The Chhattisgarh High Court, in a significant decision delivered on November 20, 2024, reaffirmed the limited scope of contempt jurisdiction, stating that courts must adhere to their prescribed boundaries and refrain from issuing fresh directives that go beyond compliance with prior orders. The Division Bench comprising Justice Rajani Dubey and Justice Bibhu Datta Guru ruled on Miscellaneous Appeal No. 124 of 2024, addressing the appointment of a substitute Sarpanch for Gram Panchayat Khapridih. This case arose out of contempt proceedings initiated under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, raising crucial legal questions about jurisdiction and procedural compliance.
Case Background
The controversy stemmed from the suspension of Smt. Bindu Chauhan, the elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Khapridih, under Section 40 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, due to pending inquiries. To maintain the functioning of the Gram Panchayat, authorities appointed Smt. Laxmi Vaishnav, a general-category candidate, as the substitute Sarpanch under Section 39(3) of the Act.
However, the office of Sarpanch was reserved for Scheduled Caste (SC) women, and Smt. Amrika Bai Ajagalay, an eligible SC woman Panch member, was not considered for the post. She alleged procedural irregularities, particularly the failure to serve her a notice regarding the appointment. Smt. Ajagalay filed a writ petition (WPC No. 1699/2024) challenging the appointment, which the High Court disposed of on April 23, 2024, directing the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) to examine the matter and take appropriate action within 60 days.
When this order was not implemented within the stipulated time, Smt. Ajagalay filed a contempt petition (CONT No. 828/2024) in the High Court. The Contempt Court, while hearing the petition, issued directives to initiate the removal of Smt. Laxmi Vaishnav and consider Smt. Ajagalay for the post of substitute Sarpanch after following due procedure.
Key Legal Issues
- Scope of Contempt Jurisdiction: The primary issue was whether the Contempt Court exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing substantive directions for removal and reappointment of the substitute Sarpanch, rather than focusing on ensuring compliance with the original writ court order.
- Appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Another question was whether the directives issued by the Contempt Court could be appealed under Section 19 of the Act, which permits appeals only against orders imposing punishment for contempt.
Arguments by the Parties
For the Appellant (Smt. Laxmi Vaishnav):
- Represented by Advocate Sunil Sahu, the appellant argued that the Contempt Court’s directions amounted to issuing a fresh order outside the scope of contempt jurisdiction.
- It was contended that the Contempt Court, instead of assessing compliance with the prior writ order, effectively adjudicated the merits of the dispute, which is impermissible in contempt proceedings.
- The appellant relied on precedents, including Ajay Kumar Bhalla v. Prakash Kumar Dixit (2024) and Midnapore Peoples’ Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda (2006), to emphasize that contempt jurisdiction does not extend to issuing new directives.
For the Respondents (Smt. Amrika Bai Ajagalay):
- Represented by Advocate Jameel Akhtar Lohani, the respondent contended that the Contempt Court acted within its powers to ensure compliance with the writ order.
- The respondent emphasized that the appellant’s appointment was prima facie in violation of Section 39(3) of the Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, which requires substitute appointments to adhere to the same reservation criteria as the original position.
- It was argued that the appellant had alternative remedies and the appeal under Section 19 was not maintainable.
Court’s Observations and Decision
The Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court delivered a detailed judgment, addressing the limits of contempt jurisdiction and the maintainability of the appeal.
Scope of Contempt Jurisdiction
Justice Bibhu Datta Guru, delivering the judgment, clarified that contempt proceedings aim to ensure compliance with court orders, not to adjudicate disputes or issue fresh directives. Quoting the Supreme Court’s decision in Midnapore Peoples’ Cooperative Bank Ltd., the court observed:
“In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties.”
The court noted that the Contempt Court, instead of merely assessing compliance with the writ order, directed the removal of Smt. Vaishnav and initiated steps to appoint Smt. Ajagalay, effectively deciding the dispute. This, the Bench held, was beyond the scope of contempt jurisdiction.
Maintainability of Appeal
Addressing the maintainability of the appeal, the court relied on Ajay Kumar Bhalla v. Prakash Kumar Dixit, reiterating that appeals under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, are maintainable only against orders imposing punishment for contempt. Since the Contempt Court’s directives did not include any punitive order, the appeal was deemed not maintainable. The Bench added:
“The applicant herein may be an affected party to the direction issued by the Contempt Court, but she is not entitled to avail the remedy under Section 19 of the Act. Such orders are open to challenge in an intra-court appeal or under Article 136 of the Constitution.”
The court dismissed the appeal as non-maintainable but granted liberty to the appellant to explore alternative remedies, including filing an intra-court appeal.
