The High Court of Delhi, in a significant judgment, has dismissed a petition seeking to quash criminal proceedings for sexual harassment, holding that a Magistrate is not bound by police closure reports and that exoneration in a departmental enquiry does not preclude a criminal trial. Justice Neena Bansal Krishna upheld the summoning order issued by a trial court against an Additional Resident Commissioner for offences under Sections 354A and 509 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
The case concerned a petition filed by the official challenging an order by the Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ), New Delhi, which had affirmed the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate’s (CMM) decision to take cognizance of a sexual harassment complaint filed by a member of the Kashmir Administrative Services.
Background of the Case
The matter originated from a complaint dated December 31, 2014, filed by the complainant with the Department of Hospitality and Protocol, Jammu and Kashmir Government, under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act). The complaint was forwarded to the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC). On February 11, 2015, the ICC submitted its report, concluding that the allegations against the petitioner were not established.
In parallel, the complainant filed a police complaint on January 6, 2015, leading to the registration of FIR No. 16/2015 on February 10, 2015, under Sections 354A, 506, and 509 of the IPC. After investigation, the police filed a Closure Report on May 21, 2016, citing a lack of evidence and suggesting the complaint seemed motivated.
The complainant filed a Protest Petition, and the CMM directed further investigation. The police subsequently filed a Supplementary Closure Report, again stating that no corroborative evidence was found. However, on August 21, 2017, the CMM disagreed with the police reports, took cognizance of the offences under Sections 354A and 509 IPC, and issued summons to the petitioner. A criminal revision petition filed by the petitioner against this order was dismissed by the Ld. ASJ on September 4, 2018, leading to the present petition before the High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
The petitioner argued that the lower courts erred by ignoring the statutory report of the ICC under the POSH Act, which had exonerated him. He contended that the text messages exchanged between him and the complainant indicated a cordial relationship and did not support the allegations. Furthermore, it was submitted that multiple witnesses examined by the police did not support the complainant’s version, and the trial court had selectively relied on certain statements. The petitioner asserted that the criminal proceedings were manifestly attended with mala fides and instituted with an ulterior motive.
The State and the complainant countered that departmental and criminal proceedings are distinct and operate in different fields. The complainant alleged that the petitioner was an influential person and that the police had filed closure reports under his pressure. It was argued that the trial court had sufficient material, including the complainant’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and corroborating statements from four other witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., to justify the summoning order.
Court’s Analysis and Decision
The High Court meticulously analyzed three primary legal questions before reaching its conclusion.
First, on whether a court is bound to accept a police closure report, the Court relied on established Supreme Court precedents, including Bhagwat Singh vs. Commissioner of Police and Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, to affirm that a Magistrate has the discretion to disagree with the police report and take cognizance of an offence based on the material collected during the investigation. The judgment noted, “the learned M.M was well within his powers to appreciate The investigations done and the evidence collected to form and independent opinion to take the cognizance Report, irrespective of the Closure Report.”
Second, addressing the implications of the ICC’s enquiry report on criminal proceedings, the Court held that the two are fundamentally different. It cited the Supreme Court’s decision in M/s Stanzen Toyotetsu India Pvt. Ltd. v. Girish V., stating, “While criminal prosecution for an offence is launched for violation of a duty that the offender owes to the Society, Departmental Enquiry is aimed at maintaining discipline and efficiency in service. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not same as of the criminal trial.” The Court concluded that “mere exoneration in the Departmental Enquiry cannot be the sole basis for discharging the Petitioner in the present FIR.”
Finally, the Court examined whether a prima facie case was made out. Justice Krishna observed that allegations of sexual harassment must be viewed from the victim’s perspective. The Court took note of specific allegations from the complaint, such as comments like “what do you have in your mind when you get ready in the morning,” “What if someone falls in love with you,” and an instance where the petitioner allegedly caught hold of the complainant’s hand. The Court found that these allegations “squarely comes within the ambit of Section 354A as well as Section 509 IPC.”
The Court also found corroboration in the statements of four witnesses who stated that the complainant had told them about the harassment. The judgment emphasized that the “sole testimony of the Complainant/Prosecutrix is sufficient to bring home a conviction, if it is found to be of sterling quality.”
Conclusion
Concluding that there was sufficient material to prima facie disclose an offence under Sections 354-A/509 IPC, the High Court found no merit in the petition. “The Ld. M.M has rightly discarded the Closure Report and taken cognizance in accordance with law. The Ld. ASJ has rightly upheld the Order of cognizance and Summoning,” the Court ruled while dismissing the petition.
