The Allahabad High Court has held that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, does not contain any provision for a “deemed sanction” for prosecution. Quashing a trial court order that was proceeding on the assumption of such a sanction, the Court reiterated that in the absence of a valid sanction granted by a competent authority, criminal proceedings under the Act are vitiated.
The ruling came from the Lucknow bench, with Justice Shree Prakash Singh setting aside the order dated July 25, 2025, from the Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Lucknow. The case involves Mohd. Abdul Aleem Khan, a retired Indian Administrative Services (IAS) officer, who is facing allegations of possessing disproportionate assets.
Appearing for the applicant was Advocate Sri Nadeem Murtaza, assisted by Sri Wali Nawaz Khan, Ms. Suruchi Tripathi, and Sri Aishwarya Pratap Singh. The State was represented by Additional Government Advocates Sri Sushil Pandey and Sri Nirmal Kumar Pandey.
Case Background
The applicant, Mohd. Abdul Aleem Khan, a retired IAS officer who left service on November 30, 2009, became the subject of an enquiry by the U.P. Vigilance Establishment in 2015. Subsequently, an FIR was lodged on October 24, 2019, under Section 13(1)(b) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act).
On January 20, 2023, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh accorded sanction for his prosecution. This sanction was challenged before the High Court, which, in an order dated December 18, 2024, found that the sanction granted by the State Government was “non est” (non-existent). The Court noted that for an officer of an All India Service Cadre, the competent authority to grant sanction is the Government of India, not the State Government. The High Court, therefore, quashed the sanction order. Following this, the sanction order was formally cancelled on March 12, 2025.
Despite the quashing of the sanction, the learned trial court on July 25, 2025, passed an order fixing a future date (October 24, 2025) to take a decision on the matter of “deemed sanction.” Aggrieved by this order, the applicant moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
The High Court, presided over by Justice Shree Prakash Singh, conducted a detailed analysis of the legal provisions and relevant case law.
No Statutory Basis for ‘Deemed Sanction’
The Court first examined Section 19 of the PC Act, which mandates a “previous sanction” for prosecution. Justice Singh noted, “Having at glance, the aforesaid, it is apparent that there is no provision with respect to the deemed sanction of prosecution.” The court emphasized that as of the current date, there is no valid sanction order against the applicant.
Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent
The High Court observed that the trial court had incorrectly relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Dr. Subramanian Swamy Vs. Dr. Manmohan Singh to consider the concept of deemed sanction. The trial court had reproduced guidelines from the Subramanian Swamy case, which suggested that if a decision on sanction is not taken within a specified time, it would be deemed to have been granted.
Correcting this interpretation, Justice Singh stated that these were not the binding ratio of the judgment. The High Court held, “…these are not the ratio of judgment drawn in the abovenoted case but those are in the form of directions/instructions, framed to be considered by the Parliament, therefore, the findings which are based on the assumption of ratio in judgment of Dr. Subramanian Swamy (supra), is erroneous, on it’s face.”
Reliance on Suneeti Toteja Judgment
The High Court instead placed reliance on the more recent Supreme Court decision in Suneeti Toteja Vs. State of U.P. and Others (2025), which dealt directly with the issue. In that case, the Supreme Court had clarified that the guidelines from Subramanian Swamy had not been statutorily incorporated by Parliament. Quoting the Toteja judgment, the High Court noted the Supreme Court’s definitive finding that “the necessary sanction not having been granted has vitiated the very initiation of the criminal proceeding against the appellant herein.”
The High Court further observed that Section 19 of the PC Act is para materia to Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., neither of which provides for deemed sanction.
Legislative Intent and Procedural Mandate
The Court invoked the established legal principle that when a law requires something to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner alone. Justice Singh observed, “It is trite law that if a law requiring a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, the same shall be done in that manner alone and not otherwise.” The Court concluded that the legislature, in its wisdom, did not intend to prescribe any provision for deemed sanction, and the courts cannot add words to the statute.
Remarks Against Counsel
The High Court also addressed adverse remarks made by the trial court against the Senior Advocate representing the applicant. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Neeraj Garg Vs. Sarita Rani and Others, the Court noted that judges should exercise restraint and avoid unnecessary remarks about counsel’s conduct. It observed, “…it is equally important for the judges to be exercising restraint and avoid unnecessary remarks on the conduct of the counsel which may have no bearing on the adjudication of the dispute before the Court.” The High Court found that the trial court’s remarks were “not required under the facts and circumstances of the present case.”
Decision
Finding merit in the application, the High Court allowed it and set aside the impugned order of the trial court dated July 25, 2025.
The Court concluded by granting liberty to the trial court to “revive the proceedings, if sanction for prosecution is granted by the appropriate Government, in accordance with law.”
