The High Court of Delhi, in a significant ruling, has quashed criminal proceedings for abetment of suicide against a woman and her brother, holding that a suicide note merely expressing anguish, harassment, and fear does not, in itself, constitute instigation under the law. Justice Amit Mahajan set aside a Metropolitan Magistrate’s order summoning the petitioners, concluding that the continuation of the proceedings would be a clear abuse of the process of law.
The Court was hearing a petition filed by a woman and her brother challenging a summoning order dated November 20, 2006, issued by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Rohini Courts. The Magistrate had rejected a police cancellation report and summoned them under Sections 306/34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in an FIR registered in 2002.
Background of the Case
The case originated from an FIR registered on September 15, 2002, at Police Station Uttam Nagar, based on a complaint by the father of the deceased. The marriage between the deceased and Petitioner No. 1 was solemnised on June 5, 2002. The deceased committed suicide on September 14, 2002, leaving behind a suicide note.
In the note, the deceased named his wife and her brother (the petitioners), alleging they had lodged a false complaint against him in the Crime Against Women (CAW) Cell and threatened to beat him and implicate his family in frivolous cases with the help of police and politicians.
Following an investigation, the police filed a cancellation report. The complainant filed a protest petition against this report. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, observing that the suicide note contained “specific allegations of harassment,” rejected the cancellation report and issued summons to the petitioners. This summoning order was challenged before the High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
The petitioners, represented by Advocate Supriya Juneja, argued that they were falsely implicated. They contended that it was Petitioner No. 1 who was harassed for dowry by her in-laws, leading her brother to lodge a complaint at the CAW Cell, which was later compromised. Subsequently, Petitioner No. 1 also registered an FIR (No. 105/2003) against the complainant and his family under Sections 498A/406/509 of the IPC.
The petitioners’ counsel submitted that the learned MM erred in relying on the suicide note, as it had been thoroughly investigated by the police. It was argued that there was no act of instigation as required by Section 306 of the IPC that could be attributed to the petitioners. The counsel asserted that the suicide note indicated the deceased was in severe depression but did not suggest any overt act by the petitioners that instigated the suicide.
Conversely, the counsel for the complainant (Respondent No. 2) argued that the summoning order was well-reasoned. It was contended that the facts revealed in the suicide note, which should be treated as a dying declaration, were never properly investigated. The respondent further submitted that the FIR filed by Petitioner No. 1 against the deceased’s family was evidence of the instigation and threats mentioned in the suicide note.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
Justice Amit Mahajan, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), proceeded to analyze the legal requirements for the offence of abetment of suicide. The Court noted that for an offence under Section 306 IPC, “there are twin requirements, namely, suicide and abetment to commit suicide.”
Referring to the definition of abetment under Section 107 IPC, the Court emphasized that it requires either instigation, engagement in a conspiracy, or intentional aiding. Citing the Supreme Court in Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, the judgment stated, “Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing… More active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 of IPC.”
The Court observed that while the suicide note reflected the deceased’s anguish, it failed to disclose any specific act of instigation by the petitioners. The judgment reads, “From a perusal of the suicide note, it is apparent that while the same reflects the anguish that the deceased faced in his matrimonial life, the same however fails to disclose any instigation or intentional aid on the part of the petitioners to lead the deceased to commit suicide.”
The Court noted that the police investigation, which included recording statements of several witnesses, had concluded that there was no material to establish the essential ingredients of Section 306 IPC. The final report stated that while a strained matrimonial relationship existed, there was no evidence that the petitioners abetted the suicide. The Court also found it “pertinent to note that there is no record of the deceased ever being summoned by the CAW Cell.”
The Court held that mere marital discord or the filing of complaints cannot be equated with abetment. The Court opined that “mere allegations or complaints made by a spouse, even if ultimately found false, cannot by themselves amount to instigation, abetment, or intentional aid to commit suicide.”
Relying on the Supreme Court’s caution in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, the High Court reiterated that courts must be careful not to convict if a victim was “hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life.” Furthermore, citing its own decision in Shikha Gupta v. State (GNCT of Delhi), the Court affirmed that there must be a “proximate and live link” between the accused’s conduct and the suicide.
Decision
Concluding his analysis, Justice Mahajan held that summoning an accused is a serious matter and cannot be done mechanically. Finding that the fundamental requirement of abetment was absent, the Court ruled that the continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners would be unwarranted.
In its final order, the Court stated, “In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order passed by the learned MM is set aside and the summons issued against the petitioners under Sections 306/34 of the IPC are hereby quashed.”
The petition was accordingly allowed.
