The Supreme Court has referred the interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, to a larger bench to address conflicting judicial views regarding the property rights of Hindu females. The referral, made in Civil Appeal No. 6557 of 2022, underscores the urgent need for clarity in a provision that has caused decades of judicial divergence.
The Case and Background
The dispute arises from the will of Kanwar Bhan, who passed away in 1965, leaving a life estate for his widow, Lachhmi Bai, over specific properties. The widow later sold part of this estate in 1981, prompting a challenge from the respondents, descendants of the testator, who argued the sale was void under the restrictive terms of the will.
The case, brought by Tej Bhan (deceased, through legal representatives) against Ram Kishan (deceased, through legal representatives), highlights the legal friction between subsections (1) and (2) of Section 14. These subsections define whether property held by a Hindu female is converted into absolute ownership or remains restricted when acquired through instruments such as wills or gifts.
Legal Issues and Observations
The key legal question is the applicability of Section 14(1), which grants full ownership to Hindu females for properties they hold, versus Section 14(2), which restricts ownership when the property is explicitly limited under a will or similar instrument.
The trial and first appellate courts sided with the widow, applying the principles established in the landmark judgment V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy (1977), which held that pre-existing maintenance rights expand into absolute ownership under Section 14(1). However, the High Court reversed these decisions, relying on Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike (2006), which narrowly interpreted Section 14(2) to uphold restrictive conditions under a will.
Supreme Court’s Approach
In their judgment, Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Sandeep Mehta reviewed decades of precedent, noting significant inconsistencies in the interpretation of Section 14. The bench observed, “Almost four decades after Tulasamma, we have two streams of thought.” One judicial line applies Tulasamma as a foundational principle granting expansive rights under Section 14(1), while another restricts such rights when a will or similar instrument prescribes limitations.
Highlighting the legislative inaction to clarify these provisions, the bench quoted Justice P.N. Bhagwati in Tulasamma: “This is a classic instance of a statutory provision… robbing the law of that modicum of certainty which it must always possess.”
Referral to Larger Bench
The bench expressed its limitations as a two-judge panel in reconciling such extensive judicial divergence. “There must be clarity and certainty in the position of law that would govern proprietary interests,” the bench stated, directing the Registry to place the case before the Chief Justice of India for the constitution of a larger bench.
The Court identified critical precedents, including:
– Karmi v. Amru (1972): A restrictive interpretation of Section 14(2), denying absolute rights where a will imposed limitations.
– Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh (1987) and Thota Sesharathamma v. Thota Manikyamma (1991): Broad applications of Section 14(1) aligning with Tulasamma.
– Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike (2006): Reaffirmed Section 14(2) as controlling in cases of restrictive wills.
