A Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka, Pankaj Mithal and Ahsanuddin Amanullah on May 14, 2025, quashed the convictions of eight appellants—including Tukesh Singh—who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for offences under Sections 147, 148, 307 read with 149 and Section 302 read with 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court held that “the failure of the eyewitnesses to identify the accused in the court as the accused they had seen committing the crime is fatal to the prosecution’s case.”
Background
On March 23, 2001, a group of nine men allegedly armed with swords, rods, knives, poleaxes and clubs attacked the occupants of a disputed shop in Masturi, Chhattisgarh. Two persons—Manrakhan Singh and Narayan Singh—were killed, and five others were injured. The accused were tried by a Sessions Court, which convicted them of rioting (Sections 147 and 148 IPC), attempt to murder (Section 307 IPC read with Section 149 IPC) and murder (Section 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC), sentencing them to life imprisonment for the murder charges.
Submissions
The appellants’ senior counsel argued that the testimony of the injured eyewitnesses contained material contradictions and omissions, and that none of them had been required to identify the accused in open court despite knowing some of them before the incident. It was further urged that parallel “counter cases” had been registered and tried separately, causing prejudice, and that the evidence fell within exceptions to Section 300 IPC, warranting conviction under Section 304 IPC at most. The State’s counsel defended the concurrent findings of guilt, contending that minor discrepancies did not undermine the core consistency of the eyewitness accounts.
Court’s Analysis
The Court examined the depositions of five injured eyewitnesses (PWs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 8), noting repeated delays in recording their statements—ranging from five and a half hours up to twenty-one days after the incident—and significant contradictions between their examinations-in-chief and police statements. Critically, although some witnesses knew certain accused personally, none was called upon to—and therefore did not—identify the accused in the dock as those they had seen wielding weapons on March 23, 2001. The Court reiterated that when an eyewitness “states in his deposition that ‘he had seen A, B and C killing X and he knew A, B and C,’ …“the eyewitness must identify the accused A, B and C in the Court. Unless this is done, the prosecution cannot establish that the accused are the same persons who are named by the eyewitness in his deposition.”
Decision
Concluding that the prosecution had failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, principally due to the fatal identification lapse, the Supreme Court quashed the High Court’s judgment of September 10, 2010, set aside the Sessions Court’s convictions, and acquitted the appellants of all charges. Their bail bonds were cancelled, and having already served substantial periods in custody and on bail, the appellants were discharged.
