The High Court of Chhattisgarh, in a significant ruling, has held that a person cannot suffer disqualification for an offence committed as a “Child in Conflict with Law” (CCL) due to the protections under Section 24(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru allowed a writ appeal and quashed the termination of a Food Inspector who was dismissed from service for failing to disclose criminal cases that were registered against him when he was a minor.
The Court held that the non-disclosure of such “stale and settled matters,” which concluded long before his appointment, does not amount to suppression of material facts warranting termination.
Background of the Case
The appellant, Prahlad Prasad Rathour, an ex-serviceman, was appointed to the post of Food Inspector (reserved for Ex-Serviceman) on August 30, 2018, and joined the service. On March 15, 2024, he was terminated from service based on a police verification report which stated his character was “unfit and non-suitable for government service.”
The adverse report was based on two criminal cases registered against the appellant in 2002. Both cases were settled, one by compromise and the other by acquittal, in a Lok Adalat in 2007. These events occurred when the appellant was a minor, and well before he applied for and was appointed to the state service in 2018. Notably, after the 2007 acquittals, the appellant served for approximately 15 years in the Indian Navy, where his character was assessed as “Exemplary” and “Very Good.”
The appellant challenged his termination in WPS No. 2823 of 2024. However, a learned Single Judge dismissed the petition on January 7, 2025, observing that the appellant “who was an Ex-serviceman has purposefully and with ill-intention had not disclosed the correct facts.” The Single Judge held that this non-disclosure prevented the appointing authority from applying its mind regarding the appellant’s suitability. This dismissal led to the present writ appeal.
Appellant’s Arguments
Appearing for the appellant, Advocate Mr. Pankaj Singh contended that the termination order was “per se arbitrary” and violated Article 14 of the Constitution, as well as the principles of natural justice, as no opportunity of hearing was granted before the termination after nearly six years of service.
He argued that the criminal cases were from 2002, when the appellant was a minor, and pertained to a “trivial issue of dispute with the neighbor” involving his entire family. The primary contention was that as the appellant was a “Child in Conflict with Law” (CCL) at the time, he was entitled to the benefit of Section 24(1) of the JJ Act, 2015, which “removes all disqualifications attached to a conviction or criminal proceeding against a CCL.”
Mr. Singh also relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2016) 8 SCC 471 and Ravindra Kumar Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2024) 5 SCC 264 to argue that leniency should be shown for non-disclosure of cases where the appellant was acquitted long prior to the recruitment.
State’s Arguments
Opposing the appeal, Mr. Shashank Thakur, Deputy Advocate General for the State, “vehemently” argued that the appellant was “indisputably” involved in criminal cases and was charge-sheeted. He submitted that a compromise in Lok Adalat “does not mean that the appellant is absolved from the liability of giving correct and fair information.”
The State’s counsel contended that the appellant had “suppressed the material fact” of the two FIRs, and the appointment order itself contained a clause allowing for termination if adverse comments were found in the character verification. He further submitted that providing an opportunity of hearing would be a “futile exercise” as the facts were admitted, and that the offences attracted “moral turpitude” as the appellant was not “honorably acquitted.” The State relied on Satish Chandra Yadav Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2023) 7 SCC 536 and Jainendra Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary, Home and Ors. (2012) 8 SCC 748.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
The Division Bench, in its judgment authored by Justice Bibhu Datta Guru, found both the termination order and the Single Judge’s order to be “unsustainable in law.”
The Court noted the “admitted position” that the criminal cases were from 2002, when the appellant was a minor, and had culminated in 2007, “much prior to his joining the services of the State Government in 2018.”
The Bench made a key observation: “Thus, on the date of submission of the verification form and appointment, there existed no subsisting criminal proceedings or disqualification against the appellant.”
The Court held that the respondents’ reliance on such “stale and settled matters” to declare the appellant “unfit” was “wholly arbitrary.” It endorsed the principles laid down in Avtar Singh (supra) and Ravindra Kumar (supra), stating they “categorically held that non-disclosure of trivial or long-concluded cases, especially those ending in acquittal, cannot be treated as suppression of material facts warranting termination.”
The judgment pivoted on the application of the JJ Act, 2015. The Court, after citing the definitions of “child” (Section 2(12)) and “child in conflict with law” (Section 2(13)), held: “…considering that the appellant was a CCL at the time of the alleged offences, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 24(1) of the Act 2015, which removes all disqualifications attached to a conviction or criminal proceeding against a CCL.”
Explaining the legislative intent, the Court observed, “Section 24 of the Act of 2015 has been incorporated in order to give a CCL an opportunity to lead his life with no stigma and to wipe out the circumstances of his past. It thus provides that a CCL shall not suffer any disqualification attaching to conviction of an offence under such Act.”
The Court also found the termination without affording any opportunity of hearing to be “violative of the principles of natural justice and fails the test of fairness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India,” further reinforcing the appellant’s case with his “unblemished record of fifteen years in the Indian Navy.”
Decision
Concluding that the appeal had merit, the High Court allowed the writ appeal. “The impugned order dated 07.01.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, as well as the order of termination dated 15.03.2024, are hereby quashed and set aside,” the bench directed, adding that “Consequences would follow.”
