The High Court of Delhi, in a significant order, has held that a civil suit seeking damages for the tort of ‘Alienation of Affection’ (AoA) is prima facie maintainable and falls within the jurisdiction of a Civil Court, not the exclusive domain of a Family Court. Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav ruled that a claim against a third party for tortious interference in a marital relationship constitutes an independent civil wrong, distinct from matrimonial disputes governed by the Family Courts Act, 1984. The Court accordingly issued summons in a suit filed by a wife against another woman, alleging that the latter’s conduct led to the breakdown of her marriage.
Background of the Case
The plaintiff, a wife, filed a suit for damages against another woman (defendant no. 1) and her own husband (defendant no. 2, as a proforma party). The plaintiff stated she married her husband on March 18, 2012, and they have twin children born in 2018.
According to the plaint, defendant no. 1 joined a venture of the husband as an Analyst in 2021. The plaintiff alleged that defendant no. 1, despite being aware of the existing marriage, developed a close and personal relationship with the husband. The plaintiff averred that this led to defendant no. 1 frequently visiting the marital home and becoming the husband’s exclusive travel companion.
The matter reportedly escalated in March 2023, when the plaintiff allegedly discovered an extramarital relationship, which defendant no. 1, upon confrontation, refused to end. Subsequently, the husband filed for divorce, with the summons being served on the plaintiff on April 4, 2025. Against this backdrop, the plaintiff instituted the present suit seeking damages, claiming that the “active and mala fide conduct of defendant no. 1” resulted in the withdrawal of affection and companionship she was entitled to from her husband.
Arguments of the Parties
The defendants, appearing on advance notice, vehemently opposed the issuance of summons, challenging the very maintainability of the suit.
Counsel for the defendants argued:
- The dispute falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court as per Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, as it arises from a marital relationship. They relied on the Delhi High Court Division Bench judgment in Geeta Anand v. Tanya Arjun.
- The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).
- The issue of adultery is already pending before the Family Court in the divorce proceedings initiated by defendant no. 2.
- Defendant no. 2, as an individual, possesses autonomy over his body and personal choices, and the plaintiff cannot curtail this freedom. While not directly relying on Joseph Shine v. Union of India (which decriminalised adultery), they argued the underlying principle of non-interference by the State in private matters of consenting adults should apply.
- Defendant no. 1 owes no legal duty to the plaintiff to refrain from interacting with defendant no. 2, and thus, no cause of action lies against her.
Counsel for the plaintiff, Ms. Malavika Rajkotia, contended:
- A prima facie case for the tort of Alienation of Affection is established.
- The plaintiff suffered damages due to the alleged “overt acts of defendant no. 1,” which resulted in the loss of affection and companionship from her husband.
- The plaintiff is entitled to claim damages under civil law for this tortious injury.
The Court’s Analysis
Justice Kaurav conducted a detailed analysis of the legal questions, primarily focusing on the status of the tort of AoA in India and the jurisdictional conflict between Civil and Family Courts.
On the Tort of Alienation of Affection:
The Court noted that AoA is a concept “fundamentally derived from Anglo-American Common Law” and belongs to the category of “heart-balm” torts. It observed that as of today, “Indian legislation does not expressly recognise the tort of AoA.”
Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat, the High Court highlighted that the apex court had described AoA as an “intentional tort i.e. interference in the marital relationship with intent to alienate one spouse from the other.” However, the Supreme Court also observed that “Anglo-Saxon common law on alienation of affection has not much roots in this country, the law is still in its nascent stage.”
The Court also cited Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed that AoA constitutes an intentional tort in principle. Justice Kaurav concluded that while Indian jurisprudence has acknowledged the concept, “no Indian Court appears to have granted relief in a civil suit seeking damages solely on the basis of AoA.”
On Jurisdiction and the Geeta Anand Test:
The central issue was whether the suit was barred by the Family Courts Act. The defendants relied on the Geeta Anand judgment, but the Court distinguished it. Justice Kaurav explained that the Division Bench in Geeta Anand had laid down a “cause of action test.” This test clarifies that for a matter to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court, the cause of action must have an “intrinsic and unavoidable nexus” with the marital relationship itself (e.g., maintenance, custody).
Applying this test, the Court found that the present suit was based on an independent cause of action. The judgment states, “the wrong alleged here, i.e., the intentional and wrongful interference by defendant no. 1 resulting in the loss of consortium and companionship of defendant no. 2, is pleaded not as an incidental outcome of marriage, but as an actionable civil injury arising from independent tortious conduct.” The Court held that such a claim is “quintessentially within the purview of the ordinary Civil Courts.”
The Court declined to follow the reasoning of the Kerala High Court in Leby Issac v. Leena M. Ninan, stating it was bound by the principle laid down by its own Division Bench in Geeta Anand.
On Personal Liberty and Civil Consequences:
Addressing the defendants’ argument on personal liberty, the Court agreed that personal autonomy must be protected. However, it clarified that this liberty does not come without consequences. The judgment observed, “The decision in Joseph Shine decriminalised adultery; it did not create a license to enter into intimate relationships beyond marriage, free from civil or legal implications.”
The Court emphasized that the current action was not against the husband but against a third party for her alleged tortious interference. It noted that in the absence of any remedy against a third party under matrimonial law, “a civil action seeking damages against a third party is not excluded and can be pursued before the Civil Court.”
The Decision
Concluding its analysis, the Court held that the plaint prima facie discloses a civil cause of action for tortious interference, which is distinct from remedies available under family law.
The Court stated, “the Court is of the considered opinion that the instant lis is wholly regarding civil rights related to tort, and the Civil Court retains the jurisdiction.”
Reserving all rights and contentions of the defendants, the Court directed that the plaint be registered as a suit and issued summons. The defendants were granted thirty days to file their written statements and were given the liberty to invoke the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC at a later stage if they seek rejection of the plaint. The matter is scheduled to be listed before the Joint Registrar on December 10, 2025, for completion of pleadings.
