The Supreme Court has held that the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 can be invoked only when a substantial question of law arises from the findings of the First Appellate Court, and not merely to reappreciate facts already settled by lower courts.
A bench comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh made this observation while allowing an appeal filed by a bonafide purchaser, setting aside the Karnataka High Court’s judgment in a second appeal that had interfered with concurrent findings recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court in a partition suit.
“What is required is a substantial question of law which if answered in favour of the appellant, shall have the effect of reversing the judgment and decree of the Court below. As a matter of course, findings rendered on facts ought not to be interfered with,” the Court held.
Background
The dispute arose out of a suit for partition and separate possession. The appellant, Gowtham Chand, was arrayed as Defendant No.2. The suit related to various items of Schedule ‘A’ properties, but the controversy before the Court was confined to Item No.2.
An agreement for sale was entered into in 1977 between the appellant and Defendant No.1, the father of the plaintiffs. Pursuant to this agreement, a sale deed was executed on 30 July 1980. However, the partition suit was filed on 25 July 1980, just five days prior to the execution. Crucially, the summons in the suit were issued only after the sale deed was executed.
Findings of the Trial Courts
The Trial Court held that the appellant was a bonafide purchaser for value and excluded Item No.2 from the partition decree. This finding was confirmed by the First Appellate Court, which upheld the validity of the sale transaction and found no reason to disturb the Trial Court’s conclusion.
High Court’s Interference Set Aside
In a second appeal, the Karnataka High Court reversed the decree insofar as Item No.2 was concerned, holding that the sale was affected by the doctrine of lis pendens and that the property was joint family property. It held that the transaction was not valid as it occurred during the pendency of the suit.
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the High Court’s interference was unwarranted and not in accordance with the scope of its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.
The bench noted that both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court had returned factual findings after due consideration of evidence. The sale transaction was based on a prior agreement executed in 1977, and the execution of the sale deed occurred before the service of summons in the partition suit.
“There is no bar for alienation during the pendency of a suit. However, in this case, the sale deed was executed on 30.07.1980, but the suit was filed on 25.07.1980 and summons were issued much later,” the Court observed.
It also reaffirmed the settled position of law that a karta of a Hindu joint family, as Defendant No.1 was, is legally competent to alienate joint family property for legal necessity or benefit of the estate.
Conclusion
Holding that the High Court erred in interfering with well-reasoned findings of fact and equity by the courts below, the Supreme Court ruled:
“Thus, looking from any perspective, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the judgment and decree rendered by the Courts below… we are inclined to set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court.”
Consequently, the decree passed by the Trial Court, as affirmed by the First Appellate Court, was restored. The Court clarified that the contesting respondents would still be entitled to claim their respective shares in Item No.2 of Schedule ‘A’ from the portion allotted to their father (Defendant No.1).
Case Title: Gowtham Chand v. A.G. Shivakumar (Since Deceased) & Ors.
Citation: Civil Appeal No. ___ of 2025 (@ SLP(C) No. 24993/2023)
