The Supreme Court of India, in a crucial ruling, has reaffirmed that a First Information Report (FIR) lodged by a deceased person cannot be treated as substantive evidence unless it is corroborated or qualifies as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. The verdict came in the case of Lalita vs. Vishwanath & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 1086 of 2017), where the Court upheld the acquittal of four accused in an alleged abetment of suicide case.
Background of the Case
The case arose from the suicide of Dev Kanya, who had been married to Vishwanath (Respondent No.1) for approximately one and a half years before her tragic demise. Her mother, Lalita, the appellant in this case, alleged that her daughter had been subjected to continuous harassment by her husband, in-laws, and the husband’s first wife, leading her to take her own life by drowning in a well.
The deceased’s father originally lodged the FIR, detailing alleged cruelty and abetment by the accused. However, he passed away before trial, leading the prosecution to rely on the FIR as primary evidence.
The Trial Court convicted all four accused under Sections 306 (abetment of suicide) and 498A (cruelty) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), sentencing them to ten years of rigorous imprisonment. However, the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) overturned the conviction, citing lack of substantive evidence. Aggrieved, the mother of the deceased moved the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s acquittal of the accused.
Key Legal Issues Before the Supreme Court
1. Can an FIR filed by a deceased person be treated as substantive evidence?
2. Does mere harassment amount to abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC?
3. Can Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act be invoked to presume abetment?
4. What is the evidentiary value of an FIR when the informant (father of the deceased) is unavailable for cross-examination?
Supreme Court’s Observations and Ruling
The two-judge bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan dismissed the appeal, emphasizing the limited evidentiary value of an FIR filed by a deceased person unless corroborated.
– “An FIR is primarily meant to set the criminal process into motion. It is not a substantive piece of evidence and cannot be relied upon unless it qualifies as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act,” the Court ruled.
– “In cases where the informant dies, the FIR can only be treated as evidence if it directly relates to the cause of death and is corroborated by other material evidence.”
– The Court clarified that under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, courts may presume abetment of suicide in matrimonial cases, but only if there is clear evidence of instigation, aiding, or direct involvement.
– “Mere harassment or cruelty is not sufficient to infer abetment of suicide. There must be clear evidence that the accused instigated or compelled the deceased to take the drastic step,” the judgment stated.
– The Court also pointed out that while the husband may have pressurized the deceased to transfer land, this alone does not constitute abetment under Section 306 IPC.
– The bench criticized the Trial Court’s decision to allow the Investigating Officer to prove the FIR’s contents in the absence of the original informant (deceased’s father), calling it legally flawed.
– “An FIR, unless corroborated by other evidence, is not admissible as proof of guilt. The prosecution must establish independent evidence to prove its claims beyond reasonable doubt,” the Court observed.
Based on these findings, the Supreme Court upheld the acquittal of all four accused.
