The Allahabad High Court, in a significant ruling on interim injunctions in specific performance suits, has held that a court can restrain a defendant from alienating suit property under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the C.P.C., even if the transfer would otherwise be covered by the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Justice Sandeep Jain set aside a trial court order that had refused an injunction, reasoning that the lis pendens rule does not prevent the creation of third-party rights that can lead to future complications, and that the legislature provided for an injunction remedy notwithstanding Section 52.
The Court allowed a First Appeal From Order (FAFO) filed by plaintiffs, granting them an interim injunction restraining the defendant from selling or transferring the disputed land pending the suit.
Background of the Case
The appeal (FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. – 2422 of 2025) was filed by Mahesh Kumar and 3 Others (plaintiffs) against a 17.09.2025 order by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gautam Buddha Nagar. The trial court had rejected their application for an interim injunction in Original Suit No. 751 of 2023.
The plaintiffs had filed the suit for specific performance of a registered agreement to sell dated 28.07.2022, executed by the defendant, Omaira Buildcon Proprietor Lalit Gogia. The agreement concerned 3250 square yards of land in Village Mirzapur, Gautam Buddha Nagar, for a total consideration of Rs. 2.05 crores.
According to the plaint, the plaintiffs had already paid Rs. 1.85 crores prior to the agreement, and the remaining Rs. 20 lakhs were to be paid by 28.10.2022, at which time the defendant was to execute the sale deed. The plaintiffs alleged that despite their readiness and willingness, and a legal notice to the defendant to appear before the Sub-Registrar, the defendant failed to execute the deed.
During the suit, the plaintiffs filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 C.P.C., stating the defendant’s intention had turned “malafide” and he was “intending to sell the disputed land to other persons,” which would “complicate the issue.”
Arguments and Trial Court’s Decision
The defendant opposed the injunction, claiming the Rs. 1.85 crores was a “loan” and the alleged agreement to sell was merely “security for the loan.” The defendant contended that he was ready to return the amount and that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to fulfill any terms.
The trial court, in its order dated 17.09.2025, rejected the plaintiffs’ injunction application. The trial court reasoned that the plaintiffs were not owners or in possession, that the agreement to sell did not confer title, and that the land was unidentifiable. Crucially, the trial court held that no prima facie case was made out and that if any transfer occurred, it would be “barred by the principle of lis-pendens,” meaning no “irreparable injury” would be caused to the plaintiffs.
The appellants (plaintiffs) argued before the High Court that the trial court’s reasoning was “perverse.” Their counsel submitted that the plaintiffs “never averred that they have got any title in the disputed land nor the plaintiffs were in possession,” and this was never the issue. The only issue was the defendant’s intent to sell, which would “create complications.” The appellants relied on the Apex Court case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi vs. Harish Ambalal Choksi & Others (2024) 11 SCC 351, which held that an injunction can be granted “notwithstanding the Rule of lis-pendens in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.”
The respondent (defendant) argued that Section 52 T.P. Act was applicable, and any subsequent purchaser would be bound by the suit’s decision, hence the plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction.
High Court’s Analysis and Observations
Justice Sandeep Jain, hearing the appeal, noted that the plaintiffs were “only claiming the interim relief that the defendant be restrained from alienating or transferring the disputed land in favour of the third party, which is perfectly in accordance with law.”
The Court found the trial court’s reasoning, which focused on the plaintiffs’ lack of title or possession, to be “perverse” because this was an “admitted position of the plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs are not protecting their possession of the disputed land.”
The High Court extensively quoted the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi (supra), which addressed the exact issue. The judgment noted:
“It is true that the doctrine of lis pendens as enunciated in Section 52 of the TP Act takes care of all pendente lite transfers; but it may not always be good enough to take fullest care of the plaintiffs interest vis-à-vis such a transfer.”
Justice Jain highlighted the Supreme Court’s illustration from that case: if a defendant is not restrained and “a third party purchases the same bona fide for value without any notice… and spends a huge sum for the improvement thereof… the equity in his favour may intervene to persuade the Court to decline, in the exercise of its discretion, the equitable relief of specific performance to the plaintiff at the trial…”
Adopting the Supreme Court’s rationale, the High Court observed that “if the doctrine of lis pendens as enacted in Section 52 of the TP Act was regarded to have provided all the panacea against pendente lite transfers, the legislature would not have provided in Rule 1 Order 39 of the Code clearly provides for interim injunction restraining the alienation or sale of the suit property.”
The Court also distinguished the case laws cited by the defendant, stating they merely reiterated the settled position that an agreement to sell does not confer title, a proposition with which there was “no quarrel.”
Final Decision
Concluding that the trial court “certainly erred in rejecting the plaintiffs’ interim injunction application,” the High Court allowed the appeal.
The impugned order dated 17.09.2025 was set aside, and the plaintiffs’ application (6C-2) under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 C.P.C. was allowed.
Consequently, the defendant, Omaira Buildcon, was “restrained from alienating, transferring or creating third party rights in the disputed land, during the pendency of the suit.” The trial court was also directed to decide the original suit “preferably within a period of six months.”
