The Chhattisgarh High Court has set aside the suspension order issued against Mansingh Bhardwaj, holding that it was passed by an authority lacking jurisdiction. The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru ruled that only an authority expressly empowered under the applicable rules could exercise disciplinary powers. Since the Collector was not the appointing or disciplinary authority, the suspension order was without legal authority and liable to be quashed.
Background
Mansingh Bhardwaj, a Class II Gazetted Officer, holds the substantive post of Principal and was serving as the Block Education Officer (BEO), Jagdalpur. He was placed under suspension on June 6, 2025, by the Collector and President of the District Level Rationalization Committee, Bastar, for allegedly submitting manipulated data in contravention of instructions regarding rationalization of teachers.
Bhardwaj challenged the suspension order in WPS No. 5711 of 2025, contending that it was issued by an incompetent authority without any show-cause notice or opportunity of hearing. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on July 4, 2025, prompting the present intra-court appeal.
Appellant’s Arguments
Senior Advocate Rajeev Shrivastava, appearing for the appellant, argued that:
- The Collector was not the appointing or disciplinary authority under the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (Rules of 1966).
- As per Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 1966, only the appointing authority, disciplinary authority, or an authority empowered by the Governor could place a government servant under suspension.
- The appellant’s appointing authority was the Secretary, School Education Department, and powers had only been delegated to the Divisional Commissioner via notification dated August 4, 2008.
- The impugned suspension order did not mention any contemplation of disciplinary proceedings, lacked a show-cause notice, and was not signed by the Collector himself.
- The learned Single Judge erroneously relied on the judgment in Panchu Ram Thakur v. State of Chhattisgarh, which involved a Divisional Commissioner and not a Collector.
State’s Response
The State, represented by Additional Advocate General Yashwant Singh Thakur, defended the impugned order and supported the reasoning adopted by the Single Judge.
Court’s Analysis
The Division Bench held that under Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 1966, only the appointing authority, its superior, or an authority empowered by the Governor can suspend a government servant.
The Bench observed:
“It is evident that the substantive post of the appellant is that of Principal… the appointing authority of the appellant is the Secretary, School Education Department.”
The Court noted that the Collector, Bastar, was not competent to issue the suspension order, nor did the order state that it was issued in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. It was also found to be in breach of natural justice principles.
Quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots Association of India v. DGCA, (2011) 5 SCC 435, the Bench reiterated:
“It is a settled legal proposition that the authority which has been conferred with the competence under the statute alone can pass the order. No other person, even a superior authority, can interfere with the functioning of the statutory authority.”
The Court further cited Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1, to emphasize that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not barred in cases where there is lack of jurisdiction or violation of the principles of natural justice.
Decision
Setting aside the suspension order dated June 6, 2025, the Bench held:
“The impugned suspension order dated 06.06.2025 passed by respondent No. 4, having been issued by an incompetent authority, is hereby set aside.”
It further directed respondent No. 3 (the Divisional Commissioner) to pass a fresh order, if required, in accordance with law within two weeks.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the Single Judge’s order dated July 4, 2025, was set aside, and the writ petition filed by the appellant was allowed.
