The Supreme Court of India, in a judgment dated November 10, 2025, has set aside a Madras High Court order that directed a doctor to undergo a DNA test to ascertain the paternity of a child born to a married woman.
The apex court held that such a direction cannot be issued when the “conclusive proof” of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, remains unrebutted by the party alleging otherwise.
A bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi, hearing Criminal Appeal No. 1013 of 2021, ruled that the High Court’s order rested on a “fundamental misapprehension of both statutory framework and constitutional safeguards.” The Court further held that in the context of the criminal case—alleging cheating and harassment—the paternity of the child was a “collateral factor” and had no direct nexus to the offences alleged.
Background of the Case
The appeal was filed by R. Rajendran, a doctor, challenging the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Madras at Madurai dated 10.05.2017. The High Court had upheld a Single Judge’s order directing the appellant to provide a blood sample for DNA profiling.
The case originated from a complaint by Respondent No. 1, Kamar Nisha. According to her, she married one Abdul Latheef in 2001. Her husband, suffering from a skin ailment, sought treatment from the appellant. Respondent No. 1 alleged that the appellant developed physical relations with her, resulting in the birth of a child on 08.03.2007.
She further alleged that her husband, upon learning of the continued relationship, deserted her when the child was about one and a half years old. Following a subsequent dispute with the appellant, she appeared on a television programme, which led to the registration of F.I.R. No. 233/2014 against the appellant for offences under Sections 417 (Cheating) and 420 (Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Women Harassment Act.
During the investigation, police sought a DNA test, but the appellant failed to comply. Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition before the High Court seeking the DNA test. A Single Judge, vide order dated 24.04.2017, held that DNA profiling was “essential for the investigation” and directed the appellant to appear for sample collection. This order was confirmed by a Division Bench, prompting the appellant to approach the Supreme Court.
Arguments Before the Court
The appellant argued that DNA testing can only be granted in exceptional cases and not for “roving and fishing inquiries,” emphasizing the implications for the right to privacy. He contended that Section 112 of the Evidence Act mandates a conclusive presumption of legitimacy for a child born during a valid marriage. He pointed out that official documents, including the child’s birth and school certificates, record Abdul Latheef as the father.
Per contra, Respondent No. 1 submitted that the present case arose from criminal proceedings, not a matrimonial dispute, and required strict proof. She argued that since she, the woman, was seeking the test, there was no element of “imputing unchastity.” She further contended that an adverse inference under Section 114 of the Evidence Act should be drawn against the appellant for his refusal.
Supreme Court’s Analysis and Findings
The Supreme Court, in its judgment authored by Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, extensively analyzed the statutory framework of Section 112 of the Evidence Act.
1. On Section 112 (Presumption of Legitimacy): The Court noted that Section 112 establishes a “conclusive proof” of legitimacy for any person born during the continuance of a valid marriage. This presumption, the Court stated, “can be displaced only by proving non-access between the spouses,” which refers to the impossibility of sexual relations.
The bench found that Respondent No. 1 had completely failed to rebut this presumption. The Court observed: “What is most striking, however, is the complete absence of any specific pleading by respondent No. 1 establishing non-access between herself and Abdul Latheef during the period relevant to the conception of the child.”
The judgment highlighted that the child was born on 08.03.2007, during the subsistence of the marriage. It pointed out that the respondent’s own claim of desertion by her husband was “sometime in 2008-2009, well after the child had attained the age of approximately one and half years.” The Court termed her claim of desertion a “bare assertion unsupported by any evidence.”
The Court held that the respondent’s case, at its highest, was one of “simultaneous access,” which “does not negate the husband’s access, nor does it suffice to displace the statutory presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act.”
2. On Paternity as a ‘Collateral Factor’: The Court ruled that the High Court’s reliance on Sections 53 and 53A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to order the test was “misplaced.” The bench held these provisions require a “clear and proximate nexus between the examination sought and the alleged offence.”
The judgment held that the paternity of the child was “collateral to the primary allegations of cheating and harassment.” The Court stated: “The gravamen of the allegations bears no nexus to the paternity of the child. The child is neither a party to the proceedings nor is the child’s status required to be ascertained to determine the commission of the offences alleged. Directing DNA testing in such circumstances would thus be wholly extraneous to the scope of the investigation…”
3. On Right to Privacy and Adverse Inference: The Court affirmed that forcefully subjecting an individual to DNA testing is a “grave intrusion upon privacy and personal liberty” under Article 21. It held that the respondent’s willingness to waive her own privacy “does not extend to waiving the privacy of others,” namely the appellant and the child, who has now attained majority.
Furthermore, the Court found the respondent’s assertion that the child is “living as illegitimate is legally untenable,” stating, “In the eyes of the law, the child is the legitimate offspring of Abdul Latheef through respondent No. 1, as the statutory presumption under Section 112… remains unrebutted.”
The argument for drawing an adverse inference against the appellant was deemed “fundamentally misconceived.” The Court held: “Without first displacing the statutory presumption of legitimacy under Section 112… respondent No. 1 cannot seek refuge in the drawing of an adverse inference…”
The Decision
Concluding that the High Court’s direction was unsustainable, the Supreme Court held that Section 112 “stands as a bulwark against the casual illegitimization of children on the strength of unsubstantiated allegations or mere suspicion.”
The Court ruled that the alleged offences “are neither of nature nor of a circumstance that warrant recourse to DNA analysis.”
Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Madras High Court dated 10.05.2017.
