The High Court of Chhattisgarh, in a significant judgment, has affirmed that the renewal of a government lease is not an automatic or vested right and can be refused based on breaches of the lease conditions. A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru dismissed a writ appeal filed by the Christian Womans Board of Mission, upholding a Single Judge’s order that rejected the Mission’s challenge to the non-renewal of its lease and subsequent dispossession from land in Bilaspur.
The Court [2025:CGHC:54533-DB] held that the appellants failed to establish locus standi and that the “admitted lease violations, commercial exploitation, sale and sub-letting of the land” justified the State’s refusal to renew the lease, which was originally granted for charitable and religious purposes.
Background of the Case
The matter came before the Division Bench as an intra-Court appeal (WA No. 715 of 2025) against a judgment dated 18.07.2025. The original writ petition (WPC No. 977 of 2025) was filed by the appellants (Christian Womans Board of Mission and its Director, Shri Nitin Lawrence), who claimed they were “aggrieved by the alleged arbitrary and unconstitutional actions of the respondent-State authorities seeking to dispossess them from a leasehold property” (Plots No. 20 and 21, Chatapara, Bilaspur).
The appellants contended they had occupied the land for over a century for “religious, educational, and charitable purposes,” establishing institutions like the Jackman Memorial Mission Hospital. According to the petition, the land was originally leased in 1925 and regularly renewed up to 1994. The appellants argued that Clause 8 of the lease deed mandated renewal for successive thirty-year terms. They alleged that authorities failed to renew the lease and instead initiated steps to transfer the land for other projects, such as Smart City development, and carried out “large-scale demolition of mission structures on 08.01.2025.”
The learned Single Judge had dismissed this writ petition, prompting the appellants to file the present appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Submissions: Mr. Mehmood Pracha, learned counsel for the appellants, argued that the Single Judge’s order was “manifestly erroneous in law and on facts.” He submitted that the land was originally purchased via a sale deed dated 19.11.1891, and the lease, renewed up to 1994, contained a mandatory renewal clause.
The primary contention was that the appellants had “acquired Bhumiswami rights under Section 158(3) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959,” which, they argued, made eviction impermissible. Mr. Pracha also contended that the Single Judge wrongly relied on a 1971 land sale, which, he stated, was “set aside by the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh in First Appeal No. 86 of 1980.” He further alleged “discriminatory treatment,” claiming adjacent plots had their leases renewed till 2043.
Respondents’ Submissions: Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, learned Advocate General appearing for the State, vehemently supported the Single Judge’s order. He argued that the appeal was “vitiated at the threshold for want of locus standi,” as the appellants had failed to demonstrate their continuing legal capacity or exclusive interest in the land.
Mr. Bharat submitted that the land’s use “was not confined to purely charitable activities.” He stated that evidence showed portions were used for “commercial purposes such as Chaupati (street-vending), Garage, Woollen Market, and other commercial activities,” along with private medical clinics and a nursing college. This “commercialisation,” he argued, “constitutes a clear breach of the lease terms.”
The State contended that the claim of Bhumiswami rights under Section 158(3) was “misplaced and inapplicable on the facts of this case.” The Advocate General also relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India and Another v. Tanya Energy Enterprise (AIR 2025 SC 4379), arguing that a court can uphold an administrative order if the record discloses other valid and legally sustainable grounds, even if they were not the original reasons for the decision.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
The Division Bench, after hearing both parties, concurred with the findings of the learned Single Judge. The judgment, authored by Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha, noted that the Single Judge had found the authorities’ orders to be “thorough and judicious” and that the petitioner’s conduct demonstrated a “gross abuse of the lease, thereby disentitling it from equitable relief.”
In its own analysis, the Division Bench made several key findings:
- Breach of Lease Conditions: The Court found that the “admitted position of facts” confirmed that “substantial portions of the leased land have been either sold or alienated to private individuals, or put to commercial use for activities such as Chaupati, Garage, Woollen Market, and other profit-oriented enterprises.” This, the Court held, constituted “patent violations of the covenants of the lease” which was meant “exclusively for charitable purposes.” (Para 26).
- Bhumiswami Rights Plea Rejected: The Bench held that the appellants’ claim of acquiring Bhumiswami rights was “rightly rejected by the learned Single Judge, as the said provision is inapplicable to Nazul lands held under lease for charitable purposes.” (Para 27).
- Renewal is Not a Right: The Court explicitly stated, “It is well settled that renewal of a lease is not an inherent right of the lessee but a discretionary act of the lessor, contingent upon fulfilment of the lease terms and compliance with public purpose.” (Para 31). It added that the appellants, “having violated the conditions of the charitable grant,” cannot “claim equity or seek indulgence under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
- Lack of Locus Standi: A central finding of the judgment was the appellants’ failure to prove their legal standing. The Court held that the appellants “failed to demonstrate before this Court that the appellants/writ petitioners have any locus standi to maintain the present writ appeal.” (Para 33). The judgment elaborated: “The record clearly reflects that the appellants have not produced any legally admissible document to show that the leasehold rights or ownership of the said land were ever validly transferred, assigned, or conveyed in their favour in accordance with law.” (Para 33).
- Land Repossessed by State: The Court noted that the State had already issued notices (dated 28.10.2025) to “three purchasers/occupiers” of the land. Furthermore, it observed that “one Dr. Raman Jogi,” claiming to be a Director of the Board, had “voluntarily handed over the possession of a major portion of the land to the Government which is evident from the communication dated 22.08.2024.” The Court concluded that the land “has been lawfully repossessed by the State and remains in its possession as of now.” (Para 35).
- Additional Documents Rejected: The Bench refused to consider additional documents filed at the appellate stage, stating it is “impermissible in law, as it would amount to permitting the appellants to fill up the lacunae in their case.” (Para 37).
Decision of the Court
Finding “no infirmity, perversity, or illegality in the impugned judgment,” the High Court dismissed the writ appeal as “devoid of merit.”
The judgment and order dated 18.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPC No.977 of 2025 was “affirmed in its entirety.” The Court also directed that the notices issued by the State Government for cancellation of the lease and resumption of the land “shall proceed in accordance with law.” Any interim protection granted earlier was vacated.
