the court cited K. L. Tripathi vs. SBI, which held that the “right of cross-examination must inevitably form part of fair play in action but where there is no lis regarding the facts… no real prejudice has been caused… by absence of any formal opportunity of cross-examination per se…”.
Upon a “prima facie appraisal,” the court found that the petitioner had “admitted the incidents, as such,” for several items in the preliminary report, though he contested the intent and inferences. In this context, the court held: “In these circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the denial of the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses did not cause such prejudice as would warrant jettisoning away of the inquiry overboard, in exercise of the writ jurisdiction.”
On the ground of no oral hearing, the court stated it is “not obligatory that, in every case, the aggrieved person must be provided oral hearing,” citing Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. vs. Dy. Comm. Of Central Excise. The court noted that the petitioner was served with preliminary findings and “given an opportunity to make representation.”
Citing State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Sudhir Kumar Singh, the court observed that “The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.”
The court concluded: “The conspectus of aforesaid consideration is that the facts of the case are not such as would warrant the exercise of writ jurisdiction, despite the availability of the statutory remedy of appeal.”
Final Decision
The High Court dismissed the writ petition. However, it provided the petitioner a window of four weeks from the date of the order to file a statutory appeal under Section 18 of the POSH Act. The court directed that if such an appeal is filed, “the time spent by the petitioner in prosecuting this petition may be accounted for, if the question of limitation arises.”
The court clarified that its observations were “confined to determine the tenability of the petition” and that the Appellate Authority should decide any appeal “on its own merits and in accordance with law, without being influenced by any of the observations made hereinabove.”
