Reiterating the settled legal position on the doctrine of res judicata, the Supreme Court has held that the principle applies not only to two different proceedings but also to different stages of the same proceeding. The observation came in Civil Appeal No. 7108 of 2025 (Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan & Ors.), wherein the Court upheld concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Kerala High Court, rejecting the appellant’s plea for deletion from the array of parties in execution proceedings stemming from a suit for specific performance.
The judgment was delivered by a Division Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan.
Background
The litigation arose from a suit for specific performance (O.S. No. 617/1996) instituted by respondent no. 1 (original plaintiff) before the Principal Sub Court, Palakkad, based on an agreement to sell dated June 14, 1996, executed by Late Jameela Beevi, the original defendant. The suit property comprised a one-cent parcel with a commercial shop in Palakkad Town, Kerala. Sulthan Said Ibrahim, the appellant, was a witness to the said agreement.
The original defendant died during the pendency of execution proceedings, leading to the impleadment of her legal heirs, including the appellant, under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908.
Procedural History
After multiple phases of litigation, including the restoration of an ex parte decree, trial, appeal, and special leave petition, the decree for specific performance attained finality in 2008. However, the execution proceedings remained pending. In 2012, the appellant filed I.A. No. 2348/2012 seeking deletion from the party array, asserting that he was neither a legal heir under Mohammedan Law nor liable to be impleaded. He also claimed tenancy rights in the suit property inherited from his father.
The Trial Court dismissed the application, finding it barred by constructive res judicata and lacking bona fides. The Kerala High Court, in O.P.(C) No. 2290 of 2013, affirmed the dismissal, holding that the impleadment had attained finality and the application under Order I Rule 10 CPC was barred by res judicata.
Supreme Court’s Analysis
Upholding the findings below, the Supreme Court held that:
“The only manner in which a decision arrived at by a court of competent jurisdiction can be interfered with is by modification or reversal by the appellate authorities. In the present case… the subsequent application under Order I Rule 10 seeking to get his name deleted… could be said to be barred by res judicata.”
The Court cited Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar [(2005) 1 SCC 787], Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi [1960] 3 SCR 590, and S. Ramachandra Rao v. S. Nagabhushana Rao [2022 SCC OnLine SC 1460] to affirm that:
“Principles of res judicata apply not only to two different proceedings but also to different stages of the same proceeding.”
The Court rejected the appellant’s claim that the doctrine of representation did not apply under Mohammedan Law, noting that the objection to impleadment ought to have been raised during the inquiry under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC.
The Bench further observed that the appellant’s delayed objections and participation in previous interlocutory proceedings without protest illustrated a “strategy to delay execution.”
On the claim of tenancy protection under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, the Court found no merit, stating that the appellant failed to establish his tenancy or exclusive possession. It noted that:
- He was a witness to the sale agreement;
- The agreement did not mention any tenancy;
- He had not raised tenancy objections earlier;
- The license in his name was obtained in 2011, well after the decree.
Regarding possession, the Court reiterated its ruling in Rohit Kochhar v. Vipul Infrastructure Developers Ltd. [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3584], holding that:
“As both the courts below have arrived at the conclusion that the exclusive possession of the suit property could be said to be with the original defendant when the suit was decreed, the relief of transfer of possession is implicit in the decree for specific performance.”
Decision
Dismissing the appeal with costs of ₹25,000 payable to the Legal Services Authority, the Court directed the Executing Court to ensure that possession is handed over to the decree-holder (respondent no. 1) within two months, with police assistance if required. The sale deed had already been executed pursuant to the decree.
