In a significant ruling reaffirming the “doctrine of pleasure,” the Chhattisgarh High Court has held that there is no violation of constitutional provisions if a legislature authorizes the State Government to terminate nominated appointments at its pleasure and make fresh nominations in their place.
The judgment came in Writ Appeal No. 211 of 2025, filed by Bhanu Pratap Singh and two others, challenging their removal from the Chhattisgarh State Scheduled Tribe Commission. The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal dismissed the appeal, upholding the State’s decision to remove them without notice or hearing.
Background of the Case
The appellants—Bhanu Pratap Singh (Chairperson), Ganesh Dhruw, and Amrit Lal Toppo (Members)—were appointed on 16 July 2021 to the Chhattisgarh Rajya Anusuchit Janjati Ayog under Section 3 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Anusuchit Janjati Ayog (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 2020.
However, following the 2023 State Assembly elections and a change in government, the General Administration Department issued an order dated 15 December 2023, instructing all departments to terminate political appointments, except where legal protection applied. The appellants’ services were terminated under this directive, prompting them to file a writ petition (WPC No. 206 of 2024), which was dismissed by the Single Judge on 29 January 2025. The present appeal arose from that decision.
Key Legal Issues Raised
- Whether appointments made under the 2020 Act were protected from termination at will by the State.
- Whether the appellants were entitled to a hearing before removal under Section 4(3) of the Act.
- Whether the doctrine of pleasure applies to such statutory appointments.
The appellants argued that their appointments were governed by statute and protected under Section 4(3), which provides for removal only after opportunity of hearing. They maintained that their termination was abrupt, politically motivated, and in violation of principles of natural justice.
State Government’s Stand
Appearing for the State, Additional Advocate General Shri Ranbir Singh Marhas contended that the appointments were clearly made at the pleasure of the State Government, as stated explicitly in the appointment orders and in Section 4(1) of the 2020 Act. He argued that when appointments are made without any formal selection process, they remain nominations, and the State has unfettered discretion to remove such individuals at will.
Court’s Findings and Observations
Rejecting the appeal, the Division Bench reaffirmed the application of the doctrine of pleasure and held:
“If an appointment has been made initially by nomination, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution in case the legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place.”
The Court further stated that:
“The appointment order itself bears with the condition that their appointment is up to the pleasure of the State Government… The action of the authorities neither offends any Article of the Constitution nor is against public policy or democratic norms.”
Referring to B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) 6 SCC 331, the Bench observed:
“The holder of an office under pleasure could be removed at any time, without notice, without assigning cause, and without there being a need for any cause.”
The Court also struck down certain stigmatic remarks made by the Single Judge in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the earlier judgment, noting that those observations did not form part of the official termination order, nor were they argued or recorded during the proceedings.
The Court concluded that:
- The appointments of the appellants were political nominations, not competitive or selection-based.
- Their tenure was clearly subject to the pleasure of the Government.
- There was no violation of natural justice or constitutional safeguards, as the termination did not cast any stigma.
The appeal was dismissed, with the Court reiterating that “a nominated member… can also be removed by adopting the procedure during the period. Otherwise, he shall continue till his term is over. The plea of vested right is like building a castle in Spain.”
