The Kerala High Court has dismissed a petition seeking to transfer a 2018 murder trial to another court, ruling that a presiding judge’s method of recording witness testimony falls within judicial discretion and does not justify shifting proceedings.
In an order issued on September 29, Justice CS Dias observed that trial judges are not passive observers in legal proceedings, but active participants tasked with uncovering the truth. The court held that an accused party’s preference for how testimony should be documented cannot override or restrict that judicial authority.
The transfer plea was filed by individuals facing trial over a February 12, 2018 incident in which an unlawful assembly allegedly conspired and launched a fatal assault on a person using lethal weapons and explosive substances.
The dispute arose after the trial court judge rejected an application by defence counsel to record a witness’s testimony in a question-and-answer format rather than in narrative form. Defence advocates S Rajeev and MS Aneer argued that the witness appeared coached and had delivered a rehearsed account. When their formal request was denied, the accused approached the Thalassery sessions court seeking a transfer, but that petition was dismissed.
Judicial Discretion And Procedural Standards
Opposing the transfer, government counsel Asaf Ali T submitted that the defence was deliberately protracting the trial. He noted that under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, evidence is routinely taken down in narrative form, with the question-and-answer format reserved solely for the presiding judge’s discretion.
Justice Dias concurred with the principle, stating that an allegation that a witness was tutored does not automatically confer a legal entitlement on the defence to demand question-and-answer transcription. The High Court found no legal error or procedural infirmity in the trial judge’s decision to follow narrative documentation.
Addressing the standard for transferring cases, the High Court clarified that the legal correctness of challenged trial orders is not the deciding criterion. Instead, the court must assess whether the totality of the circumstances provides a reasonable, genuine, and justifiable ground to believe that a fair and impartial trial is compromised.
Bail Cancellation And Judicial Demeanour
The accused had further alleged that on May 25, upon learning of their transfer petition, the trial judge abruptly cancelled their bail bonds and remanded them to judicial custody without giving them an opportunity to be heard. The High Court subsequently stayed that remand order and granted bail.
When asked to explain the situation, the trial judge informed the High Court that the defence had repeatedly stalled proceedings with unwarranted objections, prompting the cancellation of their bail. The judge also maintained that her interactions with the witness were limited to offering protection and instilling confidence so the testimony could be given without fear.
While Justice Dias affirmed that courts must facilitate an environment where witnesses can testify without intimidation, the High Court cautioned that judicial officers should avoid actively encouraging or motivating witnesses from the bench. Doing so, the court noted, risks sending a mistaken signal to the accused that the bench is adversarial toward them.
The High Court observed that while a judge must actively seek the truth, this authority must be exercised without encroaching upon the role of counsel, exhibiting partisanship, or intimidating parties and witnesses. The ruling cited the ancient philosopher Socrates regarding the essential qualities of a jurist: to hear courteously, answer wisely, consider soberly, and decide impartially.
Declining to reassign the proceedings, the High Court expressed confidence that the presiding judge and the participating advocates would resolve their differences and proceed with the trial.
