The High Court of Delhi on October 31, 2025, ruled that a person convicted of an offence but released on probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is protected from disqualification for appointment, setting aside a communication from the Airport Authority of India (AAI) that had cancelled a candidate’s appointment on the basis of a prior conviction.
Justice Prateek Jalan, in the judgment for W.P.(C) 218/2025, Rajesh v. Union of India and Ors., allowed the writ petition, quashed the AAI’s cancellation order dated 09.12.2024, and directed the authority to appoint the petitioner.
Background of the Case
The petitioner, Rajesh, had applied for the post of Junior Executive (Common Cadre) with the AAI on 25.08.2023. After clearing the Computer Based Test and document verification, he was issued an offer of appointment on 11.04.2024 and subsequently joined the required training on 19.04.2024.
However, the AAI cancelled his appointment by an order dated 19.08.2024. The cancellation was based on Regulation 6(7)(b) of the Airports Authority of India (General Conditions of Service and Remuneration of Employees) Regulations, 2003, which deems persons “convicted of offences involving moral turpitude” ineligible for appointment.
The conviction stemmed from criminal proceedings initiated by the petitioner’s estranged wife (FIR No. 431/2012) under Sections 498A, 406, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. A Trial Court convicted him on 04.09.2014 under Sections 498A and 406 IPC. In an appeal, the Appellate Court noted on 21.09.2015 that the petitioner and the complainant had settled the matter and filed for divorce by mutual consent. Consequently, the Appellate Court granted the petitioner the benefit of probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
The petitioner first challenged the cancellation in W.P.(C) 13711/2024. On 30.09.2024, the High Court disposed of that petition, directing AAI to pass a fresh reasoned order, specifically considering Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, which removes disqualification attaching to a conviction. The AAI, in its subsequent decision dated 09.12.2024, upheld the cancellation, leading to the present writ petition.
The judgment noted that this was not a case of misrepresentation, as the “petitioner declared his conviction, at the time he was required to do so.”
Arguments of the Parties
The petitioner, represented by Mr. Saqib, advocate, argued that by virtue of Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, the disqualification under AAI’s Regulation 6(7)(b) could not be applied to him. This argument was supported by reliance on judgments including Shaitan Singh Meena v. Union of India and Anr. and Satya Pal Singh v. Union of India & Ors. The petitioner also pointed out factual errors in the AAI’s order, which he argued reflected non-application of mind.
Ms. Anjana Gosain, learned counsel for AAI, defended the cancellation, relying on Regulation 6(7)(b). She submitted that there is “no hard and fast rule that release on probation automatically renders the disqualification inapplicable” and cited Ajit Kumar v. Commissioner of Police & Ors. She argued that the post of Junior Executive (Common Cadre) is an officer-level post, and AAI was entitled to apply its statutory rule against employing convicted persons.
Court’s Analysis
Justice Prateek Jalan began the analysis by stating the question was not about AAI’s general right to disqualify, but “whether the factum of the release on probation protects him from the rigors of disqualification under Rule 6(7)(b) of the Regulations.”
The Court heavily relied on the Division Bench decision in Shaitan Singh Meena. It noted that Shaitan Singh Meena distinguished between cases of “disqualification from appointment,” which Section 12 of the Act covers, and “dismissal from a post.”
The Court found the present case to be “closer to the facts of Shaitan Singh Meena.” It observed that AAI’s reliance on the Ajit Kumar case (concerning a Constable in Delhi Police) was misplaced. The Shaitan Singh Meena judgment had already distinguished Ajit Kumar on the grounds of the nature of the post (a police post requiring “utmost integrity”) and the seriousness of the offence (Section 308 IPC).
In contrast, the Court found the petitioner’s post of “Junior Executive (Common Cadre)” was not analogous to a law enforcement role. The AAI’s counter-affidavit described the post as an “officer-level position” with a career path that “may culminate in the position of Airport Director.”
The Court held this reasoning to be “too vague and speculative… upon which to deny the petitioner a livelihood.”
Concluding its analysis, the Court found that the petitioner was entitled to the protection from disqualification under Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The judgment stated: “Although the petitioner was convicted of offences under Sections 498A and 406 IPC, he was released on probation by the Appellate Court after the proceedings between him and the complainant [his wife] had been settled… The marriage of the petitioner and the complainant had also been dissolved by mutual consent. The post for which the petitioner was offered appointment was not such as to require such a lasting effect of his conviction, so as to disentitle the benefit of the statutory provisions.”
Decision
The High Court allowed the petition and set aside the AAI’s impugned order dated 09.12.2024. Noting that AAI had previously submitted that one post in the relevant category was kept vacant for the petitioner, the Court directed the AAI “to appoint the petitioner against the said vacant post.”
