The Supreme Court of India has set aside the conviction and sentence of a man held guilty of rape, after concluding that he was a juvenile at the time of the incident. The judgment, delivered by a bench comprising Chief Justice B. R. Gavai and Justice Augustine George Masih, directed that the matter be placed before the Juvenile Justice Board for appropriate orders under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
Background of the Case
The appellant had challenged the order dated 2 February 1993, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kishangarh, District Ajmer, which had convicted him under:
- Section 342 IPC (wrongful confinement): 6 months’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹200 (2 months’ simple imprisonment in default), and
- Section 376 IPC (rape): 5 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹300 (3 months’ simple imprisonment in default).
This conviction was later affirmed by the Rajasthan High Court on 12 July 2024.
Appellant’s Arguments
The defence raised several points:
- The FIR was lodged approximately 20 hours after the incident, which occurred at 2 PM on 17 November 1988.
- The prosecutrix’s brother turned hostile and stated the case was false and motivated by a boundary dispute.
- The medical evidence showed no external injuries; while the hymen was torn, there was no fresh bleeding.
- Witness statements were allegedly inconsistent.
Most crucially, the appellant raised — for the first time before the Supreme Court — the plea that he was a juvenile on the date of the incident. Based on school records, his date of birth was 14 September 1972, which would make him 16 years, 2 months, and 3 days old on 17 November 1988.
The appellant relied on Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2010) 5 SCC 344], arguing that the plea of juvenility can be raised at any stage, including after conviction.
Respondent’s Arguments
The State argued that both courts below had properly appreciated the oral and medical evidence. The prosecutrix, who was 11 years old, had clearly testified that the appellant committed rape upon her in the afternoon at her Bada (enclosure). The delay in filing the FIR was explained — the mother returned home only at 5 PM and the police station was 26 km away.
The prosecution also relied on medical reports and clothing evidence (the victim’s ghagra and the accused’s underpants), along with the victim’s consistent testimony. The potency test of the accused confirmed his ability to engage in sexual activity.
While acknowledging that one witness had turned hostile, the State argued it had no bearing as he was not an eyewitness.
Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Court noted that as per the settled legal position in Mohd. Imran Khan v. State Govt. (NCT of Delhi) [(2011) 10 SCC 192], a conviction can rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it is found to be credible and trustworthy. This principle was reiterated in Phool Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2022) 2 SCC 74] and Ganesan v. State [(2020) 10 SCC 573].
“The statement of the prosecutrix, if worthy of credence, requires no corroboration and can form the sole basis for conviction,” the Court said.
However, the key issue that turned the case was the appellant’s plea of juvenility. The Court had, by its earlier order dated 20 January 2025, directed the District and Sessions Judge at Kishangarh, Ajmer to conduct an inquiry. The report submitted by the Additional Sessions Judge No. 1 confirmed the date of birth as 14 September 1972 based on primary school records. Thus, the appellant was 16 years, 2 months, and 3 days old on the date of offence.
“The procedure has been duly followed as provided for under the 2000 Act and the 2007 Rules,” the Court noted.
Judgment
Rejecting the State’s objection that juvenility was raised belatedly, the Court held:
“The same needs to be merely mentioned to be rejected,” relying on Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan [(2009) 13 SCC 211] and Dharambir (supra), which establish that the claim of juvenility can be raised before any court at any stage.
Since the appellant was a juvenile under the 2000 Act, the sentence imposed by the trial court and upheld by the High Court was set aside.
“We order accordingly. The case is referred to the Board for passing appropriate orders in light of Sections 15 and 16 of the 2000 Act. The Appellant is directed to appear before the Board on 15th September 2025.”
The appeal was accordingly disposed of.
