The Supreme Court of India has dismissed an appeal challenging a life imprisonment sentence, holding that a dying declaration made to an independent medical witness, corroborated by circumstantial evidence, cannot be ignored “merely because there are minor discrepancies” in the testimony of other prosecution witnesses.
The bench of Justice Rajesh Bindal and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi upheld the Gujarat High Court’s order, which had reversed a trial court’s acquittal and convicted the appellant, Jemaben, for the murder of her relative, Leelaben, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
The appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 1934 of 2017) was filed by the appellant against the final order dated 21.07.2016 from the High Court of Gujarat, which had sentenced her to imprisonment for life and a fine of ₹10,000.
Background of the Case
According to the prosecution, the case originated from an incident on the intervening night of November 29 and 30, 2004. The appellant and a co-accused, Bherabhai Revaji Majirana, allegedly entered into a criminal conspiracy to kill Leelaben and her son, Ganesh.
It was the prosecution’s case that in executing this conspiracy, the appellant poured kerosene on Leelaben while she and her son were sleeping in their hut and set her ablaze. Leelaben sustained severe burn injuries and was taken to the Civil Hospital, Palanpur, where she succumbed to her injuries on December 4, 2004. Her son sustained burn injuries to the extent of 10 to 12%.
A complaint was filed on December 5, 2004, by Geetaben (PW-1), the sister of the deceased. After investigation, a chargesheet was filed, and charges were framed under Sections 302, 307, 436, 34, and 120(b) of the IPC, along with Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951.
The Additional Sessions Judge, Banaskantha, at Deesa, in Sessions Case Number 40 of 2005, acquitted both accused persons by a judgment dated November 19, 2005, “mainly on the ground that there are discrepancies in three dying declarations given by Leelaben, the deceased.”
The State of Gujarat subsequently challenged this acquittal before the High Court of Gujarat. The High Court allowed the state’s appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 539 of 2006) specifically against the present appellant, setting aside the acquittal and convicting her for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.
Arguments Before the Supreme Court
Appellant’s Contentions: Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the prosecution’s case relied primarily on dying declarations that contained “major discrepancies.” It was contended that the testimony of the complainant (PW-1), the deceased’s husband (PW-4, Kalubhai Lakhuji), and other documentary evidence suffered from “major discrepancies, inconsistencies and material contradictions.”
The appellant argued that the trial court had rightly granted the benefit of the doubt and acquitted her. It was submitted that the High Court erred in relying heavily on the deposition of Dr. Shivrambhai Nagarbhai Patel (PW-3, Incharge Medical Officer) and the ‘Yadi’ (memo) he sent to the police. The counsel asserted that when two views were possible from the evidence, the High Court should not have interfered with the trial court’s view.
Respondent’s Contentions (State of Gujarat): Conversely, the learned counsel for the State of Gujarat argued that in cases of multiple dying declarations, “each dying declaration will have to be considered independently on its own merit.”
The State submitted that the first declaration, recorded by PW-3 (the doctor), was clear. The deceased had stated she was “burnt by the appellant/accused, who was the aunt-in-law of the deceased, by pouring kerosene… and setting the deceased on fire.” The State also highlighted that the deceased had disclosed the motive on the same day: “the appellant/accused was compelling the deceased to go with one, Mania Dabhawala… and refusal by the deceased thereto, resulted into the incident in question.”
The State argued that the post-mortem report (Exhibit 25) and the panchnama (Exhibit 12), which noted an empty kerosene container and soil smelling of kerosene at the scene, corroborated this declaration. It was also pointed out that PW-3 had deposed that the deceased’s body had the “smell of kerosene” and “100% burn injuries,” whereas her 4-year-old son, sleeping beside her, sustained only 10-12% injuries, negating the theory of an accidental fire.
Supreme Court’s Analysis and Findings
The Supreme Court, after perusing the entire record and evidence, affirmed the High Court’s findings. The judgment, authored by Justice Pancholi, noted that the deceased’s narration to the doctor (PW-3) upon her admission to the hospital was critical.
The Court observed: “It emerged from the record that when the deceased was brought to the hospital, she narrated the incident before the Doctor (PW-3) wherein she specifically stated that ‘my aunt-in-law, Jemaben poured kerosene on me and set ablaze.'”
The Court further noted the disclosure of the motive: “Further, when she was asked again by the doctor, she disclosed that ‘my aunt-in-law asked me to go with Mania Dabhawala, I refused for the same and, therefore, she burnt me alive’.”
The judgment highlighted that this evidence was duly proved by PW-3’s testimony and supported by the Yadi sent by the doctor to the police, which confirmed the deceased was “conscious and… in a position to speak.”
The Supreme Court found that this dying declaration was strongly corroborated by other evidence:
- Medical Certificate: Noted “whole body and clothing having kerosene smelling burns about 100%”.
- Panchnama: “one empty container having kerosene smell” and kerosene-smelling soil were found at the incident site.
- Injuries to the Son: The 4-year-old son sustained only “10-12% burn injuries on his lower legs and feet.”
Based on this, the Court explicitly rejected the appellant’s defence: “Thus, the theory of accidental fire at the place of incident put forward by the appellant/accused cannot be believed.”
Addressing the issue of discrepancies, the Court held: “We are of the view that merely because there are minor discrepancies in the version given by the prosecution witness with regard to the dying declaration and with regard to the manner of occurrence of the incident, the first dying declaration given by the deceased before the independent witness, i.e PW-3, cannot be ignored.”
The bench concluded that the High Court had rightly relied upon the decision in Nallam Veera Stayanandam & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (2004) 10 SCC 769.
The Court held that “only one view was possible” from the evidence and the trial court had erred in its acquittal.
Decision
Finding “no interference is required in the impugned judgment passed by the High Court,” the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, thereby confirming the conviction and life sentence of the appellant.
