The Supreme Court of India, in a judgment delivered on November 6, 2025, has dismissed a Special Leave Petition filed by a disqualified councillor, Poonam, upholding the decisions of the lower courts that declared her election void.
A bench comprising Justice P. S. Narasimha and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar affirmed that the petitioner’s failure to disclose a prior conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, in her nomination affidavit was a fatal non-compliance with election rules.
Background of the Case
The petitioner, Poonam, was elected as a Councillor from Ward No. 5 of Nagar Parishad, Bhikangaon, in an election notified on October 4, 2022. The first respondent, Dule Singh, filed an election petition under Section 20 of The Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 (the “Act of 1961”), seeking to have her declared disqualified.
The election petition’s primary contention was that on August 7, 2018, the petitioner had been convicted in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and sentenced to one year of rigorous imprisonment and ordered to pay compensation.
It was pleaded that the petitioner failed to disclose this conviction in the mandatory affidavit filed along with her nomination form, as required by Rule 24-A of The Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994 (the “Rules of 1994”).
The petitioner, in her reply, contended that the conviction order was “no longer in existence” as it had been set aside in an appeal.
The trial court, by its judgment dated February 17, 2025, found that the petitioner had indeed failed to disclose the conviction, which was mandatory. The court held that this failure affected the voters’ right to correct information and materially affected the election, thus declaring her election null and void. A revision application filed by the petitioner before the High Court was subsequently dismissed, leading her to file the present Special Leave Petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Mr. Vivek Tankha, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, submitted:
- The non-disclosure was not of a “substantial nature” that would affect the election’s outcome.
- The conviction, being under Section 138 of the Act of 1881, was for a compoundable offence not involving “moral turpitude.”
- The conviction was “subsequently set aside” on December 30, 2022, and thus could not be the basis for unseating her.
- The election petitioner (first respondent) had failed to prove that the election was “materially affected” by the non-disclosure, as required under Section 22(1)(d) of the Act of 1961. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Ravi Namboothiri vs. K.A. Baiju & others (2022) and Karikho Kri vs. Nuney Tayang and another (2024).
Mr. Sarvam Ritam Khare, learned Advocate for the first respondent, countered:
- The non-disclosure under Rule 24-A meant the nomination form was “wrongly accepted” in breach of Section 22(1)(d)(i) of the Act of 1961.
- The subsequent acquittal on December 30, 2022, was “of no consequence,” as the candidate’s eligibility must be determined as on the date of submitting the nomination form (September 9, 2022), when the conviction was still in force.
- Reliance was placed on Resurgence India Vs. Election Commission of India (2013) and Krishnamoorthy Vs. Shivakumar and others (2015).
- It was also argued that the challenge had become “infructuous” because a bye-election was subsequently held to fill the vacancy, in which the petitioner contested and was unsuccessful.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
The Supreme Court, in its judgment authored by Justice Atul S. Chandurkar, first dismissed the respondent’s preliminary objection that the petition was infructuous. The Court noted its own interim order from June 25, 2025, which stipulated that the bye-election result would be “subject to outcome of the present proceedings.”
On the merits of the case, the Court found it “undisputably” true that the petitioner was convicted on August 7, 2018, and that this conviction “was in force when the petitioner submitted her nomination form on 09.09.2022.”
The judgment highlighted that Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994 mandates the disclosure of “any disposed criminal case in which he has been convicted.” The petitioner’s affidavit, however, stated “Nirank” (Nil) against the column for conviction.
The Court held that the petitioner “furnished false and incorrect information as regards her criminal antecedents,” which made the ground under Section 22(1)(d)(iii) (non-compliance with rules) available for declaring her election void.
Citing the three-Judge Bench decision in Union of India vs. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002), the Court reaffirmed the voter’s fundamental right to information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It quoted: “Voter’s (little man citizen’s) right to know antecedents including criminal past of his candidate… is much more fundamental and basic for survival of democracy.”
The Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the conviction was for a “minor offence” not involving moral turpitude. It held that the plain language of Rule 24-A(1) is mandatory and “does not admit of any doubt whatsoever.” The Court stated it could not “condone such non-compliance or exempt its compliance on the ground that the conviction was for a non-serious offence.”
The bench also distinguished the cases cited by the petitioner.
- Ravi Namboothiri was held to be distinct as it involved a different statute and a mere fine of Rs. 200/- for a non-substantive offence, whereas the present case involved a one-year imprisonment sentence, which the affidavit format specifically required to be disclosed.
- Karikho Kri was distinguished as it related to the non-disclosure of assets (vehicles) which was found not to be of a substantial nature, unlike the non-disclosure of a conviction.
Finally, the Court dismissed the contention that the election petitioner had to prove the result was “materially affected.” The Court held that non-disclosure itself was sufficient. It relied on Krishnamoorthy (supra), which concluded that in cases of non-disclosure of criminal antecedents, “the question whether it materially affects the election or not will not arise in a case of this nature.”
The Court concluded: “It is thus clear that by failing to disclose her conviction under Section 138 of the Act of 1881, the petitioner suppressed material information and thus failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994. The acceptance of her nomination form has therefore been rightly held to be improper.”
Decision
The Supreme Court found no “exceptional and special circumstances” to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The judgment noted: “The information furnished in her affidavit filed under Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994 has been found to be incorrect and false. The petitioner rests on her subsequent acquittal in appeal, which event occurred after her election. She did not step into the witness box to explain her inadvertence, which is now sought to be put forward.”
The Court also observed “in the passing” that the petitioner had contested the subsequent bye-election and lost.
“For all the above reasons, the Special Leave Petition stands dismissed,” the Court ordered.
