The Supreme Court of India, through a bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta, has held that exoneration in departmental proceedings does not automatically entitle an accused to a discharge in criminal proceedings, particularly in cases involving traps under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). The Bench observed that the standards of proof in disciplinary inquiries and criminal trials are distinct.
While rejecting the plea for discharge based on departmental exoneration, the Court set aside the Karnataka High Court’s findings regarding the validity of the sanction for prosecution. The matter has been remitted to the Trial Court to determine the factual question of the “appointing authority” to decide the competence of the sanctioning authority.
Background of the Case
The Appellant, T. Manjunath, was working as a Senior Inspector of Motor Vehicles at the R.T.O. Office, K.R. Puram, Bengaluru. He was accused of demanding and accepting illegal gratification of Rs. 15,000 from a complainant through a private person, co-accused H.B. Mastigowda. A trap was laid by the Lokayukta Police, leading to the registration of Crime No. 48/2012 under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Sanction for prosecution was granted by the Commissioner of Transport under Section 19 of the PC Act. Subsequently, a chargesheet was filed.
The Appellant filed an application for discharge under Section 227 read with Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) on two grounds:
- Invalid Sanction: He argued that his appointing authority was the State Government, and thus the Commissioner of Transport was not competent to accord sanction.
- Departmental Exoneration: He claimed that he had been exonerated in departmental proceedings on the same charges and evidence, warranting a discharge in the criminal case.
The Trial Court, vide order dated August 23, 2017, discharged the accused, holding the sanction invalid as it was not accorded by the State Government. However, the High Court of Karnataka, in its order dated July 26, 2024, reversed the Trial Court’s decision, holding that the Commissioner of Transport was the competent authority. The High Court directed the trial to proceed.
The Appellant challenged the High Court’s order before the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
The Appellant’s Contentions: Senior Advocate Devadatt Kamat, appearing for the Appellant, argued that the departmental proceedings, based on identical charges and evidence, resulted in exoneration because the complainant and shadow witnesses did not support the department’s case. Relying on Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. Deputy Superintendent of Police (2020), he contended that continued criminal prosecution was unjustified.
Regarding the sanction, Mr. Kamat produced an office memorandum dated December 3, 1991, to argue that the Appellant was appointed under the authority of the Governor of Karnataka. Therefore, under Section 19(1) of the PC Act, only the State Government was competent to grant sanction, not the Commissioner.
The State’s Contentions: Additional Advocate General Aman Panwar, representing the State of Karnataka, argued that mere exoneration in disciplinary proceedings does not ground a quashing of criminal proceedings. He submitted that the exoneration occurred because witnesses turned hostile, but the trap-laying officer had fully supported the prosecution’s case.
Citing State v. T. Murthy (2004) and State of Bihar v. Rajmangal Ram (2014), the State argued that a sanction order cannot be struck down on the ground of lack of competence alone due to the Explanation to Section 19(4) of the PC Act. The State also disputed the documents produced by the Appellant, asserting that the Commissioner was indeed the appointing authority.
Court’s Analysis
1. Effect of Departmental Exoneration on Criminal Proceedings The Supreme Court examined the enquiry report which showed that the Appellant was exonerated primarily because the complainant and shadow witnesses did not support the department’s version. However, the Investigating Officer had supported the case.
Justice Sandeep Mehta, writing for the Bench, observed:
“We feel that the conclusion drawn by the disciplinary authority that guilt of the delinquent employee could not be proved merely on the testimony of the trap laying officer, is premature and unfounded.”
The Court noted that in criminal trials, conviction can be based on the testimony of the trap-laying officer even if decoy witnesses turn hostile. The Court held:
“Thus, the mere fact that some of the witnesses did not support the department’s case in the disciplinary proceedings would, by itself, not give any assurance that they would behave in the same manner at the criminal trial.”
Rejecting the reliance on Ashoo Surendranath Tewari, the Court stated:
“Though the core facts in both proceedings may bear resemblance, the viewpoint, scope, and standards for adjudication are entirely different… exoneration in the departmental proceedings does not, ipso facto, furnish a ground for dropping the criminal charges more particularly in Trap Cases.”
2. Sanction Under Section 19 PC Act: Competence and Jurisdiction The Court addressed the issue of whether the Commissioner of Transport was competent to grant sanction. The Court distinguished the precedents cited by the State (T. Murthy, Virender Kumar Tripathi, Rajmangal Ram), noting that the Explanation to Section 19(4) of the PC Act—which cures errors in sanction—applies when the sanction is scrutinized by an appellate or revisional court after a finding or sentence has been passed.
The Court clarified:
“In the present case, such a determination was made by the learned Special Judge in the original jurisdiction… In this factual background, the Explanation below Section 19(4) is not germane to the controversy, for it operates only in situations where the finding, sentence, or order of the Special Judge on the aspect of sanction is under scanner before the appellate or revisional Court…”
3. Disputed Appointing Authority The Court noted the “divergent claims” regarding the appointing authority. The Appellant produced documents suggesting appointment by the Governor, while the State produced an order dated February 11, 2010, empowering the Commissioner.
“In view of this disputed factual scenario, we are of the considered opinion that, for a proper and effective resolution of the controversy, it would be expedient in the interest of justice to remit the matter to the trial Court for fresh adjudication on the limited issue regarding the actual appointing authority…”
Decision
The Supreme Court disposed of the appeals with the following directions:
- Rejection of Discharge Plea: The contention that the Appellant is entitled to discharge due to exoneration in departmental proceedings was rejected.
- Remand on Sanction: The High Court’s finding on the validity of the sanction was set aside.
- Fresh Determination: The matter was remitted to the Trial Court to determine the “actual appointing authority” of the Appellant. The Trial Court was granted liberty to summon original records/contemporaneous documents.
- Outcome: If the Trial Court finds the sanction was issued by a competent authority, the trial shall proceed. If not, the chargesheet shall be returned to the investigating agency to obtain fresh sanction from the appropriate authority.
Case Details:
- Case Title: T. Manjunath vs. The State of Karnataka and Anr.
- Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 11160-11161 of 2024)
- Citation: 2025 INSC 1356
- Bench: Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta
- Counsel for Appellant: Senior Advocate Devadatt Kamat
- Counsel for State: AAG Aman Panwar
