In a significant ruling on the law of limitation, the Supreme Court of India has set aside a judgment of the Karnataka High Court that had condoned an extraordinary delay of 3966 days (nearly 11 years) by the Karnataka Housing Board (KHB) in filing a second appeal. The bench, comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, held that administrative lethargy and bureaucratic inefficiency cannot be considered “sufficient cause” for condoning such inordinate delays and that the law of limitation applies with the same rigour to the State as it does to private citizens.
The case, titled Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., involved a long-standing dispute over a parcel of land. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the legal heirs of the original landowner, setting aside the High Court’s order and imposing additional costs on the KHB. The Court also directed all High Courts to remain extra cautious and not condone delays on “frivolous and superficial grounds.”
Background of the Case
The dispute originated from a 9-acre 13-gunta parcel of land owned by the appellant’s father. Following his demise, a partition suit was filed in 1971. During the pendency of this suit, 4 acres of the land were “donated” to the Government of Karnataka, and in 1979, the respondent Karnataka Housing Board took possession to establish a housing colony.
In 1989, a compromise decree was passed in the partition suit, declaring the appellant as the absolute owner of the entire parcel, including the 4 acres in question. As possession was not returned, the appellant filed another suit (O.S. No. 1100 of 1989) against the KHB for declaration of title and possession. This suit was dismissed by the Trial Court on April 17, 1997.
The appellant successfully challenged this dismissal before the First Appellate Court, which, in its judgment on January 3, 2006, decreed the suit in favour of the appellant. However, observing that substantial construction had already taken place, the court moulded the relief, declining to grant possession and instead directing the KHB to pay compensation.
When the KHB failed to act on the decree, the appellant initiated execution proceedings on January 20, 2011. It was only on February 14, 2017—after a delay of 3966 days—that the KHB filed a Regular Second Appeal before the High Court, along with an application to condone the delay. The High Court, via its order dated March 21, 2017, allowed the application, which prompted the original landowner’s legal heirs to approach the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
The appellant argued that the KHB failed to demonstrate any “sufficient cause” for the enormous delay. Their counsel pointed out that there was no explanation for the Board’s inaction, especially after being served a notice in the execution proceedings in April 2011. They cited judgments, including Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai, where the Supreme Court held that “no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State.”
The respondent (KHB), represented by Senior Counsel Ms. Kiran Suri, contended that an appellate court should not ordinarily interfere with the discretionary power exercised by a lower court in condoning delay. They argued that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the former should prevail, especially when public interest is involved. The KHB claimed the delay was due to the deliberate negligence of its officers, against whom disciplinary action had been initiated, and that such lapses should not be imputed to the government undertaking.
Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court undertook a comprehensive analysis of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for the extension of the prescribed period if the applicant shows “sufficient cause.”
1. Meaning of “Within Such Period”
The Court first addressed the conflicting judicial interpretations of the phrase “within such period” in Section 5. It noted the view in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (1962), which held that the party only needs to explain the delay from the last day of limitation until the actual filing date. The Court contrasted this with the view in Ajit Singh Thakur v. State of Gujarat (1981), which held that the “sufficient cause” must arise before the limitation period expires.
Resolving this divergence, the bench concluded that a party seeking condonation must explain the delay for the entire period. The judgment stated:
“…explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”
The Court reasoned that the expressions “after the prescribed period” and “for not preferring the appeal… within such period” used in Section 5, when read together, make it clear that the entire continuum of delay must be justified.
2. State Lethargy and “Sufficient Cause”
The Court decisively rejected the notion that the State and its instrumentalities are entitled to special treatment in matters of limitation. It traced the evolution of jurisprudence from a lenient approach that gave latitude to the government due to bureaucratic processes, to the current, stricter standard established in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012).
The bench observed that the old rationale of an “impersonal machinery” is no longer an acceptable excuse in an era of modern technology. Quoting from Postmaster General, the Court reiterated:
“The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government… Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”
The Court held that routine explanations of files moving slowly or bureaucratic red tape are no longer acceptable. It emphasized that public interest is better served by efficiency and accountability, not by condoning governmental indifference.
3. Application to the Present Case
Applying these principles, the Supreme Court found the High Court’s decision to be “erroneous and ex facie bad in law.” It termed the delay of 3966 days as “gross and inordinate” and found the KHB’s explanation wholly insufficient.
The Court noted that the disciplinary action against the allegedly negligent officials was initiated only a month before filing the condonation application, suggesting it was a tactic to “ingratiate itself before the High Court to demonstrate its bona fides.” It further criticized the High Court for performing an exercise of “merit hunting” by looking into the maintainability of the original suit to find a reason to condone the delay, a practice the Supreme Court has repeatedly deprecated. The judgment stated:
“We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time…”
Decision and Directions
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment. In its concluding remarks, the bench sent an “emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds.”
The judgment concluded:
“The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious… Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages.”
The Court imposed an additional cost of ₹25,000 on the Karnataka Housing Board, payable to the Karnataka State Legal Services Authority, and directed the executing court to conclude the execution proceedings in favour of the appellant within two months. The judgment is to be circulated to all High Courts.
