The Supreme Court has held that a Revenue Officer under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (WBEA Act) does not possess the statutory power to review an earlier order of vesting. The Court ruled that executive instructions or government orders cannot confer such jurisdiction in the absence of an express legislative mandate.
A Division Bench comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh allowed the appeal filed by the State of West Bengal, setting aside a 2012 judgment of the Calcutta High Court which had permitted a private company to retain over 211 acres of land based on a “review” order passed nearly four decades after the original vesting.
Background of the Dispute
The case involves Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., a company incorporated in 1946. The company claimed entitlement to retain agricultural land under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953, which allows companies “engaged exclusively in farming” as of January 1, 1952, to retain land.
In 1971, a Revenue Officer initiated proceedings and passed an order on October 7, 1971, holding that the company failed to produce evidence proving it was exclusively engaged in farming. Consequently, the land vested in the State. The company challenged this order, but its writ petition was dismissed in 1975, a restoration application was rejected in 1987, and a subsequent appeal was dismissed in 2002, bringing finality to the 1971 vesting order.
However, in 2008, following a proposal by the company for an “amicable settlement” to set up an agro-based industry, the State Government issued an order on February 26, 2008, directing the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer (B.L. & L.R.O.) to review the 1971 proceeding. Acting on this, the B.L. & L.R.O. passed a review order on May 7, 2008, setting aside the 1971 order and allowing the company to retain 211.21 acres.
The West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal quashed this review order in 2010, citing a lack of jurisdiction. However, the Calcutta High Court, in its impugned judgment dated May 17, 2012, reversed the Tribunal’s decision and upheld the 2008 review order. The State of West Bengal approached the Supreme Court challenging this decision.
Arguments Before the Court
The Appellants (State of West Bengal) argued that the power of review must be statutorily conferred and cannot be exercised by a quasi-judicial authority absent specific provisions. They contended that Section 57A of the WBEA Act, which invests authorities with Civil Court powers, does not inherently confer the power of review. They further argued that the 1971 order had attained finality, and the 2008 review was based on irrelevant considerations.
The Respondent (Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.) argued that Section 57A, read with the State’s notification investing Revenue Officers with powers under the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), provided jurisdiction for review. They contended that the “amicable settlement” approved by the Minister-in-Charge justified the review to correct the alleged errors of the 1971 order. The company also invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Supreme Court’s Analysis
1. No Statutory Power of Review The Supreme Court categorically rejected the contention that Revenue Officers have inherent powers of review. Citing precedents like Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji and Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, the Court reiterated that “the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication.”
The Court interpreted Section 57A of the WBEA Act, observing:
“The omnibus expression used in the State notification dated 09.01.1958 investing all the Settlement Officers, Assistant Settlement Officers and Revenue Officers with all the powers of the Civil Court, in our opinion, does not amount to conferment of power of review as well to these authorities.”
The Bench further pointed to the proviso to Section 57B(3) of the Act, which expressly prohibits a Revenue Officer from reopening any matter already decided by the State Government or any authority under the Act.
2. Separation of Powers and Independence of Judiciary The Court emphasized that permitting executive authorities to review their own quasi-judicial orders without express legislative backing would violate the basic structure of the Constitution regarding the separation of powers.
“The power of review is essentially a core judicial function, and conferring such a power upon executive authorities, absent an express legislative mandate, would blur the constitutionally mandated demarcation between the executive and the judiciary… Any contrary construction would, therefore, be inconsistent with legislative intent and would impermissibly encroach upon the basic structure of the Constitution.”
3. Review on Merits and Limitation Even examining the review on merits under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC, the Court found the 2008 order unsustainable. The Court noted that the company had been given ample opportunity in 1971 to prove its eligibility but failed to do so. The “new evidence” cited in 2008 (documents from the 1950s) was within the company’s possession and did not meet the criteria of “discovery of new and important matter.”
Regarding the 40-year delay, the Court observed:
“A concluded determination cannot be reopened on the basis of subsequent policy preferences or economic expediency, in the absence of a legally sustainable ground contemplated under the law governing review.”
The Court termed the “amicable settlement” regarding potential employment generation as an extraneous consideration wholly irrelevant to the legal jurisdiction of review.
4. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by Consent Addressing the High Court’s reliance on the Minister’s approval, the Supreme Court held that the Government Order dated February 26, 2008, could not confer jurisdiction where the statute did not. Relying on Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, the Court held that a decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity.
“The High Court… incorrectly proceeded on the premise that the Government Order issued under Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, having been approved by the Minister-in-Charge, constituted sufficient authority to confer review jurisdiction upon the Revenue Officer.”
Conclusion and Decision
The Supreme Court concluded that the review undertaken by the Revenue Officer in 2008 was “wholly without jurisdiction and void ab initio.”
The Court held:
“The WBEA Act, 1953, does not confer any power of substantive review upon the Revenue Officer, either expressly or by necessary implication… The vesting order dated 07.10.1971 shall continue to operate in accordance with the law.”
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the Calcutta High Court’s judgment was set aside, and the Tribunal’s order quashing the 2008 review was restored.
Case Details:
- Case Title: State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd.
- Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 7407 of 2012
- Coram: Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
