Procedural Errors Don’t Vitiate Trial Unless Failure of Justice is Proven, SC Rules While Restoring POCSO Conviction

The Supreme Court of India, in a significant ruling, has set aside a High Court judgment that had acquitted two men convicted of rape under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. A bench of Justices Satish Chandra Sharma and Sanjay Kumar held that procedural irregularities, such as errors in framing charges or misjoinder of trials, do not invalidate a conviction unless they are shown to have caused a “failure of justice.” The Court restored the trial court’s order convicting and sentencing the two accused to life imprisonment.

The apex court was hearing an appeal filed by the victim’s father against the acquittal of Hare Ram Sah and Manish Tiwari. The trial court had found them guilty, but the High Court overturned the conviction, citing several procedural infirmities and inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case.

Background of the Case

The case originated from a complaint lodged on July 2, 2016, in Piro, Bihar. The appellant’s minor daughter fell ill a few months after the festival of Holi in 2016. When her health continued to deteriorate, her mother took her to a hospital in Ballia, Uttar Pradesh, on July 1, 2016, where she was found to be three months pregnant.

Upon being questioned, the victim disclosed that she had been raped on separate occasions by Hare Ram Sah and Manish Tiwari about three to four months prior. She stated that Manish Tiwari had raped her one afternoon when she was alone at home, threatening to kill her if she told anyone. A few days later, Hare Ram Sah lured her into his coaching center on the pretext of helping her find her brother and raped her, issuing a similar threat. The victim deposed that for the next two to three months, both men took turns and raped her multiple times.

Following the investigation, a chargesheet was filed. The Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge (POCSO Act), Bhojpur at Ara, found both accused guilty of offences under Sections 376(2) of the IPC and Sections 4 & 6 of the POCSO Act, sentencing them to rigorous life imprisonment.

High Court’s Acquittal

In an appeal, the High Court acquitted the accused, identifying five primary infirmities in the prosecution’s case:

1. The precise date and time of the alleged incidents were not proven.
2. The age of the victim was not properly determined.
3. There was no proof of the victim’s abortion placed on record.
4. The charge was improperly framed, recording the date of the offence as July 2, 2016 (the date of FIR), instead of 3-4 months prior.
5. The trial court erred by conducting a joint trial for both accused, which was not permissible under Section 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) and had caused “grave prejudice” to them.

Arguments in the Supreme Court

The appellant argued that the High Court had erred, contending that the ground of an improper joint trial was never raised by the accused and, in any event, it did not cause any prejudice. It was submitted that the victim’s minority, pregnancy, and subsequent abortion were all established through evidence, and any procedural lapse should have led to a remand for fresh adjudication, not an outright acquittal.

Conversely, the respondents supported the High Court’s decision, arguing that the investigation was “casual and negligent,” leading to prejudice. They highlighted the defective charges, the violation of Section 223 Cr.P.C., and inconsistencies in the witness testimonies.

Supreme Court’s Analysis and Decision

The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed each ground of acquittal relied upon by the High Court and found its reasoning to be flawed.

On Evidentiary Issues:

• Victim’s Age: The Court found that oral testimonies of the victim’s parents and her school Transfer Certificate, which recorded her date of birth as October 3, 2004, conclusively established her age as around 12-13 years at the time of the offence. The bench noted that the respondents had not challenged her age during cross-examination. It observed, “once the minority of the victim was beyond doubt, the special protection of POCSO Act ought not to have been diluted by raising a fictious doubt regarding the precise age of the victim.”
• Proof of Pregnancy and Abortion: The Supreme Court held that the High Court “fell in a grave error by failing to acknowledge the evidence on record.” It pointed to the medical report dated July 1, 2016, which confirmed a 15-week pregnancy, the testimony of the doctor (PW-7), and a letter from the Bihar State Legal Services Authority (BSLSA) regarding the permission sought for the abortion, which was subsequently performed.
• Date and Time of Offence: The Court deemed the victim’s inability to recall the exact date and time as “completely natural,” given that she was a minor who had been threatened into silence. It held that the medical reports corroborated the timeframe she provided.
• Delay in FIR: The delay was found to be “appropriately explained” as the FIR was lodged the very next day after the pregnancy was discovered on July 1, 2016.

On Procedural Irregularities:

• Defective Charge: While acknowledging that the trial court erred in stating the date of the offence as the date of the FIR, the Supreme Court invoked Section 464 of the Cr.P.C. This provision states that an error in a charge does not invalidate a court’s finding unless it has “occasioned a failure of justice.” The Court concluded that the respondents were fully aware of the allegations and the correct time frame throughout the trial and were not misled in any manner.
• Joint Trial (Section 223 Cr.P.C.): This was the central procedural issue. The Supreme Court faulted the High Court’s approach, stating that it was not enough to find that a joint trial was irregular. The crucial test, the Court emphasized, is whether the misjoinder caused actual prejudice and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The judgment stated, “Mere non-compliance of the procedure contemplated under Section 223 does not ipso facto render the trial as invalid, and the same cannot form the basis of returning a finding of prejudice and failure of justice.” The bench found no evidence that the joint trial had prejudiced the accused or prevented them from presenting a valid defence.

In its concluding remarks, the bench observed that the principle of “beyond reasonable doubt” is often misunderstood. It stated, “Every instance of acquittal of an actual culprit revolt against the sense of security of the society and acts as a blot on the criminal justice system… no culprit should manage an acquittal on the basis of unreasonable doubts and misapplication of procedure.”

Finding the High Court’s judgment “unsustainable,” the Supreme Court set it aside and restored the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence in its entirety. The respondents, Hare Ram Sah and Manish Tiwari, were directed to surrender within two weeks to serve the remainder of their life sentences.