The Supreme Court of India has reiterated that a consensual relationship between two adults that does not culminate in marriage cannot be construed as a criminal offence. In a significant ruling, the Court quashed an FIR filed against Prashant, accused of rape under false promise of marriage and criminal intimidation, stating that the prosecution was “an abuse of legal process.”
The judgment, delivered by a bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, highlights the importance of distinguishing consensual relationships from criminal acts and emphasizes the need to prevent misuse of criminal laws in personal disputes.
Background of the Case
The case arose from an FIR (No. 272/2019) filed on September 29, 2019, at Police Station South Rohini, Delhi. The complainant accused the appellant, Prashant, of repeatedly sexually assaulting her under the pretext of marriage and threatening harm to her brother if she resisted. She alleged that Prashant had initiated the relationship in 2017, which continued until 2019, during which he repeatedly promised to marry her but later refused.
Following the registration of the FIR, a charge sheet was filed in November 2019, and the case was taken up by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Rohini. Prashant challenged the proceedings in the Delhi High Court, seeking quashing of the FIR under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The High Court dismissed his petition on October 16, 2023, prompting him to approach the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues
The Supreme Court examined two primary issues:
1. Whether the allegations in the FIR constituted offences under Sections 376(2)(n) (rape) and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
2. Whether the continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the legal process.
Supreme Court’s Observations
The bench extensively analyzed the allegations, evidence, and legal principles before arriving at its decision. Drawing on precedents like State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019), the Court noted the following:
1. Consent in Relationships:
– The Court emphasized that consent obtained under a false promise of marriage can constitute rape if the promise was made in bad faith or with no intention of fulfillment. However, in this case, there was no evidence that the relationship began with such a false assurance.
– “A mere failure of a relationship to culminate in marriage does not constitute rape,” the Court observed.
2. Delay in Filing the FIR:
– The complainant lodged the FIR nearly nine months after the alleged incidents, during which the relationship remained active. The Court found it inconceivable that she would continue meeting the appellant if the relationship was coercive or non-consensual.
3. Abuse of Legal Process:
– The judgment stated, “The continuation of prosecution in the present case would amount to a gross abuse of the process of law.”
– Both parties are now married to different individuals, and the Court concluded that the prosecution served no purpose except to harass the appellant.
4. Criminal Intimidation:
– The Court held that there was no evidence of threats or coercion to justify charges under Section 506 IPC.
The Verdict
Quashing FIR No. 272/2019 and the subsequent charge sheet, the Court concluded that the relationship between the appellant and the complainant was consensual. The judgment read: “What was a consensual relationship between two educated adults cannot be given the color of criminality merely because it did not result in marriage.”
The bench further stated, “The facts and circumstances of the case show no intent to deceive or exploit the complainant. Such cases highlight the need for a careful and nuanced interpretation of the law to avoid its misuse.”
Case Details
– Case Title: Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi
– Case Number: Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2793 of 2024
– Bench: Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
– Representation: Senior Counsel for the appellant and the Additional Solicitor General for the respondent-State.
