The Delhi High Court has ruled that DNA evidence confirming paternity cannot, by itself, establish the offence of rape without independent proof that the sexual act was non-consensual. Setting aside the conviction of a man accused of repeatedly raping a young woman over several months, the Court emphasized that “mere proof of sexual relations, even if resulting in pregnancy, is insufficient to prove rape unless it is also shown that the act was non-consensual.”
The judgment was delivered by Justice Amit Mahajan in CRL.A. 242/2023, Nathu v. State, arising from Sessions Case No. 216/2018 (FIR No. 30/2018, PS Nangloi).
Case Background
The case revolved around allegations by the prosecutrix, a young woman who claimed she was sexually assaulted by her neighbour, Nathu, over a span of six months in 2017. She alleged that the assaults occurred at his residence under the pretext of playing Ludo. The complaint was filed only after she discovered her pregnancy during a medical check-up in early 2018.
Nathu was arrested on 13 February 2018, and charges were framed under Sections 376(2)(n) (repeated rape) and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the IPC. The Trial Court at Tis Hazari, presided over by the Additional Sessions Judge (FTSC), convicted him based mainly on the testimony of the prosecutrix and her family, supported by the DNA report confirming that the accused fathered the child.
Key Legal Issues and Arguments
Appearing for the appellant, advocate Ms. Sunita Arora argued that the relationship was consensual and the delay in reporting, along with material improvements in the prosecutrix’s testimony, raised serious doubts. She pointed out that:
- There were no physical injuries or signs of forcible intercourse in the medical examination.
- The FIR was lodged after a significant delay, only after the pregnancy was discovered.
- The allegations of threats (Section 506 IPC) were absent from the initial complaint and emerged only during court testimony.
- The DNA report confirmed paternity, not absence of consent.
On the other hand, the State, represented by APP Mr. Sunil Kumar Gautam along with Ms. Astha and Ms. Megha Singh (counsel for the prosecutrix, DHCLSC), defended the conviction. They contended that the prosecutrix had no motive to falsely implicate the appellant and that her testimony was consistent and cogent.
DNA: A Double-Edged Sword
The High Court acknowledged that while the DNA report (Ex. PW9/A) confirmed the accused was the biological father of the child, this alone could not establish the crime of rape in the absence of independent proof of lack of consent.
Justice Mahajan observed:
“The DNA report merely proves paternity—it does not and cannot, by itself, establish the absence of consent. It is trite law that the offence under Section 376 of the IPC hinges on the absence of consent.”
Court’s Observations
In a detailed 18-page judgment, the Court critically examined:
- The delay in lodging the FIR (approx. 2–3 months after the alleged last incident).
- Material contradictions and omissions in the statements of the prosecutrix, particularly the absence of threat allegations in the Section 164 CrPC statement.
- The voluntary nature of visits to the appellant’s house and the admission of affectionate feelings toward him.
- The possibility that the relationship was consensual and the complaint was made after the pregnancy, perhaps under social pressure.
Justice Mahajan quoted the Supreme Court’s observations in Sadashiv Ramrao Hadbe v. State of Maharashtra:
“If the version given by the prosecutrix is unsupported by any medical evidence or the whole surrounding circumstances are highly improbable… the court shall not act on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix.”
Conviction under Section 506 IPC Also Set Aside
The Court found no contemporaneous evidence of criminal intimidation. It noted that initial statements made no mention of threats, and the prosecutrix only introduced the element of threats during trial. Justice Mahajan held that such a material improvement cast doubt on the credibility of the allegations.
Final Verdict
The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and that the Trial Court had erred in convicting the appellant without fully appreciating the inconsistencies and gaps in the evidence. It ruled:
“The benefit of doubt must, and does, go to the appellant.”
Accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges.
