The Supreme Court has reiterated that courts should refrain from staying convictions of public servants convicted of corruption unless there are justifiable reasons. This observation came while dismissing a special leave petition filed by a public servant seeking a stay on his conviction. The decision was rendered on 19 June 2025 by a bench comprising Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Prasanna B. Varale in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary No. 4666 of 2025 titled Raghunath Bansropan Pandey vs. State of Gujarat.
Background
The petitioner, Raghunath Bansropan Pandey, was convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He was found guilty of offences under Section 7 read with Section 12, and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. The trial court sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2), and two years under Section 7 read with Section 12.
Following the conviction, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Gujarat High Court and sought suspension of his sentence. The High Court, while granting suspension of sentence, clarified in its order dated 3 April 2023 (in CRLMA No. 1 of 2023 in R/Criminal Appeal No. 608 of 2023) that the order did not amount to a stay on conviction.
Supreme Court Proceedings
Challenging the High Court’s observation that there was no stay on conviction, the petitioner moved the Supreme Court. After condoning the delay in filing, the Court heard arguments and examined the impugned order.
Referring to its previous rulings in K.C. Sareen v. CBI, Chandigarh, (2001) 6 SCC 584, and CBI, New Delhi v. M.N. Sharma, (2008) 8 SCC 549, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that convictions of public servants for corruption should not be stayed casually.
The Court observed:
“Courts should refrain from staying conviction of public servants who have been convicted on charges of corruption. Ex facie, we find no justifiable reason to take a different view.”
Decision
Finding no merit in the petition, the Court stated:
“We are of the firm opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference.”
Accordingly, the special leave petition was dismissed, and all pending applications were disposed of.
