The Supreme Court in Umashankar Yadav & Anr. vs State of Uttar Pradesh [Criminal Appeal No. 439 of 2018] quashed the prosecution initiated under Sections 186 and 353 of the Indian Penal Code against NGO workers, holding that even though a police report in a non-cognizable offence may be deemed a complaint under Section 2(d) CrPC, the mandatory bar under Section 195 CrPC remains applicable.
Background of the Case:
The appellants were associated with the NGO Guria, which actively works against human trafficking and child exploitation. On 6 June 2014, they participated in a raid at a brick kiln in Varanasi following a complaint regarding bonded and child labour. The raid was conducted by Labour Enforcement Officers, police personnel, and the appellants.
According to the appellants, several children and labourers were found and taken to the police station. However, the kiln owner allegedly intervened, and the rescued individuals were released. A faxed message was then sent by the first appellant to the District Magistrate.
Contrarily, the informant, a labour officer, filed an FIR alleging that the appellants obstructed the joint team, forcibly removed labourers and children in a dumper, and did not allow recording of their statements. The FIR invoked Sections 186, 353, and initially 363 IPC (later dropped).
Arguments and High Court’s Ruling:
The appellants sought quashing of the charge sheet before the High Court, which rejected the petition, stating that the matter involved disputed facts not suitable for adjudication under Section 482 CrPC and that the appellants had the remedy of seeking discharge before the trial court.
Supreme Court’s Observations and Decision:
The Bench of Justice P.S. Narasimha and Justice Joymalya Bagchi held that the High Court did not consider the facts or contentions of the case and mechanically dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court, therefore, undertook its own analysis.
The Court held that:
- The uncontroverted allegations in the charge sheet did not disclose use of force or threatening gestures toward public servants as required under Section 353 IPC.
- There was no voluntary obstruction with mens rea to prevent officials from discharging their duties under Section 186 IPC.
- The appellants’ conduct stemmed from a difference of opinion about the mode of interrogating labourers, not from an intention to obstruct official work.
- Allegations of bribery against the appellants were found to be malicious and unsupported by any statement recorded during the investigation.
On the issue of maintainability, the Court pointed out two key legal hurdles:
- Section 155(2) CrPC Violation:
As Section 186 IPC is non-cognizable, the FIR could not have been registered without prior Magistrate approval, which was absent. - Violation of Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC:
Cognizance of an offence under Section 186 IPC cannot be taken except on a complaint by the aggrieved public servant or their superior. Here, the police report could not substitute as such a complaint.
The Court acknowledged the Explanation to Section 2(d) CrPC, which deems a police report on a non-cognizable offence as a complaint and the officer as the complainant. However, it firmly held that:
“Even then, the legal embargo under section 195 Cr.PC is not dispelled as the legal fiction deems the police officer and not the aggrieved public servant as the complainant.”
This view was reinforced by a reference to B.N. John v. State of U.P.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the prosecution, terming it an abuse of process of law driven by malice and personal vendetta.
