The Supreme Court of India, in a significant ruling, has held that a second petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) for quashing a criminal complaint is not maintainable on grounds that were available to the accused at the time of the first petition. A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta observed that entertaining such a petition amounts to a review of a previous order by a coordinate bench, which is expressly barred by Section 362 of the CrPC.
The Court set aside an order of the High Court of Judicature at Madras which had allowed a second quashing petition and had consequently quashed a criminal complaint against the respondents. The Supreme Court restored the criminal proceedings, clarifying that while there is no absolute bar on a second quashing petition, the onus is on the petitioner to demonstrate a change in circumstances.
Background of the Case
The case originates from loan transactions between 2005 and 2008 involving the appellant, M.C. Ravikumar (the complainant), and the accused-respondents, who were money lenders. As security for the loans, the complainant handed over original property deeds for his properties in Thanjavur and Chennai.
The complainant alleged that after clearing the total loan amount of Rs. 1,65,98,000, the accused-respondents failed to return the original property deeds. A legal notice was sent on August 30, 2011. Subsequently, the complainant discovered that respondent No. 1, D.S. Velmurugan, had allegedly executed a “sham sale deed” for the Thanjavur property.
This led to a series of legal actions. A criminal complaint (Crime No. 193 of 2012) was filed, but police submitted a closure report, which was accepted by the trial court and upheld by the High Court and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, observed that its dismissal would not prejudice the complainant from pursuing other appropriate remedies.
Later, another individual, P. Jothikumar, filed a civil suit (Civil Suit No. 79 of 2018) against the complainant for recovery of money, exhibiting the original documents of a flat in Chennai that the complainant claimed were given as security to the accused-respondents.
Aggrieved, the complainant filed Criminal Complaint No. 1828 of 2019 before the IX Metropolitan Judicial Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, against the accused-respondents and P. Jothikumar for offences including criminal breach of trust, cheating, and forgery under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The magistrate issued summons to the accused.
The accused-respondents filed a first quashing petition (Criminal Original Petition No. 14186 of 2019) before the Madras High Court, which was dismissed by a speaking order on December 22, 2021. Six months later, they filed a second quashing petition (Criminal Original Petition No. 16241 of 2022) seeking to quash the same criminal complaint. The High Court, via its order dated September 13, 2022, allowed this second petition, which prompted the complainant to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
For the Appellant (Complainant): The counsel for M.C. Ravikumar argued that the High Court committed a grave error by allowing the second quashing petition, as it was based on the very same grounds as the first. It was contended that there were no new circumstances to justify a second petition. The counsel submitted that the High Court’s order was effectively a review of a previous order by a coordinate bench, which is impermissible under Section 362 of the CrPC.
For the Accused-Respondents: Conversely, the counsel for the accused-respondents argued that the High Court was right to quash the complaint, citing a change in circumstances, namely that a similar complaint regarding the Thanjavur property had already been quashed. They contended that the second petition raised different grounds that were not effectively argued in the first. It was further argued that the dispute was purely civil and the criminal proceedings were an abuse of the legal process, which the High Court has inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to prevent.
Supreme Court’s Analysis and Findings
The Supreme Court framed the central question for consideration as: “Whether a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC would be maintainable on the grounds/pleas that were available to be raised even at the time of filing/decision of the first quashing petition?”
The bench found the respondents’ claim of new grounds to be “not tenable on the face of it.” The Court noted that the quashing of the complaint related to the Thanjavur property occurred on March 9, 2020, well before the dismissal of the first quashing petition on December 22, 2021. This ground was therefore “manifestly available” to the accused during the first petition.
The Court held that the failure to raise an available plea at the first instance does not grant a right to file a subsequent petition. It stated, “The failure of the accused-respondents to raise a pertinent ground/plea which was tangibly available to them at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition can in no circumstance grant a right to the said accused persons to file a subsequent quashing petition as it would amount to seeking review on pre-existing material.”
Referring to its decision in Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of UP & Anr., the Court reiterated that while there is no blanket ban on a second petition, its maintainability depends on the facts and circumstances. The judgment quoted:
“Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr.P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted.”
The bench concluded that the High Court’s order in the second petition was a “review (plain and simple)” of the earlier order and was passed in “gross disregard to all tenets of law as Section 362 CrPC expressly bars review of a judgment or final order.”
Citing the precedent in Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and Anr., the Court affirmed that the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC cannot be used to override a specific statutory bar. The Court quoted:
“The law is therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the Code. The court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent power.”
Final Decision
Concluding that the High Court’s impugned order was “unjustified on the face of the record,” the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the order dated September 13, 2022.
As a result, Criminal Complaint No. 1828 of 2019 was restored to the file of the IX Metropolitan Judicial Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai. The Court clarified that the accused-respondents remain free to raise all available defences before the appropriate forum at the proper stage.
