The Delhi High Court has set aside the conviction and 10-year sentence of a man under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, holding that the mere use of the term “physical relations” by the prosecutrix, without further clarification or supporting evidence, is insufficient to prove the offence of penetrative sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri allowed the criminal appeal (CRL.A. 808/2023) filed by the appellant, acquitting him of all charges. The Court’s judgment, pronounced on October 17, 2025, heavily scrutinized the lack of specific evidence and a significant delay in filing the First Information Report (FIR).
Case Background
The appeal challenged a trial court judgment dated 22.05.2023 and an order on sentence dated 27.07.2023, which had convicted the appellant. The case (Sessions Case No. 59044/2016) arose from FIR No. 255/16 registered at PS Alipur. The trial court had sentenced the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years.
According to the facts noted by the trial court, the complainant (prosecutrix) stated in her written complaint that in the year 2014, she was 16 years old and studying in school. Her Bua’s son (the appellant), used to visit their house, and they developed a friendship that “converted into love affair.”
The complainant alleged that “[The appellant] promised her to marry her and during that period he made physical relations with her.” When she later asked him to marry her, he “clearly refused.” The complaint further stated that due to her “upset mental state,” she consumed poison on 12.11.2014 and received hospital treatment for about one month and eighteen days. She alleged that “on the false pretext of marriage, [the appellant] made physical relations with her for about one and half years and used her.”
The prosecution examined 12 witnesses, including the prosecutrix (PW-1), her mother (PW-2), and her father (PW-3). The appellant, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied the allegations, claiming he was “falsely implicated in the case as his mother had refused financial aid when family of the child victim requested for the same.”
Arguments Before the High Court
Appearing for the appellant, Mr. Vinayak Bhandari, Ms. Teestu Mishra and Ms. Jaisal Singh, Advocates, while conceding that the victim’s age of 16 was not disputed, assailed the conviction primarily on two grounds:
- There was a “gross and inordinate delay of about one and half years” in reporting the incident.
- The testimony of the child victim (PW-1) did not establish a case for conviction under Section 376 IPC or Section 6 POCSO Act, as “at no place, the child victim has stated that any penetrative sexual assault was committed.”
The appellant’s counsel placed reliance on the Division Bench decisions in Sahjan Ali vs. State (2024 SCC OnLine Del 9079) and Dipesh Tamang vs. State of Sikkim (2020 SCC OnLine Sikk 24).
Mr. Pradeep Gahalot, learned APP for the State, along with Ms. Tanya Agarwal, Advocate for the victim, refuted these contentions. They argued that the victim was only 16 and the appellant committed rape on a “false promise of marriage.” They submitted that the delay in lodging the FIR occurred because the victim consumed poison on 12.11.2014, “fell unconscious,” and “lost her voice.” The FIR was lodged only after she regained her ability to speak.
High Court’s Analysis and Findings
Mr. Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri, penning the judgment, noted that the prosecution’s case “hinges only on the oral evidence” of the victim and her parents. The Court observed, “Notably, there is no forensic evidence on record,” and that during the medical examination, “internal examination has been refused.”
On the Delay in FIR: The Court scrutinized the prosecution’s explanation that the FIR (lodged 31.03.2016) was delayed from the incident (end of 2014) because the victim lost her voice after consuming poison on 12.11.2014.
The judgment states: “However, there is no evidence on record to prove that she did not have the ability to speak from the time since the incident till the FIR came to be registered.” The Court pointed out that neither her statement under Section 164 CrPC (01.04.2016) nor her court deposition (27.07.2016) indicated any inability to speak. The Court found that the Investigating Officer’s (PW-9) statement in cross-examination about a damaged vocal cord was not supported by the victim’s discharge slip from 2014.
The Court concluded, “Thus, in absence of concretely established reasons, the delay of one and a half years in reporting the incident assumes importance.”
On the Term ‘Physical Relations’: The central issue addressed by the Court was whether the victim’s testimony established the foundational facts of “penetrative sexual assault” as defined under Section 3 of the POCSO Act and “rape” under Section 375 IPC.
The Court noted that before the “presumption as to certain offences” under Section 29 of the POCSO Act can operate, the prosecution must first prove the foundational facts, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Sambhubhai Raisangbhai Padhiyar v. State of Gujarat ((2025) 2 SCC 399).
The judgment analyzed the specific testimony. The victim, in her Section 164 CrPC statement, alleged: “[The appellant] mere saath ek-dedh saal se shareerik sambandh bana raha tha.” In court, she deposed: “Then accused established physical relations with me in end of year 2013. Thereafter, he continued to establish physical relations for one year on pretext of marrying me.”
The High Court observed, “No clarification was sought, either by the APP, or the Court as to what the child victim meant by the term ‘physical relations’ and whether it fulfilled the ingredients of penetrative sexual assault.”
Citing precedent, the Court referred to a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Sahjan Ali (supra), which held that for conviction under Section 6 POCSO Act and Section 376 IPC, the “use of expression ‘sambandh’ and ‘physical relations’ would in no manner lead to the conclusion that there was any penetrative sexual assault.” The Sahjan Ali judgment was quoted: “The leap from physical relations or samband to sexual assault and then to penetrative sexual assault is one which has to be established on record by means of evidence, and the same cannot be presumed or deduced as an inference.”
The Court also referenced Depesh Tamang (supra), where the Sikkim High Court held that “‘physical relationship’, by way of surmises and conjectures, could not be equated to penetrative sexual assault.”
On the Duty of the Trial Court: Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri highlighted the “statutory duty of the Court” under Section 165 of the Evidence Act “to ask certain questions to discover or to obtain proper proof of the relevant facts” when testimony is lacking in essential details. The Court noted that in this case, “no questions have been put to the victim by the prosecution or Trial Court to gain some clarity as to whether the essential ingredients of the offence… have been made out or not.”
Final Decision
Concluding its analysis, the High Court found that the victim’s and her parents’ testimonies lacked clarity on what “physical relations” entailed. This, combined with the lack of medical or forensic evidence and the “significant delay” in reporting, was fatal to the prosecution’s case.
The Court held: “In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the use of the term ‘physical relations’, unaccompanied by any supporting evidence, would not be sufficient to hold that the prosecution has been able to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant’s conviction under Section 376 IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act is unsustainable.”
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment and order on sentence were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted. The Court directed his immediate release from jail, if not required in any other case.
