The Supreme Court, in Angadi Chandranna vs Shankar & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 5401 of 2025, arising out of SLP (C) No. 6799 of 2022), set aside the Karnataka High Court’s judgment and restored the First Appellate Court’s decree. The Court held that once joint family property is partitioned, the individual shares allotted cease to be joint family property and become self-acquired properties.
Background of the Case:
The appellant, Angadi Chandranna (Defendant No.2 in the original suit), had purchased property bearing Sy. No. 93 measuring 7 acres 20 guntas at Mahadevapura Village, Challakere Taluk, from Defendant No.1 (C. Jayaramappa) by a registered sale deed dated 11.03.1993. Defendant No.1 had earlier purchased the same property from his elder brother, C. Thippeswamy, under a registered sale deed dated 16.10.1989, after a partition among brothers through a deed dated 09.05.1986.
Respondents (plaintiffs) were the sons and daughters of Defendant No.1, who filed Suit O.S. No.169 of 1994 seeking partition and separate possession of the said property, claiming it as ancestral property.
The Trial Court decreed the suit, declaring the plaintiffs entitled to partition. However, the First Appellate Court allowed the appeal by Defendant No.2 and set aside the decree. The High Court, on Second Appeal, reversed the First Appellate Court’s findings and restored the Trial Court’s decree. Aggrieved, Defendant No.2 approached the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties:
Appellant (Defendant No.2):
- It was contended that the property was the self-acquired property of Defendant No.1, bought using his own funds and a loan from Narasimhamurthy (DW3).
- It was argued that after partition in 1986, each brother’s share became their separate property.
- Reliance was placed on Jaichand (Dead) Through LRs v. Sahnulal & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864, and Gurnam Singh (Dead) by LRs v. Lehna Singh (Dead) by LRs, (2019) 7 SCC 641, to assert that reappreciation of facts is not permitted under Section 100 CPC unless a substantial question of law exists.
- It was further submitted that the plaintiffs could not seek partition without first cancelling the sale deed executed in favour of Defendant No.2, relying on Murugan & Ors. v. Kesava Gounder (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors., (2019) 20 SCC 633.
Respondents (Plaintiffs):
- The plaintiffs contended that Defendant No.1 acquired the suit property using the nucleus funds of the joint family, and therefore, it should be treated as ancestral property.
- It was submitted that minor sons had a coparcenary right over the property and relied upon Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, (1987) 1 SCC 204.
- The plaintiffs argued that Defendant No.1 could not have independently accumulated the purchase money merely through coolie work and that there was no credible evidence of a loan from DW3.
Supreme Court’s Analysis:
The Court, comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, made several critical observations:
- On Scope of Section 100 CPC:
Citing Jaichand and Chandrabhan (Deceased) through LRs v. Saraswati & Ors., 2022 INSC 997, the Court reiterated that the High Court cannot interfere with findings of fact unless they are perverse or based on no evidence. It found that the High Court had erroneously reappreciated evidence without a proper substantial question of law. - On Nature of the Property:
The Court found that after the 1986 partition, the share allotted to Defendant No.1 became his self-acquired property. It reaffirmed that:
“After the joint family property has been distributed in accordance with law, it ceases to be joint family properties and the shares of the respective parties become their self-acquired properties.” - On Proof of Nucleus:
The Supreme Court emphasised that the mere existence of a joint family does not imply that a property is joint. Referring to R. Deivanai Ammal v. G. Meenakshi Ammal, AIR 2004 Mad 529, the Court stated that unless the plaintiffs established the existence of sufficient joint family nucleus to acquire the suit property, it could not be presumed to be ancestral. - On the Doctrine of Blending:
The Court noted that the doctrine of blending requires a clear intention to throw self-acquired property into the common stock, which was not evidenced in this case. Mere family enjoyment or non-maintenance of separate accounts does not amount to blending. - On Legal Necessity:
The Court observed that Defendant No.1 had sold the property partly to repay loans and to perform his daughter’s marriage, which constituted legal necessity. - On Errors by High Court:
It was found that the High Court mistakenly examined issues regarding properties other than the suit property and failed to appreciate that the sale deed clearly stated the suit property was self-acquired.
Decision:
Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held:
“Defendant No.1 acquired the suit property out of the loan obtained from DW3 and not from the income derived from the nucleus funds or joint family funds, and hence, the suit property should be considered as his self-acquired property.”
Accordingly, the Court:
- Set aside the High Court’s judgment dated 12.08.2021.
- Restored the First Appellate Court’s judgment and decree dated 21.02.2006.
- Directed the parties to bear their own costs.
