The Supreme Court of India has ruled that segregating a criminal trial solely on the ground that the accused is a sitting Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) is legally unsustainable and violates the principles of equality and a fair trial. A bench comprising Justices J. B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan quashed the orders of a trial court and the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which had directed a separate trial for Haryana MLA Mamman Khan in connection with the 2023 Nuh communal violence cases. The Court directed that a joint trial be conducted for the appellant along with all co-accused.
Background of the Case
The appellant, Mamman Khan, a sitting MLA from the Ferozepur Jhirka Constituency in Haryana, was implicated as an accused in FIR No. 149 and FIR No. 150, both dated August 1, 2023, registered at Police Station Nagina, District Nuh. The FIRs were filed in connection with large-scale communal violence that occurred in the Nuh District on July 31, 2023.
During the proceedings before the Additional Sessions Judge, Nuh, the trial court, by orders dated August 28, 2024, and September 2, 2024, directed the Station House Officer to file a separate charge-sheet against Mr. Khan and ordered the segregation of his trial from that of the other co-accused. The trial court reasoned that the case against the MLA needed to be expedited on a day-to-day basis as per directions from the Supreme Court in the Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India case, and that proceedings were being delayed due to the non-appearance of other co-accused.
Aggrieved, Mr. Khan challenged these orders before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The High Court, via a common judgment on December 12, 2024, dismissed his petitions, upholding the trial court’s decision. This led to the present appeals before the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Mamman Khan, argued that the segregation of his trial was arbitrary and legally untenable. It was contended that since the alleged offences, including a conspiracy charge under Section 120B IPC, arose from the “same transaction,” a joint trial was the rule as per Section 223(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). The counsel submitted that the reliance on the Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay judgment was misplaced, as its directions were for expeditious disposal and did not authorize a deviation from statutory norms. It was further argued that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the investigating agency to file a separate charge-sheet and that a separate trial would cause serious prejudice to the appellant.
Conversely, the counsel for the respondent, the State of Haryana, defended the segregation. It was submitted that the presence of numerous accused (43 in one FIR and 28 in the other) made a joint trial cumbersome and prone to delays. The state argued that the trial court’s order was in consonance with the Supreme Court’s directive for the expeditious disposal of cases involving public representatives and upheld the constitutional right to a speedy trial under Article 21. The respondent also maintained that the appellant failed to establish any specific prejudice caused by the separate trial.
Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court, in its detailed judgment authored by Justice R. Mahadevan, identified the principal issue as whether segregating a trial solely because the accused is a sitting MLA is legally sustainable.
The Court found the trial court’s and High Court’s reliance on the Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay case to be “misplaced.” It clarified that while the judgment emphasizes expeditious disposal of cases against legislators, it does not “confer any procedural disadvantage upon an accused legislator, nor do they authorise deviation from the mandatory legal norms governing joint trials.”
The bench observed that the trial court’s orders were passed suo motu without any application from the prosecution and without affording the appellant an opportunity of being heard, which “violates the basic principles of procedural fairness inherent in Article 21.”
Analyzing the statutory framework under Sections 218-223 Cr.P.C., the Court reiterated the principles laid down in Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab, noting that the two paramount considerations for a joint or separate trial are prejudice to the accused and judicial delay. The Court held that the trial court “inverted the settled principle” by segregating the appellant, who was regularly attending court, instead of the defaulting or absconding co-accused.
The judgment firmly stated that the trial court “exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the police to file a separate charge-sheet against the appellant,” as this discretion lies solely with the investigating agency.
Most significantly, the Court anchored its reasoning in the constitutional guarantee of equality. It held, “Most importantly, the appellant’s status as a sitting MLA cannot, by itself, justify a separate trial. All accused stand equal before the law, and preferential segregation militates against the equality principle enshrined in Article 14.”
The Court further elaborated on this constitutional principle, stating, “Segregating the appellant’s trial solely on account of his political office, in the absence of any legal or factual necessity, amounts to arbitrary classification and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice process.”
The Decision
In light of its findings, the Supreme Court set aside the trial court’s orders of August 28 and September 2, 2024, and the affirming High Court judgment of December 12, 2024. The direction to file a separate charge sheet and the consequential segregation of Mr. Khan’s trial were quashed.
The matter has been remitted to the trial court with a clear direction to “conduct a joint trial of the appellant along with the co-accused, in accordance with law.” The Court granted the trial court liberty to regulate the schedule to ensure expeditious disposal, but only after hearing all concerned parties and without compromising procedural safeguards.
