The Delhi High Court has set aside the orders of a Single Judge that had invalidated the vesting of land as evacuee property, ruling that the decision was made without granting an opportunity of hearing to the affected purchaser and without adequately examining complex factual disputes regarding the identity of the evacuee.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Tejas Karia, in the case of Neelam Arya v. Din Mohd (Deceased) and Ors., allowed the Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) filed by the Appellant, Neelam Arya. The Court has remitted the matter back to the Single Judge for a fresh decision on merits, directing that the Appellant be impleaded as a necessary party.
Background of the Case
The dispute centers on land situated in Village Chandan Hola, Delhi, with its origins tracing back to the post-partition era. Following the Administration of Evacuee Property (Chief Commissioners Provinces) Ordinance XII of 1949, a notification was issued on June 16, 1949, resulting in the automatic vesting of several properties in the Custodian.
On July 21, 1961, a Competent Officer declared the property vested entirely in the Custodian as no claims were made regarding the non-evacuee share. Decades later, on February 23, 1981, the Central Government allotted the subject land to one Sh. Gurbax Singh under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, in lieu of properties left in Pakistan.
The Respondents, claiming to be heirs of one Sh. Safed Khan, challenged this vesting in 1981, filing a Revision Petition under Section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. The Custodian General dismissed this petition on June 29, 1982, finding that the Respondents’ predecessor was not the same “Safed Khan” whose name appeared in the revenue records as excluded from the evacuee list.
The Respondents subsequently filed a writ petition (W.P.(C) No. 2385/1982). During the pendency of this petition, the original allottee, Sh. Gurbax Singh, passed away. The Appellant, Neelam Arya, purchased the property from his heirs via registered sale deeds on December 15, 1992, and subsequently constructed a farmhouse after obtaining necessary sanctions.
In 2009, the Single Judge allowed the writ petition, setting aside the Custodian’s order. The Appellant challenged this decision, arguing she was never heard despite being the registered owner.
Arguments Raised
Contentions of the Appellant: Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant argued that the impugned orders were passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, as the Appellant, a registered owner, was not granted an opportunity to be heard. The Appellant contended that the Respondents suppressed material facts, including her ownership and the construction on the land. It was further argued that the Respondents approached the authorities after a delay of 32 years from the date of vesting. The Appellant also highlighted a fundamental dispute regarding the identity of “Safed Khan,” asserting that the parentage and death certificate details of the Respondents’ predecessor did not match historical records.
Contentions of the Respondents: Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents argued that the subject land never validly vested as evacuee property because it was excluded by the Notification dated June 16, 1949. They contended that the allotment to Gurbax Singh was void ab initio due to this jurisdictional error, which could be corrected despite the delay. Regarding the identity issue, they submitted that the distinction between “Safed Khan, son of Ghisa” and “Safed Khan, son of Bhosan” was technical and that the Single Judge correctly treated them as the same person. They further argued that the Appellant, being a subsequent purchaser, could not claim a better title than her vendor.
Court’s Analysis and Observations
The Division Bench observed that the litigation required a “holistic and pragmatic view” while balancing the rights of all parties. The Court identified several critical errors in the proceedings before the Single Judge:
- Violation of Natural Justice: The Court noted that the Appellant had purchased the property through registered sale deeds from the legal heirs of a government allottee. The Bench stated:
“The Impugned Order originally passed by the learned Single Judge in 2009 was without granting an opportunity of hearing to the Appellant, thus violating the principles of natural justice… The learned Single Judge proceeded to set aside orders of a Quasi-judicial Authority without giving an opportunity of hearing to the Appellant rendering her remediless…” - Failure to Examine Statutory Provisions: The Court observed that the Single Judge quashed the Deputy Custodian General’s order “without examining the critical provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property (Chief Commissioners’ Province) Ordinance No. XII of 1949 and the subsequent Notification dated 16.06.1949.”
- Delay and Laches: The Bench highlighted that the Respondents filed a Revision Petition 32 years after the vesting of the land in 1949.
- Disputed Identity: The Court flagged significant factual discrepancies regarding the identity of the original owner. The Respondents claimed their predecessor was Safed Khan son of Ghisa, whereas historical notifications excluded land belonging to Safed Khan son of Bhosan. The Court remarked:
“The learned Single Judge overlooked this factual discrepancy in parentage and assumed them to be the same individual. Such an identity dispute alone raises suspicion over the genuineness of the claim of the Respondents (Writ Petitioners).” - Discrepancy in Death Date: The Court noted a conflict where a corrected death certificate from 1981 indicated Safed Khan died in 1952, while the Respondents claimed he died in 1955. The Bench held that these “highly disputed questions of fact were decided by the learned Single Judge in summary proceedings without adequate inquiry.”
Decision
The Division Bench held that the Single Judge erred in deciding complex factual disputes without the full appreciation of evidence and the participation of the affected party.
The Court held:
“The findings on the identity of the evacuee, the timing of vesting, and the non-disclosure of subsequent titles are central to the resolution of this matter.”
Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned orders dated February 26, 2009, January 22, 2010, and January 7, 2013. The matter has been remitted to the Single Judge to decide W.P.(C) No. 2385/1982 afresh on merits. The Court directed the impleadment of the Appellant as a Respondent, granting her an opportunity to file a response.
The parties have been directed to appear before the Roster Bench on February 5, 2026.
Case Details:
- Case Title: Neelam Arya v. Din Mohd (Deceased) and Ors.
- Case Number: LPA 114/2013
- Coram: Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Tejas Karia
