The Supreme Court of India has set aside the conviction of two appellants in a 1990 murder case, holding that the prosecution “miserably failed” to prove the guilt of the accused. A Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta acquitted Suresh Sahu and Aditya Prasad Sahu, criticizing the “perfunctory manner” of the trial, the suppression of the initial Fardbeyan (police report), and the non-examination of the Investigating Officer (IO).
The Court observed that the conviction recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court of Jharkhand was based on “misreading and erroneous appreciation of evidence on record.”
Background of the Case
The case dates back to May 11, 1990. The prosecution alleged that the deceased, Gajendra Prasad Gupta, was assaulted while returning from selling sweets at a fair in village Jhinjhari.
According to the initial Fardbeyan (Exh. 1) recorded by the informant, Rameshwar Sahu (PW-3), on May 12, 1990, at R.M.C.H., Ranchi, he stated that three persons had assaulted his son. Crucially, in this initial version, the informant did not name any specific assailants.
However, on May 13, 1990, the informant submitted a second written report (Exh. 5) to the Mandar Police Station. In this subsequent report, he alleged that while being beaten, his son shouted, “Don’t beat me, leave me Aditya, leave me Suresh.” Based on this report, FIR No. 43/1990 was registered.
The Trial Court convicted the appellants under Sections 120B, 302, and 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) on August 30, 1994, sentencing them to life imprisonment. The High Court of Jharkhand, in a judgment dated February 10, 2023, dismissed their appeal but modified the conviction to Section 302/34 IPC.
Submissions of the Parties
Arguments for the Appellants: The counsel for the appellants argued that the Fardbeyan (Exh. 1) was the actual First Information Report (FIR), and the High Court erred in discarding it in favor of the subsequent written report (Exh. 5), which should be treated as a statement under Section 161 CrPC. It was submitted that the informant (PW-3) was an unreliable witness who failed to identify the accused initially.
The defence highlighted that the theory of the deceased shouting the names of the accused was an “embellishment.” Furthermore, the alleged oral dying declaration heard by the sisters of the deceased (PW-1 and PW-2) was challenged on the ground that their statements were recorded more than one and a half months after the incident.
A critical submission was that the non-examination of the Investigating Officer, ASI R. Paswan, caused grave prejudice to the defence, as he was the scribe of both conflicting reports.
Arguments for the State: The State counsel supported the impugned judgment, arguing that both the Trial Court and the High Court had recorded concurrent findings of fact after due appreciation of evidence. It was argued that the findings did not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Court’s Analysis and Observations
The Supreme Court conducted a detailed re-appreciation of the evidence and identified several fatal flaws in the prosecution’s case.
1. Defective Examination under Section 313 CrPC The Court noted that the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) was conducted in a “highly laconic and defective manner.” Only three generic questions were put to the accused.
Justice Mehta, writing for the Bench, observed:
“These questions were framed in an extremely generic and mechanical manner, without articulating any of the specific incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence.”
Citing the precedents of Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) and Ramji Prasad Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2025), the Court held that omission to put material circumstances to the accused causes serious prejudice. However, given that 35 years had passed, the Court declined to remand the matter for a fresh statement.
2. Suppression of the First FIR and Withholding of Material Witness The Court rejected the High Court’s reasoning for discarding the initial Fardbeyan (Exh. 1). The Supreme Court held that the Fardbeyan was the actual FIR, and the subsequent report (Exh. 5) incorporating the names of the accused was a “sheer embellishment introduced by the informant at a belated stage.”
The Court came down heavily on the prosecution for not examining the Investigating Officer, ASI R. Paswan.
“Non-examination of a material witness would give rise to adverse inference… The withholding of the witness was a deliberate attempt by the prosecution to cover up the crucial flaw in its case.”
Referring to Harvinder Singh @ Bachhu v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2023), the Bench held that the failure to produce the scribe of the vital documents gave the defence a right to claim grave prejudice.
3. Implausibility of Oral Dying Declaration The prosecution relied on the testimony of the deceased’s sisters (PW-1 and PW-2) regarding an oral dying declaration. The Court found this “unworthy of credence” because their statements were recorded with significant delay. Furthermore, relying on the medical evidence of Dr. Ajit Kumar Chaudhary (PW-5), who noted a “crack fracture of right temporo-parieto-occipital bone” and “diffused contusion of whole scalp,” the Court observed:
“It is impossible to believe that, having received such grave head/cranial injuries, the deceased would have been in a position to speak what to talk of making an oral dying declaration.”
4. Credibility of the Informant The Court found the informant (PW-3) to be unreliable, noting inherent inconsistencies between his Fardbeyan, the written report, and his statements under Section 164 CrPC. The Court noted that the litigation regarding land acquisition employment between the parties provided a “strong motive to the complainant party to implicate the accused-appellants.”
5. Weight of Defence Witnesses Two witnesses, Jatan Sahu (DW-1) and Khakhandu Sahu (DW-2), who were named in the written report as eyewitnesses, were not examined by the prosecution but appeared as defence witnesses. They categorically stated that unknown assailants attacked the deceased.
Citing State of U.P. v. Babu Ram (2000) and Munshi Prasad v. State of Bihar (2002), the Court reiterated that:
“The testimony of a defence witness carries the same evidentiary value as that of a prosecution witness.”
Decision
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was guilty of superseding the actual FIR and replacing it with an improved version to implicate the appellants.
“The conviction of the accused-appellants, as recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is based on misreading and erroneous appreciation of evidence on record and, hence, the same is unsustainable in facts as well as in law.”
Consequently, the appeal was allowed. The judgment of the High Court dated February 10, 2023, and the conviction by the Trial Court were set aside. The appellants, who were in custody, were ordered to be released forthwith.
