The High Court at Calcutta has set aside the conviction and sentence of a man found guilty of rape (Section 376 IPC) and cheating (Section 415 IPC) by a trial court. The High Court, allowing the appeal, held that the prosecution failed to establish the charge of rape, concluding that the relationship between the appellant and the complainant was consensual, not coercive.
Justice Prasenjit Biswas observed that the complainant was a major, “more than 20 years old,” at the time of the incident, and her subsequent conduct, including a “prolonged physical association” admitted to in cross-examination, negated the theory of forcible sexual intercourse. The Court also noted the complete lack of medical evidence and the prosecution’s failure to examine key witnesses as “serious” gaps in its case.
Background of the Case
The appeal was filed by the appellant against a judgment dated July 7, 2000, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Islampur. The trial court had found him guilty under Sections 376 and 415 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to two years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 7,000.
The prosecution’s case originated from a complaint filed by the victim, a co-villager of the accused. The complaint stated that a “love affairs had grown in between them.” It was alleged that on March 13, 1994, the accused entered the complainant’s bedroom on “good faith,” put a garland on her neck, “convinced the defacto complainant to be his marriage wife,” and then “forcibly took the complaint to bed and committed rape on her without her consent forcibly.”
The accused allegedly reassured her he would marry her “socially subsequently” and continued to cohabit with her. When the complainant asked him to marry her, he “adopted dilatory tactics.”
The matter was escalated to a ‘salish’ (village meeting) on November 10, 1996. In the ‘salish’, the accused allegedly confessed to having “enjoyed the victim” and agreed to marry her, but demanded Rs. 10,000 as dowry. When the complainant’s mother could not pay, the accused refused to marry her, leading to the criminal complaint. The trial court subsequently framed charges under Sections 376, 493, and 504 of the IPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Submissions: Mr. Dipanjan Chatterjee, appearing for the appellant, argued that the materials on record were “wholly insufficient” to justify the conviction. He pointed to “substantial inconsistencies and contradictions” in witness depositions.
It was argued that the complainant was “aged about 20 years and 11 months” at the time, a major capable of understanding her actions. Evidence from PW4 and PW6 confirmed a “romantic relationship,” supporting the defense’s version that the relationship was consensual. The appellant’s counsel also highlighted that the victim did not raise any alarm and that her testimony in the trial court deviated from her earlier statement before the S.D.J.M.
State’s Submissions: Mr. Arnab Chatterjee, representing the State, contended that there was “no illegality, irregularity, or infirmity” in the trial court’s judgment. He argued that the accused took “advantage” of the love relationship and, under a “false assurance of marriage,” “forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her against her will.”
The State further submitted that the victim became pregnant and the accused provided “herbal medicines to terminate the pregnancy.” It was argued that the cohabitation was “not consensual but was obtained under a false promise of marriage.”
Court’s Analysis and Observations
The High Court conducted a meticulous examination of the evidence and found significant flaws in the prosecution’s case.
1. Victim’s Age and Consensual Relationship: The Court gave significant weight to the victim’s age. Based on her Transfer Certificate (Exhibit-3), her date of birth was January 2, 1974. The Court calculated that at the time of the alleged incident (March 13, 1994), “the victim was more than 20 years old.”
Justice Biswas observed, “She was, thus, a major and a matured individual, capable of understanding the nature and consequences of her own acts and decisions.”
The Court noted that the victim (PW1), as well as PW4 and PW7 (Secretary of the Mohila Samity), all testified to the pre-existing “love relationship.” PW7 testified that the victim had filed a written petition before her stating she had love affairs with the accused, they exchanged letters, he “promised to marry her,” and “by way of exchanging garlands, they had even solemnized a form of marriage and thereafter had sexual intercourse.”
Based on this, the Court found “the relationship between the parties was voluntary, affectionate, and consensual in nature.”
2. Victim’s Conduct and Delayed Complaint: The Court found the victim’s conduct inconsistent with the allegation of rape. The judgment noted that the victim “did not disclose the incident to anyone immediately—not even to her mother.” This “prolonged silence,” the Court held, “cast grave suspicion on the veracity of her allegations.”
Most significantly, the Court highlighted the victim’s cross-examination, where she “stated in her cross-examination that the act of rape continued for 2 to 3 years.” Justice Biswas found this admission critical, stating, “Such prolonged physical association between two individuals… negates the theory of forcible sexual intercourse. A relationship of this duration and continuity strongly indicates that the intimacy between the two was voluntary and consensual in nature.”
Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Prashant-vs-State of NCT of Delhi (2025), the High Court noted it was “inconceivable that the complainant would continue to meet the appellant or maintain a prolonged association or physical relationship with him in the absence of voluntary consent on her part.”
3. Lack of Corroborating Evidence: The Court identified “serious” gaps in the prosecution’s evidence.
- No Medical Evidence: “Further, the record is silent on any medical examination of the victim being conducted immediately after the alleged incident.”
- Abortion Allegation Unsubstantiated: Regarding the alleged abortion, the Court found “no medical evidence or independent corroboration.”
- Failure to Examine Witness: The prosecution failed to examine “Bina Devi,” the woman alleged to have supplied the herbal medicine. The Court called this “a serious gap in the chain of evidence” and an “omission” that “creates a serious infirmity.”
- Complaint Scribe’s Testimony: PW6, the scribe of the written complaint, testified that the victim “did not state him that her menstruation had stopped, that she had become pregnant, or that she had undergone abortion.” The Court viewed these allegations as “subsequent improvements or embellishments.”
4. Nature of the Promise and Motive: The Court distinguished between a false promise and a broken promise, citing Deepak Gulati-vs-State of Haryana (2013). It found the accused’s assurance of marriage to be “vague and uncertain” and “more in the nature of an emotional or romantic expression… rather than a serious or binding commitment.”
Citing Uday-vs-State of Karnataka (2003), the Court reiterated that “consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a latter date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact.”
The Court also addressed the dowry demand, observing that it “reveals a transactional element… which is wholly inconsistent with the conduct of a person who has allegedly committed rape.” The Court stated, “It is quite possible that such grievance became the motive for implicating the accused in the instant case.”
Concluding its analysis, the Court held: “Such disappointment or breach of expectation, by itself, cannot be construed to mean that the accused had committed the offence of rape… the facts and surrounding circumstances suggest that the act was consensual and stemmed out of mutual affection between the two.”
The Decision
Finding that the “learned Trial Court committed error and illegality in convicting the accused,” Justice Prasenjit Biswas allowed the appeal.
The High Court ordered: “The impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned Trial Court… is hereby set aside.” The appellant, who was on bail, was ordered to be discharged from his bail bonds, subject to furnishing new bonds as required under Section 437A of the Cr.P.C.
